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FOREWORD 
In October 1950, the Landlord-Tenant Relations 
Subcommittee was assigned the task of preparing 
an outline for a study of leasing practices for con-
sideration as a regional research project to be 
sponsored by the North Central Land Tenure Re-
search Committee. The basic purpose was to de-
velop a set of principles to be applied in dealing 
with the questions and problems raised by land-
lords and tenants concerning content of leases and 
effective leasing arrangements. The proposal for 
a regional study grew out of a j oint meeting with 
the North Central Farm Management Extension 
Committee in April 1950 in which research needs 
in land tenure were discussed. Between October 
1950 and March 1951, the Subcommittee prepared 
a project proposal for a regional study to be con-
ducted by use of a mail questionnaire. In March 
1951, the North Central Land Tenure Research 
Committee authorized the Landlord-Tenant Rela-
tions Subcommittee to initiate the study in all 
states able to partiCipate. Seven states joined in 
the study, in cooperation with the Farm Founda-
tion and the then Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, United States Department of Agriculture. 
A sampling procedure was developed in collab-
oration with the Statistical Laboratory, Iowa 
State College, to obtain a random sample of names 
of persons operating one tract or more of farm 
land under a lease. Economic areas as defined by 
the Census of Agriculture were used as the unit 
for sampling and analysis. In two states, two or 
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more economic areas were combined, glvmg a 
total of 46 areas or combinations of areas, as 
shown in fig. 1. These 46 areas are called eco-
nomic areas in all following discussion. 
The source of names of renters was the records 
in the county offices of the then Production and 
Marketing Administration, United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Within each area used in the 
study, a sampling rate was calculated to give a 
total of 900 names distributed among and within 
counties in such manner that each lease in effect 
in 1951, whether for a whole farm or a tract of 
land, had equal chance of falling within the 
sample. The unit of observation was a lease, 
rather than a farm. A total of 900 names would 
furnish 300 usable schedules per area, assuming 
a one-third response to the mail questionnaire.* 
The 300 replies per area were judged to be suf-
ficient for reliable results, in view of the kinds of 
analyses intended and the types of inferences ex-
pected to be drawn from the data to be collected 
from respondents. 
The content of the questionnaire was deter-
mined by the Subcommittee through discussion, 
pretesting of the preliminary forms and attention 
to the kinds of analyses expected to be made. The 
questions were designed to obtain information 
about the farm operated, the renter, the landlord 
and the details of the lease covering one tract. In 
addition, five questions were included to obtain 
'The estimated one·third response was based upon experience with 
mailed questionnaire. in an earlier regional study. John F. Timmons 
and Raleigh Barlowe. Farm ownership in the midwest. Iowa Agr. Exp. 
St8. Res. Bul. 361. 1949. 
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Fig. 1. Economic areas included in the study of farm rental practices. 
OpInlOnS of tenants concerning leasing problems 
and changes needed to improve leases. The ques-
tionnaires were the same in all states, except for 
a few details on shares of crops, operating ex-
penses and ownership of machinery. In accord-
ance with requirements, the questionnaire was 
approved by the Bureau of the Budget. A copy 
of the questionnaire is included in the Appendix. 
Printing and mailing of questionnaires, obtain-
ing the sample, checking the returned question-
naires, editing and coding schedules, and the 
punching of cards for IBM analysis were the 
responsibility of each participating state, under 
uniform procedures approved by the Subcommit-
tee. All regional analysis and the preparation of 
a regional report were performed at Iowa State 
College by or under the direction of a full-time 
project leader in consultation with Subcommittee 
members. 
The Subcommittee met as needed when called 
by the chairman. Materials and problems of pro-
cedure to be discussed were developed by the proj-
ect leader and sent to members of the Subcom-
mittee well in advance of each meeting. 
The general plans for the study, including the 
design of the sample, the source of names of 
tenants, the rough framework of the question-
naire, the use of a mail questionnaire and use of 
IBM equipment, were completed by June "1951, 
through individual assignments and meetings of 
members of the Subcommittee. Virgil L. Hurl-
burt, the project leader assigned to the study by 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, began 
work July I, 1951. After that date, the details 
of procedure were his responsibility, subject to 
approval of the Subcommittee. 
The project was financed by the participating 
state agricultural experiment stations, the Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics and the Farm Founda-
tion. Each station was responsible for the costs 
of the work done within the state. In addition, 
each participating agency transferred funds or 
otherwise contributed substantially to the costs of 
the work done at the regional headquarters of the 
study. " 
Questionnaires were mailed to tenants during 
January and February 1952. An attempt was 
made to increase the rate of response by use of 
colored paper in the questionnaires, repeat mail-
ings, publicity in local papers, announcements on 
the radio, and prepared statements through reg-
ular channels to County Agricultural Extension 
Agents and county offices of the Production and 
Marketing Administration. 
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Data for Minnesota were used for pilot analysis 
in the regional study. Marvin Kottke, graduate 
student at the University of Minnesota, was re-
sponsible for the detail of work in that state. A 
plan was devised whereby the IBM tabulations 
for Minnesota were made at the Business Office 
at South Dakota State College. A number of pre-
liminary sorts and comparisons were made, thus 
laying the foundation for the regional work at 
Iowa State College. 
A detailed outline including hypotheses to be 
tested, proposed tests, and content and organiza-
tion of the regional report was prepared by the 
project leader and reviewed by members of the 
Subcommittee. This outline served as the basis 
for selection of cross-runs to be made, and a set 
of instructions for IBM wo"rk was prepared from 
it. Only the more important cross-runs could be 
completed because of budget limitations. 
A preliminary draft of the regional report was 
discussed at th.e Land Tenure Research Workshop 
sponsored by the North Central Land Tenure Re-
search Committee and held at Blackduck, Minne-
sota in August 1953. The study was examined 
critically by a group of 30 agricultural economists 
as to methods used, results obtained and conclu-
sions drawn from the evidence. A revised draft 
of the regional report was prepared by the project 
leader and distributed to members of the Subcom-
mittee in January 1954. After review by the Sub-
committee, a revised draft was prepared and 
presented to the North Central Land Tenure 
Research CommittEie in April 1954. 
Attention is directed to three characteristics of 
this regional research project. The first two are 
the subject matter and the methods of analysis. 
This study plows new ground in the application of 
economic analysis to practical problems. Other 
studies in the same direction and in greater detail, 
taking up where this one ends, hold promise of 
helping landlords and tenants solve some of the 
problems in leasing arrangements that they have 
long been unable to solve for themselves. The 
third characteristic is the cooperative nature of 
the project. Seven state agricultural experiment 
stations, the Farm Foundation and the United 
States Department of Agriculture pooled their 
efforts and resources. The results are tangible 
evidence that effective procedures can be devised 
to deal with social problems across wide geo-
graphic areas. 
JOHN F. TIMMONS, Chairman 
Landlord-Tenant Relations Subcommittee 
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GLOSSARY 
Farm firm: The decision-making unit in agri-
cultural production; a unit within which factors 
are combined and production decisions are made, 
whether the resources are owned by one resource 
owner or are split between a landlord and a renter. 
Resource: Any factor of input in the firm; a 
factor is a unit of resource. 
Renter: A tenant or a part-owner. For this 
study the types are: (1) full tenants, one land-
lord-rent all the land they operate from one land-
lord; (2) full tenants, two or more landlords-
rent two or more tracts from different landlords; 
(3) part-owners, one landlord-rent one tract and 
own some land; and (4) part-owners, two or more 
landlords-rent two or more tracts from different 
landlords and own some land. 
Tenant: The operator under a lease covering 
one tract or one farm. 
Landlord: An individual owning or controlling 
a tract of land operated by a renter. 
Lease, leasing arrangement or rental agree-
ment: A written or oral contract between a land-
lord and a renter concerning use of resources for 
a given period and a specified payment. 
Cash lease: A rental agreement in which the 
payment is a specified amount of money. 
Crop-share lease: A rental agreement in which 
the payment is a share of the crop or crops. 
Crop-share-cash lease: A rental agreement in 
which the payment is a share of the crop or crops 
and a specified amount of money. 
Livestock-share lease: A rental agreement in 
which the payment is a share of the income from 
livestock and crops, and livestock are the major 
source of income. 
Labor-share lease: A rental agreement in which 
the payment is a share of the crops or livestock 
income, and the tenant's contribution is primarily 
his own labor. 
Special or other lease: A rental agreement in 
which the payment cannot be classified clearly into 
one of the above types. 
Statistically Significant or significant difference: 
A difference of sufficient magnitude that it would 
occur less than once in twenty times in repeated 
sampling; the 5-percent level of significance is 
used for all tests in this study. 
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THE HIGHLIGHTS 
The economic functions of a lease provide a 
standard against which the terms of the contract 
may be evaluated. Strictly speaking, economic 
problems in leasing arise whenever terms of the 
lease, as such, encourage inefficient use of re-
sources or cause transfer of income from one to 
the other party in the agreement. 
• All farms must meet the same tests of eco-
nomic efficiency. 
• Four incentive conditions are needed in each 
lease to encourage efficient use of resources and 
to prevent transfers of income between resource 
owners. 
• Few leases contain all four of these incentive 
conditions. Consequently, there are one or more 
conditions in most leases to encourage resource 
owners to maximize the returns from the re-
sources they contribute rather than to try to 
maximize the returns on the combined resources 
in the farm firm. 
• Practices vary widely between economic 
areas on the sharing of costs and returns but tend 
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to follow rather uniform patterns within economic 
areas. 
• Few leases contain provisions for specific 
payment by the renter for housing facilities pro-
vided by the landlord. Thus, few leases make a 
clear-cut distinction between consumption and 
production expenditures within the farm firm. 
• Much more attention and careful economic 
analysis needs to be devoted to the difference 
between the fixed and variable resources provided 
by the parties to the agreement. 
• In any share lease, all variable expenses and 
income need to be shared in the same proportion 
as are the fixed resources furnished by the two 
parties if both parties are to benefit equally from 
their contributions to the agreement. 
• The similarity of terms from lease to lease 
and the lack of variation in leasing practices 
within economic areas suggests that much more 
attention needs to be devoted to the content of 
the individual agreement to fit the needs of the 
landlord, the renter and the property involved. 
Farm Rerltal Practices and Problems 
in the Midwest 
By VIRGIL L. HURLBURT! 
THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF 
RENTAL PRACTICES 
Leasing and ownership are alternative methods 
of obtaining the use of farm real estate. These 
two methods are not perfect substitutes for each 
other because of the subjective values attached to 
ownership including status, feeling of independ-
ence and greater certainty of tenure. This study 
recognizes farm tenancy as a method of obtaining 
the use of farm lands, buildings and equipment 
by operators who otherwise might not be able to 
do so and as a method by which farm owners 
obtain the services of operators. 
Selected phases of current leasing practices are 
analyzed to: (1) appraise their economic sig-
nificance; (2) indicate the nature of the economic 
problems involved in leasing; and (3) suggest 
some of the adjustments required to solve the 
problems of leasing. That landlords and renters 
need help in developing effective leasing arrange-
ments is attested to by the continuing number 
of requests for assistance or advice received each 
year by the state agricultural extension services, 
the colleges of agriculture and by the United 
States Department of Agriculture. 
Analysis of rental problems and practices re-
quires definition of the function of the farm firm, 
the function of a lease, and the nature of the 
basic problem in leasing arrangements. Under-
standing the meaning of these concepts is essen-
tial in the separation of lease-oriented problems 
from other economic problems of the farm as a 
firm. The analytical framework itself is made up 
of the principles of production organization applied 
to the particulars of leasing arrangements. 
The farm as an operating unit is the production 
unit in agriculture. The purpose or function that 
this unit serves in agriculture, as in any industry, 
is to provide a framework within which production 
decisions are made and executed. An operating 
unit may include resources in several ownerships 
and be composed of several decision-making units. 
In essence, a separate firm or decision-making unit 
exists whenever two different resource owners 
pool their resources in production. 
A leasing arrangement is an agreement within 
tprodudion Economics Research Branch, Agricultural Research Serv-
ice, USDA. 
the farm as an operating unit. Essentially, a 
lease is a contract between a landlord and a renter 
concerning use of resources for a given time period 
and for a specified payment. The lease may be 
either written or oral. It may cover all or only 
part of an ownership unit. The operator may own 
other land, may rent tracts of land from other 
landlords and operate them all as a unit or he 
may rent from only one landlord. The landlord 
may share in cash operating expenses, ownership 
of livestock or provide the use of machinery and 
equipment; or he may furnish only the land, with 
91' without buildings and improvements. 
The economic function of a lease is twofold: 
(1) to provide a basis for combining resources in 
production; and (2) to distribute income to re-
source owners within the firm. 
The lease takes as given the kinds and amounts 
of resources owned or controlled by the parties 
to the agreement. The fact that one individual 
may own a dozen farms, all of which he rents to 
as many different tenants, may influence the terms 
he is willing to offer or accept. Or, the fact that 
a renter owns or has access to enough machinery, 
livestock and operating capital to farm a unit 
twice as large as the average in the community 
may put him in a better position to bargain with 
a landlord. However, the lease is an operating 
agreement regardless of the amount of resources 
each party owns or controls. The agreement 
merely states the conditions of use and the manner 
and amount of payment to be received by both 
parties for the use of resources in the firm. 
The basic economic problem in the development 
and use of farm leases stems directly from the 
function to be performed by the lease. Namely, 
the problem is to determine the terms that are 
necessary in the lease to allow and encourage an 
efficient combination of resources and to distribute 
the income to the owners of the resources in ac-
cordance with the productivity of the resources. 
Numerous questions arise within any farm firm 
regarding resource valuation, level of output, com-
bination of enterprises and choice of alternatives 
in production regardless of who owns the various 
production resources. Strictly speaking, none of 
these questions is a leasing problem pm' se unless 
efficiency in use of resources or income distribution 
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within the firm is affected by terms or conditions 
of the lease. 2 
The function of the lease and the nature of the 
basic problem in leasing as defined above establish 
the frame of reference for analysis of rental prac-
tices. Any leasing practice may be analyzed in 
terms of its effect upon efficiency of resource use 
and upon distribution of income to resource owners 
within the farm firm. 
In economic analysis, efficiency of resource use 
is a function of quantity and price relations. Con-
sumer preferences are expressed in sets of prices 
in the market. Resources are used efficiently 
within the firm when profits are a maximum. 
Thus, leasing practices may be analyzed in terms 
of their effects upon the profits of the firm by 
specifying the conditions for any farm firm and 
those for tenant operated firms to maximize 
profits. 
Reduced to the simplest terms, the conditions 
required for any farm firm to maximize profits 
from given quantities of resources over a period of 
years are: 
1. Relation of factor to factor. An increment 
of one factor is substituted for an increment of 
another factor until the cost of the increment of 
the one is exactly equal to the cost of the incre-
ment of the factor it replaces in the production of 
a given output. This rate of substitution applies 
within one production period and between produc-
tion periods. 
2. Relation of product to product. An increment 
of one product is substituted for an increment of 
another product until the value of the increment 
obtained is exactly equal to the value of the incre-
ment replaced. This rate of sUbstitution applies 
to any two products in one production period and 
between two time periods. 
When these two conditions are satisfied, the 
final unit of each factor earns the same rate of 
return in each of its uses in the firm.3 
If profit is to be a maximum when the farm or 
tract is tenant operated, there can be no condition 
'Excluded from analysis in this study are the whole set of problems of 
renters finding farms, landlords finding tenants, finance, and scale of 
operation. These and other problems are associated with tenancy and 
must be dealt with in the larger framework of improving land tenure. 
However, the content of the lease and the nature of leasing practices, 
though influencing them and influenced by them, are not the main device 
Or method to solve the problems involved. Also, this study takes as given 
the rate of payment and the shares that are reported, and does not treat 
the problem of determining the cash rent per acre or the fractional share 
of expenses and returns. 
3This is the caSe of the multiple·product firm operating under competi· 
tion and uncertainty, with a given amount of resources. The only further 
requirement for the firm with unlimited capital is that the marginal 
rates of transformation of factor into product equals the ratio of their 
prices; namely, increment of factor divided by increment of product 
equals price of product divided by price of factor, and all ratios equal 1. 
These are a simplification of the three Hicksian conditions of equilib· 
rium. The illustrations used by Earl Heady for the tenant firm are an 
application of the Hicksian conditions. 
Obviously, the maximum profit combination for the given farm firm 
does not necessarily maximize income for the individual operator if there 
are greater income earning opportunities available to him outside the 
firm. Firms can maximize income from given quantities of resources 
without the industry being in equilibrium. In other words, simply be· 
~aUBe the majority of firms maximize income from given resources does 
not deny the possibility of greater total product by shifts between firms. 
However, the problem under discussion here is at the intra-firm level. 
although admittedly, faults in leasing arrangements can and do contrib· 
ute to economic inefficiency by retarding adjustments in allocation of 
resources between farms. 
See J. It. Hicks. Value and capital. 2nd ed. Chs. 6 and 19. Oxford 
at the Clarendon Press. 1946. 
See Earl O. Heady. Economics of agricultural production and resource 
use. Chs. 6 and 8. Prentice·Hali Inc., New York. 1952. 
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in the leasing arrangement that will change either 
product cost or factor return. Four incentive con-
ditions are required within the lease to encourage 
operation at a level that will maximize income 
from the combined resources of tenant and land-
lord. Otherwise there is incentive for either the 
landlord or the tenant to attempt to maximize 
returns from the resources he contributes, and the 
sum of the returns to each maximized separately 
is always less than the total when returns are 
maximized on the combined resources. If the farm 
is operated at the highest profit combination with-
out meeting these conditions, there is a transfer 
of income from one resource owner to the other. 
CONDITIONS NECESSARY WITHIN THE LEASING 
ARRANGEMENT TO ENCOURAGE OPERATION AT 
THE MAXIMUM PROFIT FROM THE COMBINED 
RESOURCES OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 
The four conditions are: 
Incentive condition 1. The share of the factor 
of variable input must be the same as the share 
of output of product obtained from it. 
Incentive condition 2. The shares of all products 
must be the same. 
Incentive condition 3. Each resource owner 
must receive the full share of the product earned 
by each unit of resource he contributes. 
Incentive condition 4. Each resource owner 
must have opportunity to receive return on invest-
ment made in one production period but not forth-
coming until a subsequent period. 
The four conditions provide a tangible basis for 
analysis of leasing practices in terms of the eco-
nomic functions of a lease. In the following 
section leases are examined to find whether the 
incentive conditions are present. The testing de-
vice is a comparison of shares, of contributions 
and returns and of associated characteristics of 
leasing arrangements. The comparisons do not 
prove whether resources are used efficiently on 
rented farms or whether there are income trans-
fers between resource owners under a given lease. 
Much more detailed analysis is needed to deter-
mine the degree of efficiency in resource utiliza-
tion. Also, it must be emphasized that the pres-
ence of all incentive conditions in a lease does not 
guarantee that resources will be used efficiently. 
Operators may not have the necessary informa-
tion or may not choose to react to the incentives. 
Absence of anyone of the conditions needed to 
encourage efficiency in use of resources on tenant 
operated farms or tracts can motivate decisions 
and actions concerning use of resources and cause 
departure from the highest profit combination for 
the combined resources of landlord and tenant. 
The conditions are multiple. Each of them must 
be present in each lease whether i the operator 
rents one or more tracts, is a part-owner or pays 
a cash or share rental. Cash leases automatically 
satisfy the first two conditions, but share leases 
mayor may not. For purposes of analysis, it is 
not necessary to know how many leases· depart 
from two or more incentive conditions. It is only 
necessary to know that one of the incentive condi-
tions is not present. 
SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE 
INCENTIVE CONDITIONS 
Efficient production measured by maximum 
profit for the firm is a social goal which may 
differ from the goal or purpose of the individual. 
If both the necessary conditions for income max-
imization and the incentive conditions are met, 
however, the societal goal and the individual goal 
are the same. With the income for the firm at a 
maximum, production of goods and services is a 
maximum and is in harmony with the preferences 
expressed by consumers through market prices." 
Also, with the income of the firm at maximum the 
incomes of both landlord and tenant are maximum. 
Thus, the total set of conditions necessary for the 
tenant operated firm to maximize profits provides 
a guide to both individual and social goals. 
One of the limitations of the incentive conditions 
for profit maximization is involved in the functions 
of the lease. If, through joint determination and 
mutual agreement of landlord and tenant, the firm 
is operated at the maximum profit combination, 
even though one or more of the incentive condi-
tions is absent, then the efficiency goal has already 
been attained. In particular cases, income transfer 
from one party to the other may be a primary 
and an intended purpose. An income transfer 
takes place within the firm if either party receives 
less than the full share of the product earned by 
the resource he contributes to the firm. For ex-
ample, if the return to land in a cash lease is 
calculated to be at the rate of $25.00 per acre and 
the tenant pays only $15.00 as cash rent, income 
from the land is transferred to the tenant. 
If an income transfer takes place but resources 
continue to be used efficiently and the parties to 
the agreement are aware of the transfer, society 
suffers no loss. Only the parties to the agreement 
are affected. If one wishes to give part of his 
income to the other, the choice is his own.~ 
Income transfers are an expected and rational 
event in leases among relatives. A father may pur-
posely pay all of the fertilizer costs, even though 
he receives only half the corn, to increase the 
income of his son. Likewise, a son or daughter 
taking over the home farm after the parents have 
retired may pay a cash rent above gross returns 
to land to provide support for the parents. Similar 
transfers might take place among nonrelatives. 
When the income transfer is not an intended 
purpose and it occurs as a result of the lease, the 
lease is at fault. One party or the other is receiv-
ing less than full return for the use of the re-
sources he contributes. 
'The fact that some factor prices are sticky and SOme product prices 
are administratively determined through legislated programs does not 
deny the argument. because in spite of these Imperfections in markets, 
prices are given to the firm at anyone time. However, administered 
prices may not be in line with consumer preference and total production 
may not result in a maximum contribution to total welfare. 
"This applies In the case of efficient operations. Obviously, if an in-
come transfer motivates continuity of non-economic units and retards 
inter-firm allocation of resources, society does lose. 
Purposes or goals other than income maximiza-
tion influence the use of resources in production. 
Preference for consumption expenditure in the 
present is an example. A family with teen-age 
children, when considering alternative uses of 
$2,000 profit from farming operations, may pur-
posely choose a new automobile rather than in-
vesting in contouring and terracing the farm. An 
individual may choose to go fishing on the day or 
two well suited to plowing corn-thus choosing 
leisure rather than income. In choosing other use 
of his time or other resources, the individual at-
tempts to maximize his satisfactions. The con-
scious choice of leisure as compared to a few more 
dollars of income by working more hours or the 
preference to raise only spotted Poland-China hogs 
when the income earning possibilities are greater 
by devoting capital to milking Holstein cows is a 
rational choice to him. He is using his resources 
to obtain the satisfactions he wants. Use of re-
sources by an individual has no effect upon prices 
of factors and of products. But if, through this 
type of preference by groups of individual produc-
ers, the supply of a given product is less than 
consumers are willing to take, price of the given 
good will increase, and thereby encourage a higher 
price for the factors which go into it. 
In all firms there are decisions to be made be-
. tween consumption expenditures and investments 
in production. Problems of firm-household rela-
tions are not peculiar to rented. farms and do not 
deny the efficiency concept as a test of the use 
of resources committed to production. In economic 
analysis, the sets of preferences are taken as given 
at anyone point of time and supposedly are re-
flected in market prices. 
Resources cannot be used efficiently if the quan-
tities available for combination are less than those 
required for an economic unit. Here again, the 
problems of economic organization as influenced 
by quantities of resources available are the same 
for the leased farm as for any other farm firm. 
This does not deny that the leasing of a tract of 
land may be the method by which a given Op-
erator increases the size of his business or that 
capital limitations affect resource use on tenant 
operated farms. Principles of economic analysis 
apply the same whether all resources are in one 
ownership or are split between two or more 
parties. Limited resources and the existence of 
non-economic units are not necessarily the fault 
of leasing as a method of operating. 
The major limitations of the necessary condi-
tions are methodological and technological. The 
problems of calculation are complex. Knowledge 
is lacking for a wide range of production functions. 
Some factors cannot be added in small increments. 
It takes a trained technician to calculate or esti-
mate marginal costs in a multiple product firm, 
and most farms are multiple product firms. These 
difficulties do not deny the efficacy of the frame-
work of analysis. Tenants and landlords will need 
the assistance of technicians in solving leasing 
problems the same as they need the assistance 
of soil specialists or animal husbandry technicians. 
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In addition to the above limitations for the set 
of incentive conditions as a whole, there are sev-
eral that apply to each by itself. The following 
discussion of the four incentive conditions at-
tempts to assess the more important limitations 
and indicate the significance of each as a meth-
odological tool in the analysis of leasing practices. 
The discussion of limitations and the following 
analyses are based upon three assumptions. First, 
plans are made and executed for given production 
periods, usually 1 year. Some of the resources 
are fixed for the given period. For example, the 
quantities of land and buildings are fixed and 
therefore their costs are fixed costs. Second, in 
the production planning process as well as in the 
production process, variable resources are added 
to fixed resources in such kinds and quantities as 
to equate the return on the final unit of the vari-
able in each of its uses. This means that the final 
units of labor used in production of corn, hogs, 
soybeans, wheat or milk result in the same value 
of product. Third, adjustments are made between 
production periods in the fixed resources so that 
in the long run all resources are variables. 
Distinction between fixed and variable resources 
is particularly important because management de-
cisions cannot be made effectively without that 
distinction. A fixed resource has a constant cost 
over a given time period and over a given range 
of output. The cost of a variable resource depends 
upon the level of output. Although the economic 
principles apply the same to tenant operated as 
to other farm firms, the distinction between fixed 
and variable factors and costs by landlord and 
tenant is itself a crucial decision in the develop-
ment of a leasing arrangement. Fixed costs may 
be divided between tenant and landlord to deter-
mine the rental share. Also, the labor of the 
tenant is a fixed cost for the production period in 
the sense that some portion of it must be used 
regardless of the level of production; but, the 
number of hours and quality of labor required 
depends upon the enterprises in the firm.G 
Incentive 1. Sharing of costs and returns. The 
share of the factor of variable input must be the 
same as the share of output of product from it. 
Difference between share of cost and share of 
return motivates operation at other than the high-
est profit combination or causes transfer of income 
from one resource owner to the other. Cash leases 
fulfill this condition because the tenant furnishes 
all the variables and receives the returns from 
them. A simple illustration may suffice to indicate 
why this condition is necessary in any share lease 
to motivate operation at the highest profit com-
bination, and why income is transferred between 
°This illustration is an example of Weintraub's statement that, "Some .. 
times a factor is technically fixed although the payment of its services 
is variable .... " Weintraub's discussion of factors of production and 
fixed and variable factora is apropos but is not sufficiently definitive. 
The problem of handling cost. of labor and of management is an ex· 
ampl. of the need for further theoretical analysis of leasing practices. 
Management can be treated as a fixed cost. with an evaluation placed 
upon that supplied by both landlord and tenant. If treated as a variable. 
the return from management goes to the resource owner and is shared 
between landlord and tenant in a share leaoe. Dossibly in " different 
proportion than that in which it is furnished. See Sidney Weintraub. 
Price thEory. p. 55 and Chapter 3. Pitman Publishing Corporation. New 
York. 1949. 
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resource owners if the shares differ and the firm 
is operating efficiently. 
Assume that commercial fertilizer is a necessary 
input for corn production and that a 50-50 sharing 
of the corn is the form of the rental payment. If 
the cost of fertilizer is also shared 50-50, both 
parties to the agreement will be interested in 
applying fertilizer until the final unit of applica-
tion just pays for itself in value of corn produced. 
Any difference between share of cost of fertilizer 
and share of value of corn changes the level at 
which application of fertilizer is most profitable. 
If the tenant pays all the costs of fertilizer, the 
most profitable application for him is to apply 
fertilizer until the cost of the final unit of input 
is equal to half the value of the additional corn 
produced by that input. This results in a different 
level of output than would be the case if the share 
of cost were the same as the share of return. 
Suppose further that the two parties agree 
to apply fertilizer at the most profitable combina-
tion, but the tenant (or the landlord) pays all the 
costs of fertilizer. The one who paid the costs 
of fertilizer would receive a return of less value 
than the cost of the final units of input, and the 
other party would receive an income from those 
inputs. 
There is only one case in which unequal shares 
of cost and return on a variable will not motivate 
change from the highest profit combination for 
combined resources of landlord and tenant or cause 
shift in income between resource owners. If the 
farm is operated at the highest profit combination, 
one variable cost can be matched or balanced 
against another in such manner that total variable 
costs and returns are shared in the same propor-
tions as are total fixed costs. 
Crop-share-cash leases in which the cash pay-
ment is a per acre rental for pasture or hay land 
pose special and particular problems in equating 
shares of costs and returns. In the case of hayland 
used in the crop rotation plan, it is not likely that 
all variable costs associated with hay production 
are paid by the tenant; yet, he receives all income 
from the hay produced. Also, in the case of per-
manent pasture, the tenant would need to pay all 
variable costs to match the 100 percent of variable 
return he receives in pasture. In practice, few 
crop-share-cash leases would meet the require-
ment that the share of variable cost be equal to 
the share of variable return, throughout the firm. 
The requirement that the share of variable cost 
be the same as the share of the return means 
that all variable costs must be shared in any share 
rental arrangement. In practice, some items of 
variable costs may be so small as to be of no effect. 
Also, a given technique such as the use of weed 
spraying may produce such high returns that it is 
used regardless of who pays the cost. These minor 
limitations do not deny the general applicability 
of the incentive condition. 
In this study, the test of incentive condition 1 
is made by comparing shares of selected items of 
costs and returns to find the frequency of equal 
sharing by economic areas. The number of de-
partures from equal shares of costs and returns 
indicate the number of leases in which there are 
economic motivation for operations at other than 
the highest profit combination for all resources. 
Incentive 2. Equal shares of all products. 
Cash leases automatically fulfill the condition be~ 
cause the rental is a fixed cost for all products. 
In share leases, any difference between shares of 
two products provides incentive to move away 
from the quantities of the two products that re~ 
suIt in the highest profit from the combined re-
sources of landlord and tenant. Difference between 
shares of products offers incentive for each re-
source owner to maximize the return from his own 
resources, even though the share of cost is equal 
to the share of return in each product. There are 
a number of cases in which this incentive condition 
does not apply and is not necessary to encourage 
operation at the highest profit combination. These 
limitations are discussed below after the illustra-
tion of why equal shares of products are a neces-
sary condition if decisions as to level of output are 
made by either the landlord or the tenant alone. 
The reason why all shares of product must be 
the same may be demonstrated by examples. In 
the simplest case, suppose that a farm is produc-
ing- two crops that are competitive and the per unit 
costs and product prices for these two are the 
same. The landlord or the tenant with opportunity 
to make the choice would have income incentive 
to produce all of the crop of which he received 
the larger share. If the shares were the same, 
however, that combination of the two at which 
the final unit returns were equal would be chosen, 
because that combination would provide the high-
est profit. Whether resources were limited or un-
limited, production of some quantity of each of the 
two crops would result in a higher income than if 
all resources were devoted to production of one. 
The more usual case is that of producing two or 
more crops with different unit costs, different 
yields and different prices with a given quantity 
of resources. But the incentive effect of differ-
ences in shares of the crops is exactly the same 
as that above. Because of the opportunity to 
obtain a higher income, the operator will want to 
shift resources into production of that crop which 
gives the highest income on the factors he con-
tributes. This will not necessarily be the one on 
which the lower share rental is paid because dif-
ferences in unit costs may more than compensate 
differences in shares, and some minimum acreage 
of a crop like clover may be essential in the rota-
tion to maintain the yield and income from corn. 
The inclination usually will be to shift more re-
sources into production of the crop with the lower 
rental share! 
~ the multiple product firm. the quantities of any two products to 
be produced for the highest profit combination are indicat<;d by equ.ating 
of ratios of marginal products and pro~uct prices. Profit IS a lI!axlmum 
when the ratio of marginal products Is Inversely equal t'? the rabo of the 
product prices. Under differential shares. the operator Inv<;rsely equate. 
the ratios of marginal products of his resources to the rabo of product 
prices at a level which Is different from that of the total resource.. In 
short 'differential shares, with decision by the tenant, changes the oppor-
tunity line for choice betweeen products al)d thereby chan!!"es the point 
at which the ratio of marginal products will equal the ratIO of product 
prices. The same situation will apply if decision i. made. by . the la",d-
lord; then the landlord will want to operate at that combinatIon whIch 
maximiz .. s profit on the resources he contributes. See Earl O. Heady, 
op. cit., Ch. 20. 
In the case of joint decisions and equal bargain-
ing powers of landlord and tenant, differential 
shares will have no effect if the share of cost 
equals the share of return in all products and 
decision is made to operate at the highest profit 
combination for the combined resources of land-
lord and tenant. In the case of joint decisions and 
unequal bargaining powers of the two parties, the 
effect of differential shares is indeterminate. The 
result may be either a change in resource alloca-
tion among products, a shift in income from one 
party to the other or both. 
Any analysis of differential shares must there-
fore take into account the question of who makes 
the decision as to the amounts of variable re-
sources and the quantities of the different prod-
ucts to be produced. 
If decision to operate at the optimum product 
quantities has already been made, obviously the 
objective of the incentive condition has already 
been achieved, and then only the income transfer 
is a debatable issue. Also, it follows that if shares 
of products are the same throughout the firm, the 
shares of costs are likewise equal when incentive 
condition 1 is met. Even though decisions are 
made jointly by landlord and tenant, the making 
of them might be easier and less debatable if in-
centive conditions 1 and 2 are both met.' 
Share leases are examined in the following sec~ 
tion by comparing shares of products. Again, as in 
the tests for equal shares of costs and returns, 
these comparisons show only whether the incen-
tive condition is present in the lease. The data 
are not in sufficient detail to determine whether 
the firm uses resources inefficiently or whether 
income is transferred from one party to the other. 
Incentive 3. Share of product earned by each 
resource. This incentive condition applies to fixed 
and variable resources of both parties, and to all 
leases. If the resource owner does not have oppor-
tunity to receive the full share of return from 
the resource contributed, he has incentive to move 
away from the highest profit combination. If, 
through joint decisions, the firm is operated at 
the highest profit combination and one or the 
other party receives less than his full share of 
the product earned, there is an income transfer. 
Although the logic is simple and the necessity for 
the incentive is obvious, in practice the problems 
are complex. The chief limitation of incentive 
condition 3 is the problem of calculation in the 
multiple product firm. 
The import of incentive condition 3 is that any 
living facilities on the rented farm need to be 
separated from the production facilities and a 
separate payment be specified for them. Other-
wise, the landlord has no method of making de~ 
cisions as to how much to invest in housing and 
the tenant cannot calculate how much he is pay-
"The case of complementary products does not complicate the problem 
of choice under differential shares, because even with decisions made by 
either party. it i. to the advantage of the decision maker to operate out-
side the complementary range. In the case of supplementary products, 
differential shares might encourage product substitution to the extent 
that the products became competiti ..... 
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ing for housing, which to him is a consumption 
good. 
Likewise, if the landlord is to receive the full 
return on his investments in fixed improvements 
used in production under any type of lease, he 
needs to receive a direct and specific payment for 
such items as barns, sheds and fences either in 
a cash payment or in a share of the return from 
the factor. The requirement is the same for fixed 
resources supplied by the renter. 
Only partial tests can be made in this study to 
determine whether incentive condition 3 is pres-
ent in leases. The data are not in sufficient detail 
to test whether owners of fixed resources receive 
the full return from them. The main test is a com-
parison of shares of costs with shares of returns 
on selected variables, because the condition cannot 
be fulfilled unless the resource owner receives the 
same share of return as he pays in costs of vari-
ables.o 
Incentive 4. Opportunity to receive return on 
investment. This incentive condition applies to 
both fixed and variable resources used in produc-
tion, and applies likewise to investments made by 
the landlord in housing facilities. In brief, it 
means that the terms of the lease cannot increase 
the uncertainty of the firm, be the cause of shift 
in use of resources between time periods or change 
the selection of products within a production pe-
riod. 
Tenant and other farms encounter the same set 
of risks and uncertainties as business organiza-
tions. Future prices and yields are unknown. 
Floods, grasshopper infestations, hail, windstorms 
and similar risks pay not the least attention to 
the incidence of land ownership. 
A lease is for a given time period. It may con-
tain no provisions for renewal, no compensations 
for the value of unexhausted improvements at the 
time of termination and no specific agreement as 
to form and length of termination notice. These 
and similar characteristics are forms of uncer-
tainty peculiar to leasing. If the tenant has no 
assurance that his l-year lease will be renewed, 
the tendency will be to choose products that can 
be finished within the lease period. This might 
mean, for example, the choice of a hog enterprise 
rather than a dairy enterprise that under a longer 
and certain tenure would be more profitable. Thus, 
uncertainties within the lease may result in less 
than the maximum income that would be possible 
without them. 
Uncertainty and the lack of technical knowledge 
are two different phenomena. The difference be-
tween them sometimes confuses the analysis of 
leasing practices. An individual operator may 
have no knowledge of yield response to fertilizer, 
the effects of spraying, the income effects of rota-
tion grazing or any similar technology; this lack 
of knowledge cannot be classified as an uncer-
tainty. Nor should uncertainty be confused with 
lack of opportunity, lack of capital resources or 
the strength of the bargaining position of either 
"This condition requires that the resource owner receive the marginal 
\'alue product of the resources he contributes. 
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the landlord or the tenant. A tenant may take 
a farm which is smaller than one his machinery 
and equipment could handle, and take it on a 
l-year lease with no promise of renewal, because 
that is the best opportunity available to him. The 
only characteristic of such situation that can 
properly be classed as an uncertainty in leasing 
is the lack of provision for renewal of the lease. 
Particular practices and characteristics of leas-
ing arrangements are examined in the following 
pages. The method of analysis is a comparison of 
selected characteristics to see how they would 
likely affect the outlook or actions of the operator 
in the use of resources. 
OTHER ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
LEASING PRACTICES 
Numerous other characteristics of leases, of 
landlords and of renters influence both resource 
use and distribution of income within the firm. 
Also, leasing practices affect the allocation of re-
sources among firms. For example, the fact of 
an income transfer from landlord to tenant may 
be sufficient reason in itself to encourage opera-
tion of a farm by a tenant whereas he would 
otherwise seek another and larger farm or seek 
non-agricultural employment. Content of the in-
dividual agreement depends upon what the parties 
are able to do-because of the amount and kinds 
of resources at their command-as well as upon 
what they want to do. The type of landlord, such 
as the governmental agency that controls a sig-
nificant portion of the land in an area, may in-
fluence the form and content of leases offered by 
other landowners in that area. 
Need for the various types of leases, such as 
cash, crop-share, crop-share-cash, livestock-share, 
labor-share and special, arises because of differ-
ences among renters and among landlords as to 
what and how much they are willing and able to 
contribute to the firm. The cash lease and the 
labor-share are opposites with each adapted to 
given sets of characteristics of the tenant and 
landlord. A renter with sufficient capital resources 
in the form of machinery, equipment, livestock 
and operating funds-one willing and able to as-
sume the full risks of the firm-finds the cash 
lease best suited to his purposes. A renter with 
only the value of his labor to contribute may find 
that a labor-share lease offers the best oppor-
tunity. 
The effects of characteristics of leasing prac-
tices are many and diverse. Awareness of the 
nature, extent and distribution of them has par-
ticular' significance to programs for improvement 
of leasing arrangements. The usual channels of 
information in adult education may not reach the 
parties concerned, particularly nonresident and 
nonfarm landlords. ' 
Comparisons and counts of frequencies of asso-
ciations ,or relations between type of lease and 
characteristics of landlords and of renters may 
thus indicate need for changes in types of leases. 
Likewise, comparing selected characteristics of 
landlords or of renters with other characteristics 
or with selected practices should disclose both the 
need for and the kinds of changes to make leasing 
practices more effective in accomplishing their 
purposes. 
Data for each of the items or characteristics 
such as type of lease, age of renter or type of 
landlord were calculated as percentage distribu-
tions within economic areas. In each instance, the 
given item or category was calculated as a percent 
of the total number of respondents replying to 
the two questions. The cases of non-applicable 
and no response were excluded. For example, in 
the comparison of type of lease and length of 
lease, the leases were sorted into types and then 
each type was sorted by length of lease; the per-
cent of leases of each length was then calculated 
for each lease type using the number of cases 
replying to both items. Tests of statistical sig-
nificance were then made on the differences be-
tween proportions within areas. No tests were 
made between areas. 
Significance of differences between proportions 
depends upon and varies with the size of the 
samples involved. Because of the volume of cal-
culations to be made in these tests, a set of pre-
pared tables showing significance of differences 
was used. The difference between the two propor-
tions being tested was checked against the dif-
ference required for significance at the 5-percent 
level for the given sizes of samples.10 
ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE CONDITIONS 
IN LEASES 
Economic areas are the geographic units used 
in this study. Data are presented for selected 
areas to illustrate the findings and demonstrate 
the content of leasing practicesY The results 
apply only within areas. No inference can be 
drawn from the findings in anyone area about 
the situation for a whole state because there are 
variations between areas. Data for economic 
areas must be weighted to obtain state totals or 
averages. Likewise, no summaries have been pre-
pared for broad regional totals or averages be-
cause of the weighting problems involved, and be-
cause such averages would cover up some of the 
wide variations from area to area throughout the 
Midwest on many characteristics of leasing prac-
tices. 
SHARE OF COST AND SHARE OF RETURN 
Under a cash lease, the rental is a fixed cost to 
the tenant and a fixed return to the landlord. The 
landlord's income is the same regardless of the 
level of operation, and his interest in the intensity 
of operation would be that of insuring that the 
land is not depleted by the tenant. Cash leases 
meet this condition in that the tenant applies all 
the variables and receives all the return from 
them. 
IOVernon Davies. Table showing significance of differences between 
percentages. Wash. Agr. Exp. Sta. Circular 102. September 1950. 
llnata for all 46 economic areas are included in supplementary tables. 
prepared In multilith form for limited distribution and available at the 
state agricultural experiment station. participating in the study: In-
diana, Iowa. Kansas, Minnesota. Nebraska. South Dakota and Wisconsin. 
Under any form of share rental, the fractional 
share of the product paid to the landlord is a 
variable cost to the tenant, because the amount 
of rental varies with the level of production. The 
fractional share retained by' the tenant is his 
return from the variable inputs he furnishes. 
Thus, share of cost may be compared with share 
of return for a given factor by comparing the 
share of the cost of the factor with the share of 
the product. In the following examples, this is 
done by counting the number of share leases in 
which the shares are the same. 
No test of statistical significance of variation 
within areas is needed. The incentive condition 
is either present in or absent from the lease. Al-
though the amount of difference between share 
of cost and share of return would influence the 
incidence of the incentive, any departure from 
equal shares is taken as a departure from the 
necessary condition. 
SHARES IN LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASES 
With few exceptions, the number of cases of 
equal shares exceeds the number of cases of un-
equal shares of livestock owned compared to live-
stock or product sold in each economic area (table 
1). Differing shares appear to be the exception 
rather than the rule; few areas have less than 
60 percent of leases reporting the same share for 
the given type of livestock owned. . 
On those farms with a constant number of dairy 
cows for the year, share of cows owned actually 
would be a fixed cost, and in those cases this type 
of comparison would not apply as a test of equality 
of share of variable cost and return. The case 
would be the same for farms with a cow-calf, 
beef enterprise; the breeding cows would be a 
fixed cost. Feeder cattle and feeder hogs would be 
a variable cost on most farms. If livestock owned 
are a fixed cost, and the two parties to the lease 
share all income and variable costs in the same 
proportion that they furnish total value of fixed 
resources, obviously the share of livestock owned 
can differ from the share of livestock or product 
sold. The difference would not be an incentive for 
either party to change the level of output because 
livestock as a fixed cost can be balanced against 
some other fixed cost. 
The percentages of leases with the same shares 
in table 1 are no indication of the frequency of 
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASES AND PER-
CENT WITH SAME SHARE OF LIVESTOCK OWNED 
AS OF PRODUCT SOLD. 
Dairy cattle and neef cattle and Hogs owned and 
products sold beef sold hogs sold 
------------------State and No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
areat caseS same cases same cases sam. 
---------------Ind.2b ......... 63 81 82 100 130 100 
Iowa 4 .......... 89 91 51 96 105 96 
KaD. 6 .......... 31 71 42 98 38 97 
Minn.6 ......... 84 79 19 89 80 98 
Neb. 4 .......... 14 57 23 70 17 94 
S. D.l .......... 4 50 23 78 14 78 
Wis. 3 .......... 242 86 49 88 241 92 
tArea with largest number of livestock-share leases in each state. 
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equal shares of variable costs and returns in 
livestock-share leases, because there is no evidence 
whether the livestock owned are a fixed or a 
variable cost in the individual lease. However, 
the comparison of variable costs and returns in 
livestock enterprises is one that can be made by 
the landlord and tenant in making an agreement. 
Difference between share of cost and share of 
return might be the determining criterion in 
deciding whether to sell grain or feed it to live-
stock. 
Difference in shares can be used purposely as 
a method of achieving an income transfer. For 
example, a son renting from a widowed mother 
might own all the dairy cattle but share the milk 
check with his mother as a means of supporting 
her. A father might own a larger share of the 
livestock as a method of helping to finance the 
farming operations of his son. Also, in terms of 
harmonious relations between the parties, the 
landlord might purposely provide the tenant's 
family with milk, meat or eggs for family con-
sumption while maintaining equality of share of 
ownership and share of product sold. Such per-
quisites might have no effect upon the choice of 
enterprises or the combination of factors in the 
firm, but would stimulate a willingness and satis-
faction in day-to-day associations. 
In practical application under share rentals, the 
effect of a difference between share of variable 
cost and share of returns upon use of resources 
may be nominal or unimportant. Shares of breed-
ing fees and of veterinary expenses are examples 
(table 2). Although these expenses are variable 
in the sense that the totals depend upon the num-
ber of animals or frequency of treatment, they 
are not costs that cause the operator to change 
the amount of production. Breeding fees will be 
paid whether the landlord or the tenant pays 
them, or whether the costs are shared in one or 
another proportion. There is no effect upon the 
volume of production if $100 of breeding fees 
paid by the landlord are matched by $100 of vet-
·erinary expense paid by the tenant. But there 
may not be an opportunity for specific matching 
of expense items so that the matching produces 
the same result as would a sharing of both. Fur-
thermore, if one party pays all the veterinary 
expenses, he might be more hesitant in deciding 
that there is sufficient need for the services of a 
veterinary to examine a sick cow. 
The percent of livestock-share leases with the 
same share of cost as of return on selected items 
varies from area to area. In Wisconsin area 3, 
in' which livestock-share leases are numerous, 
nearly all leases have equal sharing on all the 
selected items compared. In other areas, partic-
ularly if there are few livestock-share leases, un-
equal shares are more frequent than equal shares, 
as in Nebraska area 4 and South Dakota area 1. 
As a general practice, the major items of variable 
expenses and returns are shared the same in live-
stock-share leases. 
SHARES IN CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES 
The frequency of unequal sharing of costs and 
returns in crop-share and crop-share-cash leases 
suggests that two or more methods are being 
used in determining the shares. One is a strong 
reliance upon customary practice, with the tenant 
paying all variable expenses commonly accepted 
as a tenant's responsibility; costs of picking corn 
are seldom shared. Another is to reduce the share 
of the return going to the landlord if the tenant 
pays all or a larger share of the variable expenses; 
the modal share of crop is one-third or one-fourth 
in western South Dakota, and sharing of variable 
expenses is infrequent (tables 3a-3c). 
Practice varies widely among economic areas on 
sharing of a given expense, and there is wide 
variation as to sharing of different expenses with-
in an area (tables 3a-3c). Fertilizer is more fre-
quently shared in the same proportion as the 
crop than is seed or harvesting expenses. 
The continuing difficulty of making adjustment 
in leasing practice to allow for changes that take 
place in technology is shown by the variations in 
sharing of expenses of crop production within 
areas. The differences in practices of sharing 
costs of fertilizer, seed, spraying and corn picking 
illustrate the problem of adjustment (table 3a). 
Each of these expenses is a variable cost and each 
affects the level of production and the combination 
of factors in production. 
The cost of fertilizer tends to be shared in the 
same proportion as the return on corn in the 
economic areas in which fertilizer is regularly 
used on corn. In these same areas, corn picking 
is usually paid by the tenant or is shared in a 
different proportion than is the corn. Apparently 
the differences in practice for these two expense 
'l'ABLE 2. NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASES AND PERCENT WITH SAME SHARE OF SELECTED SALES AS OF 
SELECTED EXPENSE. 
Dairy prodUcts sold Hog •• old Beer calves sold 
Feed bought I Breeding rees ------Vet. expo Feed bought Breeding re .. Vet. expo Feed bought Vet. expo 
~ Percent I-~i Percent -------------;';:-1 Pereent --------No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
State and area t cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same eases same cases same eases same 
---------------------------------
Ind. 2b ..................... 66 62 52 71 66 62 130 97 98 89 129 97 75 93 75 93 
Iowa 4 ..................... 86 98 72 99 86 98 101 99 80 98 101 99 45 93 45 93 
Kan. 6 ..................... 33 64 21 48 33 61 36 94 23 83 36 83 37 92 37 81 
Minn. 6 .................... 83 95 68 90 83 89 79 99 65 91 79 95 19 100 19 100 
Neb. 4 ..................... 12 25 7 0 13 23 18 83 11 73 19 74 18 89 18 78 
S. D. I. .................... 5 0 4 0 3 0 13 77 13 62 11 73 18 67 15 60 
Wi •. 3 ...................... 249 97 220 95 248 94 250 98 224 92 250 94 44 89 43 93 
tArea with largest number of livestock-share leases in each state. 
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TABLE SA. NUMBER OF CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES AND PERCENT WITH SAME SHARE OF CORN 
AS OF SELECTED EXPENSE. 
_~~i~e_r_I __ SeC_d __ 1 Spray material I Corn picking 
State and No. Percent I No. I Percent I No. Percent No. Percent 
areat cases same cases same cases same caseS same 
----------------------------
Ind. 2b .... 125 97 123 90 67 49 121 6 
Iowa 2b .... 200 88 243 88 199 40 210 2 
Kan. 3b .... 114 68 115 6 56 30 71 3 
Minn. 1-4 .. 46 50 57 42 38 34 50 56 
Neb. 4 ..... 107 45 212 3 128 8 196 2 
S. D. 2b ... 29 10 81 11 55 16 78 15 
tArea with largest number of leases of both types in each state. 
Wisconsin excluded because of smaU number of leases. 
TABLE 3B. NUMBER OF CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES AND PERCENT WITH SAME SHARE OF OATS 
AS OF SELECTED EXPENSE 
Fertilizer Small grain seed Lime I Combining 
------------.------
State and No. Percent No. Percent !'{o. Percent No. Percent 
.reat cases same cases same cases same cases same 
--------------------
Ind. 2b .... 75 89 73 75 66 29 74 53 
Iowa 2b .... 192 48 202 30 115 35 205 14 
Kan. 3b .... 96 83 93 8 30 50 88 3 
Minn. 1-4 .. 90 48 121 6 15 20 109 49 
Neb. 4 ..... 56 57 81 2 30 13 90 1 
S. D. 2b ... 26 19 83 1 I 10 0 78 22 
t Area with largest number of leases of both types in each state. 
Wisconsin excluded because of small number of leases. 
TABLE 3C. NUMBER OF CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES AND PERCENT WITH SAME SHARE OF WHEAT 
AS OF SELECTED EXPENSE 
Fertilizer I Small grain seed Combining nail Insurance 
--,-----------------
State and No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
areat caseS same cases same cases same cases same 
-----
---~--------
Ind. 2b .... 78 97 76 86 78 58 17 82 
Iowa 2b .... 3 67 3 67 4 25 2 100 
Kan. 3b .... 157 80 141 5 138 4 100 70 
Minn. 1-4 .. 77 52 87 H 87 47 49 57 
Neb. 4 ..... 104 50 185 2 199 1 150 41 
S. D. 2b ... 34 15 115 3 112 28 59 31 
t Area with largest number of leases of both types in each state. 
Wisconsin excluded because of small number of leases. 
items are the result of using custom rather than 
careful analysis of the problem as the guide in 
making agreements. 
Corn picking has historically been a cost paid 
by the tenant. Before the introduction of me-
chanical equipment, this was mainly a labor cost. 
Under the crop-share lease, labor of the tenant 
was one of the inputs to match the annual use-
value of land and buildings provided by the land-
lord. When the cornpicker came into use the cost 
of picking continued to be the tenant's responsi-
bility. The capital investment in mechanical 
equipment was looked upon as merely a substitu-
tion of machinery for hand labor, and the addi-
tional machinery supplied by the tenant may not 
have been evaluated specifically in the process of 
equalizing the contributions of fixed resources by 
landlord and tenant. 
In contrast, application of commercial fertilizer 
came about as an addition to the expenses of pro-
duction. There was no substitution of capital for 
labor as in the case of the mechanical picker. 
There was no historical experience to guide the 
making of agreements on cost of fertilizer. Con-
sequently, when fertilizer application became a 
necessary practice, the general tendency was to 
share the expense. Both parties to the agreement 
realized that benefit would accrue to both if fer-
tilizer were used. 
A specific example from the experience of re-
cent years will illustrate the fact that not solving 
one problem satisfactorily and completely at the 
time it arises often causes further and more com-
plicated problems later. Use of mechanical pickers 
on the higher than average corn yields in years 
of heavy damage from corn borers and wind re-
sulted in more than the usual amount of corn 
being left on the ground after picking. Suppose 
that in a specific case the amount of corn left in 
the field was estimated as 10 bushels per acre. 
The leasing agreement called for a 50-50 sharing 
of the corn with the tenant paying all picking 
costs. Only by additional hand labor could be corn 
on the ground be saved. The tenant realized that 
for every dollar of labor he spent in harvesting 
corn on the ground he received only half the value 
of corn. The landlord insisted on receiving his 
full 50 percent share of total yield. 
This problem was further aggravated by the 
fact that on those farms on which the tenant 
paid all costs of corn picking or paid a larger per-
cent of picking than his share of the crop he 
usually paid all expenses of spraying for corn 
borer. Spraying for borer would have increased 
the yield and decreased the amount of corn on the 
ground, but with all spraying paid by the tenant 
there was tendency for some to ,.refuse to spray. 
The lack of sharing of one expense contributed 
to corn loss and increased the number of instances 
of disagreement between landlord and tenant on 
what to do about corn on the ground. These dis-
putes would not have arisen had both spraying 
and picking expenses been shared in the same pro-
portion as was the corn crop. Thus, even though 
a given item of expense may appear to be of little 
importance as to the method of handling it, the 
nature of problems arising from it cannot always 
be seen in advance. 
Sharing of all variable costs would require more 
careful bookkeeping and might also lead to more 
joint decisions. These changes in prospect might 
be unacceptable and looked upon as interfering 
with freedom of action. Viewed in terms of the 
function of the lease, the advantages of sharing 
variable expenses might be seen to outweigh any 
disadvantages involved-when the parties under-
stand the problem. 
EQUAL SHARES OF ALL PRODUCTS 
The requirement that the shares of all products 
be the same applies to all types of leases. Cash 
leases fulfill this incentive condition because the 
share is the same for all products. Any form of 
share rental may fulfill the condition depending 
upon the details of the lease. 
Equal shares of products do not imply that the 
landlord must share in livestock enterprises under 
any share lease. The requirement can be met in 
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the crop-share or the crop-share-cash lease for the 
farm with livestock as a major source of income 
by equal shares of the crops produced. In effect, 
the tenant's livestock enterprise is separate and 
apart from the crop enterprises in which he and 
the landlord combine resources. If the cash pay-
ment in a crop-share-cash lease is for use of crop, 
hay or pasture land, however, the incentive condi-
tion is not fulfilled.12 
As with incentive condition number 1, departure 
from equal shares of products results in an income 
transfer from one to the other party or encourages 
shift in use of resources. The data are not in 
sufficient detail to ascertain which of these hap· 
pens on the individual farm, and none but the 
parties concerned can judge if income transfer 
is an intended purpose. 
SHARES OF LIVESTOCK SOLD IN LIVESTOCK·SHARE 
LEASES 
Comparison is made upon the basis of number 
of cases in which both of the given types of live· 
stock are reported. The farm with dairy cattle 
but no beef, or with beef but no dairy, drops out 
of the comparison of shares of these two enter-
prises. The main comparison is within economic 
areas, in one table at a time. IS 
The majority of livestock-share leases provide 
for the same shares for sales of different types 
of livestock in major livestock enterprises. If beef 
and hogs or dairy and hogs are produced, the 
shares of sales tend to be the same (tables 4a-4b). 
Some of the cases of differing shares of sale 
of one type of livestock compared with another 
are instances in which one party owns all the 
Hvestock in a minor enterprise. In general, these 
minor enterprises are not of sufficient size to cause 
a shift in the kinds and amounts of production 
on the farm or to cause a shift in the use of cap-
ital. Instead, they are contributions to family 
living which may do far more to promote good 
will and satisfaction with the lease than their 
denial would accomplish in preventing small trans· 
fers of income. Yet, if allowed to go too far, the 
amount of income transferred could become siz-
able. A large flock of hens fed out of the un-
divided crops, for example, could take a load or 
more of the corn or wheat actually belonging to 
the other party.14 
If two or more types of livestock are major 
12This case is discussed in more detail under Incentive condition 3. 
because crop·share and crop·share-cash leases on farms with livestock 
as a major source of income have a problem in working out the ar-
rangement so that each resource owner will receive the full share of 
the return that his resources eam in the farm firm. 
"Comparison of shares within areas between tables has limited 
meaning here because the individual cases reporting may not be the 
same ones In each table'. That is, the case reporting dairy and beef 
cattle, dairy cattle and hogs, dairy and poultry, hogs and beef, and 
beef and sheep, may not be the same farm. Multiple cross comparisons 
were not made because of the small number of cases that would fall 
into sub-sorts, but more important so far as the test is concerned, the 
principle is illustrated by comparing only two types at a time. The 
amount of the share is Unimportant In testing whe'ther the shares of 
enterprises are the same or different. 
UNo particular problem need arise in the ownership of hens, cows, 
or pigs for home consumption, because a limit on numbers can be 
agreed upon in the lease or the tenant can pay nil of the costs in. 
valved. Data supplied by respondents were not In sufficient detail to 
describe the particulars of the arrangements under which the tenant 
or the landlord owned all of one type of stock under a Iivestock·share 
lease. 
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TABLE <lA. NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASES AND PER-
CENT WITH SAME SHARE OF DAIRY PRODUCTS SOLD 
AS OF OTHER PRODUCTS OR LIVESTOCK SOLD. 
Beef sold I Hogs sold Poultry sold I Eggs sold 
State and ~- Percent I~ Percent ~ Percent I~' Percent 
areat cases same ca.ses same cast"s same cases sawe 
--------------------
Ind. 2b .... 40 48 62 66 49 53 49 59 
Iowa 4 ..... 35 91 88 97 72 71 72 69 
Kan.L ... 17 35 19 37 20 45 20 50 
Minn. 6, ... 15 93 75 96 75 37 76 42 
Neb,4.. ... n 27 11 91 6 80 5 80 
S. D. 1. ... 5 20 5 20 5 60 5 80 
Wis. 3 ..... 44 82 235 91!. 210 39 212 41 
tArea WIth largest number of livestock-share leases In each state. 
TABLE <lB. NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASES AND PER-
CENT WITH SAME SHARE OF HOGS SOLD AS OF 
OTHER LIVESTOCK SOLD 
Beef sold Sheep sold Poultry eold 
------
---------
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
State and areat cases ssme cases same cases same 
---
---
Ind. 2b .......... 77 92 19 95 78 32 
Iowa4, ..... , ... 51 96 16 88 80 69 
Kan. 5., ........ 22 73 6 50 25 48 
Minn. 6 ......... 17 88 16 94 69 40 
Neb. 4, ... , ..... 16 88 3 34 6 0 
S. D.I .......... 14 79 4 75 G 17 
Wis. 3 .......... 51 88 37 92 207 40 
tArea with largest number of livestock-share leases In each state. 
sources of income and the shares of sales differ, 
then the task of figuring out arrangements for 
sharing of variable expenses is indeed complicated. 
Especially in the case of joint costs, such as that 
of pasture for a dairy herd and a beef herd, dif-
ferences in shares call for compensating adjust-
ments which in general are complicated and cum-
bersome in operation. Equal shares throughout 
all enterprises provide a general rule for solving 
problems of sharing two products. The problem 
of determining whether the share of both should 
be one-half or some other amount can be solved 
only by careful calculation in the individual case. 
SHARES OF CROPS IN CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-
CASH LEASES 
The frequency of differing shares in crop-share 
and crop-share-cash leases suggests that differing 
shares is a compensating adjustment to deal with 
particular problems in share leases. One example 
is the common difference between share of corn 
and share of oats. The explanation is often offered 
that a lower share is paid on oats than on corn 
to adjust for the differences in expenses of the 
two crops and differences between expenses paid 
by each party on each of the crops. The cost of 
seed is more frequently shared for corn than for 
oats (tables 3a and 3b). Thus, differential shares 
may result from differences in sharing of variable 
expenses or because some variable expenses are 
not usually shared. 
The necessity that shares be the same on all 
crops to encourage efficient use of resources is 
apparently more widely recognized in some eco-
nomic areas than in others judging by the propor-
tions of the same and of differing, shares reported 
from area to area (table 5). But, as in the com· 
TABLE 6. NUMBER OF CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES AND PERCENT WITH SAME SHARES 
OF SELECTED CROPS. 
Corn and Oats and 
State and Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
areat No. cent No. cent No. cent No. cent No. cent 
e .... sam. eases same e .... sam. e .... same cases same 
------------------
Ind. 2b ....•.. 8 100 77 97 73 90 7 100 7 100 
Iowa 2b ...... 239 57 208 82 4 100 194 74 4 100 
Kan.Sb .••... 127 87 3 67 186 84 6 83 159 97 
Minn. 1-4 ..... 66 48 12 75 39 41 13 85 93 97 
Neb.4 ....... 113 92 6 17 243 94 6 33 106 98 
S. D. 4a ...... 142 79 19 63 73 74 20 96 78 100 
Wi •. 5 ........ 34 85 2 50 9 89 1 100 6 100 
t Area with largest number of leases of both types. 
parisons of livestock shares, differences in propor-
tions among areas are less important than are 
differences within the lease. The comparisons in 
table 5 indicate that there are income transfers 
or incentive for inefficient use of resources in one-
third or more of the crop-share and crop-share-
cash leases in several economic areas. 
SHARE OF PRODUCT EARNED BY 
EACH UNIT OF RESOURCE 
Actual determination of whether the resource 
owner receives a return on a final unit of input 
equal to the cost of the input is difficult. Deter-
mination can be made only by careful calculation, 
allocating the returns to each factor used in the 
firm. Yet, in practice, farm operators are aware 
that too much fertilizer does not pay; that cultiva-
tion of c,orn beyond some number of times to con-
trol weeds gives no additional yield; that more 
money invested in brood sows will give a higher 
return than will more money invested in feeder 
cattle. In other words, farm operators apply mar-
ginal analysis. 
Only partial tests can be made in this study 
to determine whether there is opportunity under 
the lease to receive the full share of the product 
earned by the resource contributed. Specifically, 
the resource owner must receive the same share 
of the product as he pays in share of the cost of 
the variable factor. Namely, incentive condition 
1 must be met. 
Even if incentive condition 1 is met, however, 
incentive condition 3 is not automatically met. 
But condition 3 cannot be met unless condition 
1 is met. Additional information is needed to test 
whether condition 3 is met when number 1 is 
fulfilled. 
If the annual use value of the fixed resources 
supplied by the landlord is equal to the annual 
use value of those supplied by the tenant, then 
the two parties can share 50-50 in all variable 
expenses and in. all income. This arrangement 
meets the requirement of both incentive condi-
tions 1 and 3. Likewise, any other proportion 
between fixed resources supplied by the two 
parties will serve. If the value of the fixed re-
sources supplied by the landlord is twice that of 
the tenant, then a %-% sharing of variables and 
income will meet both incentive conditions.1G 
The comparisons of costs and returns indicate 
that shares of variable costs differ from shares 
of returns in some leases in all economic areas 
(tables 2 and 3). Resource owners do not have 
an opportunity to receive the full return on re-
sources contributed if the shares of cost and re-
turn differ. Furthermore, incentive condition 3 
applies to fixed resources the same as it does to 
variable resources. Obviously, if the annual use 
value of the fixed resources of a tenant exceeds 
that of the landlord and the share rental is 50-50, 
there can be both inefficiency in resource use and 
an income transfer. 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 3 AND THE CASH LEASE 
, The cash lease as a type meets the requirement 
that the resource owner receive the full share of 
the return earned by the resources he contributes 
only if the cash rental rate for the land (and that 
for any other fixed factor such as buildings) 
equals the rate at which the unit of land (or other 
factor) contributes to the earning, and only at the 
highest profit combination for all resources used in 
production.1G If the cash rental is above or below 
the actual earnings of the fixed factors, there is 
an income transfer and the incentive condition is 
not fulfilled. This calculation and comparison can 
be made only farm by farm. There is no general 
test. 
INCENTIVE CONDITION 3 AND THE SHARE LEASE 
Crop-share leases fulfill condition 3 if conditions 
1 and 2 are met, and if land is the only fixed re-
source supplied by the landlord. It is highly im-
probable that the costs of housing, buildings, 
fences and other such fixed factors will be truly 
rewarded in any simple crop-share rental. The 
probability is even smaller if livestock are a major 
source of income and the landlord also furnishes 
fixed resources which contribute to the tenant's 
livestock enterprises. There is no direct method 
of relating costs and earnings of a combination 
of fixed resources supplied by the landlord in a 
single share of crops without sharing variable ex-
penses. The best that can be done is that the 
average annual value of the rental share approx-
imates the sum of the earnings of the resources 
the landlord supplies. 
Crop-share-cash and livestock-share leases offer 
opportunity for incentive condition 3 to be ful-
filled. There is nothing inherent in either form 
of lease as such to prevent the condition from 
being met. There are, however, at least two re-
quirements or details needed in the individual 
agreement to encourage decisions which will give 
to the resource owner the full share of the product 
earned by the resources he furnishes. One is a 
separate and distinct payment for the use of any 
housing facilities that the landlord furnishes. 
'.Both incentive conditions can be met without schleving the highest 
profit combination for the farm as a firm. It still must follow that 
inputs of variables must be applied to the fixed resources until marginal 
costs equal marginal returns, in each ent..rprise. 
16Technically, the condition is met if the marginal value product of 
land equals the cash rental. This equality can be achieved at several 
levels of production, but land income is an optimum only at one level. 
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This separate and distinct payment enables the 
landlord to decide how much to invest in housing 
facilities and to choose between investments in 
housing and other investments in or outside the 
firm. At the same time, a separate payment for 
housing gives the tenant a basis for choosing be. 
tween investments in consumption goods and in-
vestments in production. The second requirement, 
particularly in the crop-share-cash lease, is that 
a separate and distinct payment be made for the 
use of the fixed factors the landlord furnishes for 
use in the production processes of the farm busi-
ness. These factors must earn and receive their 
return the same as do variable factors in the 
business. In the livestock-share lease, the land-
lord has opportunity to receive a return on the 
factors contributing to production through his 
share of income from both crops and livestock. 
The explanation is made here in terms of fixed 
resources furnished by the landlord, because, in 
practice, renters do not supply fixed resources in 
the farm firm without sharing (or receiving all) 
the returns from them. Fixed resources of land-
lord and renter alike must receive their reward 
if incentive condition 3 is to be fulfilled. 
The crop-share-cash lease in which payment is 
made on a per acre basis for use of pasture and 
hay is a common departure from equal sharing 
of all products (namely, from the second incentive 
condition). The practice of paying a cash rental 
for pasture and hay plus a share of other crops 
meets the third incentive condition only if the 
payment per acre equals the return to land in 
this and in other uses of land of the same produc-
tivity on the farm. Otherwise, there would be in· 
centive to shift acreage to the crop offering an 
income advantageY 
Building rentals are paid on few farms (table 
51). It follows that the cash rental in the great 
majority of crop-share-cash leases is for pasture 
or hay. Cash rental rates are known to change 
slowly.IS Thus, it appears that few cash-crop-
share leases fulfill condition 3. 
Further evidence ·that leases do not include in-
centive condition 3 is provided in a simple count 
of all leases as to whether the landlord shares in 
the cash operating expenses. The practice varies, 
by type of lease and from area to area, with shar-
ing in crop-share and crop-share-cash much more 
frequent in the eastern than in the western eco-
nomic areas (table 6). In central South Dakota, 
for example, expenses are shared in 10 percent 
of all leases; whereas in Indiana area 2b expenses 
are shared in 99 percent of all leases. Sharing of 
variable expenses is essential for the resource 
owner to receive the marginal value product of 
his resource, except in a cash lease. 
Another indication of the need for revisions in 
17Heady and Kehrberg discus. the lump sum payment. partieularly as 
a means of avoiding the effects of premium rates on pasture and hay 
in distorting the cost structure. The same idea would apply to any per 
acre rate in which the tenant could see an advantage in either in-
creasing or decreasing the acreage of hay. See Earl O. Heady and Earl 
W. Kehrberg. Relationship of crop-share and cash leasing systems to 
farming efficiency. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 1952. pp. 667-668. 
18Walter E. Chryst. Adjusting farm rents to changes in priees, 
costs and production. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. p. 79. Iowa State 
College Library, Ames. 1952. 
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TABLE 6. PERCENT OF LEASES WITH LANDLORD SHARING 
CASH OPERATING EXPENSES BY TYPE OF ,LEASE. 
All leases Percent sharing by type ,of lease 
-------------------
State No. Percent Crop- Live-
and No. of 8har- shar- Crop- share- stock- Labor-
areat leases jng ing Cash share eash share share Other 
----------------Ind. 2b ..... 275 274 99 0 100 100 100 100 100 
6 •... 186 175 94 18 100 90 100 ....... ... --. ... 
Iowa 2b, ... 333 322 97 56 98 99 100 ....... 
6 .... 242 203 84 58 89 98 100 ....... 67 
Kon. 1. .... 269 130 48 50 41 55 100 ....... 100 
6 ..... 333 310 93 13 94 98 100 ....... ....... 
Minn. 1-4 ,. 324 209 65 26 75 78 ·97 ....... ~ ...... 
7-8 .. 347 278 80 37 91 89 98 ....... ....... 
Neb. I., ... 256 129 50 17 46 59 100 ....... 85 
3b .... 3ll 242 78 ....... 74 81 100 ....... 100 
S. D.I.. ... 155 63 41 8 42 22 88 ....... 73 
30 .... 199 20 10 ....... 10 7 50 ....... ....... 
Wis. I." .. 171 52 36 22 75 100 90 ....... 38 
3 ..... 331 315 05 74 100 71 I 99 ....... 100 
t Areas with the high and low proportions for each state. 
current leasing practices concerning sharing of 
expenses is provided by comparing the share of 
crop paid as rental when expenses are shared with 
that when expenses are not shared. For this com-
parison, the distributions of shares of corn were 
calculated for each economic area in which there 
were 20 or more cases of sharing and 20 or more 
of non-sharing of cash expenses for crop-share 
and crop-share-cash leases combined. The dis-
tribution of shares of the crop with arrangement 
for sharing of expenses is compared with the 
distribution of shares in the leases with no ar-
rangement for sharing cash expenses (table 7).10 
In 7 of the 13 economic areas, there is a significant 
difference in shares of corn; the share is higher 
for leases with landlords sharing operating eXM 
penses (table 7). In the other six areas, the dis-
tribution of shares of corn is the same whether 
or not expenses are shared. 
"A seleetion of areas on some such basis is essential because In some 
economic areaS the number of cases of non-sharing is too small to allow 
meaningful comparison. 
TABLE 7. PERCENT OF CROP-SHARE AND CROP-SHARE-CASH 
LEASES WITH SELECTED SHARE OF CORN UNDER AGREE-
MENTS IN WHICH LANDLORDS SHARE OPERATING EX-
PENSES COMPARED WITH THOSE IN WHICH LAND-
LORDS DO NOT SHARE OPERATING EXPENSES. 
Landlords share Landlords do not share 
operating expenses operating expens .. 
-~---~~---
----------
State Percent of leas .. with share Percent of leases with shor. 
and No. ------ No. -------
area leoses ~ % ~ leases ~ % ~ 
---------
-~ 
--
--Kan. 3b' ,. 132 60 26 14 34 47 53 0 
4'" .. 155 23 60 16 29 55 38 7 
Minn. 7-8'. 181 7 57 3! 20 35 55 10 
Neb. 1.. ... 54 90 6 4 50 80 8 8 
2 ..... 90 61 4 3 30 iO 0 0 
3a." , 143 78 18 4 45 87 11 0 
3b .... 218 19 76 5 52 27 65 6 
4 ..... 150 89 7 3 115 95 3 2 
5· .... 209 29 71 0 68 51 46 0 
6· .... 185 3 81 16 34 0 94 6 
7 ..... 156 4 65 31 58 3 76 19 
S. D. 4a· .. 54 65 6 26 93 83 to 2 
4b' ,. 30 10 37 53 202 17 78 .; 
'Significantly larger share of corn in leases with landlord sharing 
operating expenses. 
SHARES IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHARE LEASES 
Within economic areas, the shares of corn are 
the same in crop-share and crop-share-cash leases. 
In half of the (46) areas, livestock-share leases 
have significantly greater proportions of the 50-
50 share (table 8a). Resource owners in all leases 
could not receive full returns on their contribu-
tions if the shares of crops were the same in all 
leases. The fact that shares are the same in many 
leases of different types in all areas suggests that 
condition 3 is not met in some leases. 
The similarity of shares among types of leases 
in half the economic areas covered by this study 
suggests that it is not common practice to depart 
from some customary share regardless of type 
of lease. Adjustments in earnings of resources 
furnished by the parties to the agreement are 
apparently made by adjusting the share of ex-
penses.20 
Shares of fertilizer are the same in crop-share 
and crop-share-cash leases (table 9a). Livestock-
share leases have a higher landlord's share with a 
greater frequency of the half share. The differ-
ence between livestock-share and crop-share leases 
is significant in 20 of the 46 economic areas. n 
Although the landlord's share in livestock-share 
leases is higher than in crop-share leases, in all 
areas there are many leases of the two types with 
the same shares of expenses. As in the case 
of shares of corn, condition 3 cannot be fulfilled 
in some leases if the shares of expenses are the 
same in different types. 
2oComparisons were also made for wheat; see supplementary table 8b. 
Findings were similar enough that illustration with the share of corn 
suffices for the purpose here. 
"'See supplementary table 9b for landlord's share of lime, and table 
9c for landlord's share of small grain seed. 
FORM OF RENTAL PAYMENT AND THE SOURCE 
OF INCOME 
The source of income on a farm rented for cash 
is of no consequence in the lease. The crop-share 
or crop-share-cash lease is another matter. If 
livestock or livestock products are the major prod-
uct sold and the landlord receives only a share of 
the crop, the operator has incentive to decrease 
the number of acres and production of cash grain 
crops in order to increase production of forage 
crops, This may move away from the highest 
profit combination for the combined resources of 
landlord and tenant. Also, the landlord does not 
have an opportunity to receive the full return on 
some of the fixed resources he contributes. 
Crop-share and crop-share-cash leases are the 
most frequent type of lease for farms with hogs 
as a major source of income. As high as 75 per-
cent of the leases are crop-share-cash (table lOa). 
The comparison is made for full-tenants renting 
from one landlord, and the lease applies to a whole 
farm rather than a tract or part of a farm. Much 
the same situation exists with other major sources 
of income.22 
OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE RETURN 
ON INVESTMENT 
Lack of agreement as to conditions under which 
the lease will be renewed and the fact that the 
lease is for a given time period are two outstanding 
characteristics of leasing practice that create 
problems concerning the flow of income. If re-
sources are to be used efficiently within a given 
time period and between time periods, both parties 
to an agreement need some assurance that they 
"'See supplementary tables lOb and 10c. 
TABLE SA. LANDLORD'S SHARE OF CORN BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
CroIHIhare leases I CroIHIhare-cash leases Livestoek ... hare leases 
State Percent with share I Percent with share Percent with share 
_~~~t 0 I ~.~ 1- % I % [%-u I all 0 I ~.% 1 % % I %-u I all _ 0 _ ~-H Yo % %-u I ail-
Ind. 2b".. ........ 1 1 98.. . . . ... ........ ........ 2 2 96. .. . .... ........ ........ ........ 1 98 1 
Iowa. 4.... ........ ........ 6 94. . . . . . .. ........ 2. . . . • . . . 4 94. . . . . . .. ........ ........ 3 93 4 
~~~~.6;.:: :::::::: ~~ 3~ ~ ·····4·· :::::::: ····23·· 3~ i~ ~~ ..... ~ .. :::::::: :::::::: I 1 g~ ~ 
Neb. 4"... ........ 94 3 2 1........ 1 89 8 2. ....... ........ ........ 31 10 56 3 
S. D. 1', .. ........ 88. . . . . . . . 8 4 14 86. . . . . . .. ........ ."..... ........ 18 18 9 37 18 
Wis. S" ... ........ 48 2 SO. . .. . . .. ........ 25 25. . . . .. .. 50. . .. . ... ........ 1 7 2 89 1 
'One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
t Area in each state with largest numher of cases. 
TABLE 9A. LANDLORD'S SHARE OF FERTILIZER BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
CroIHIhare leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock ... hare leases 
State Percent with share Percent with share Percent with share 
and --------------------------------------------
areat 0 ~.~ % % %-U all 0 ~-~ % % %·U all 0 ~.% % % %-U aU 
----------------------------------------------------------
Ind. 2b.... ........ ........ 3 94 3 2...... .. 2 96 .......... ".... 1.... . ... ........ 97 2 
*':..~~.::: · .... 4 ...... is ...... 2S.. ~I :::::::: 3; .... ·5 ...... ii.. 1; ~~ :::::::: .... ·Ii .... · .. 2.. 1 :::::::. ~~ ~ 1~ 
Minn. 6".. 25 12 44..... .. . 19 30 22 9 39"... ... ........ 1 1 1 91 4 2 
Neb. 4·... 42 43 4.. ..... . 2 9 36 46 3 15.. .. .... ........ 12 12 53 6 17 
S. D. 6.... 50 6 ...... '. 2S........ 19 100 .................... ,... ........ 204 .... '3'" .... '2'" 50 30 Wi .. 5·.... 12 18........ 47 3 20........ ........ ........ 50.... ... . 50 77 3 11 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
tArea in each .tate with largest number of cases. 
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TABLE lOA. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LEASE 
FOR J:<'ARMS WITH HOGS AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF INCOME. 
Type of lease 
No. of Crop- Crop-shar.- Livestock-
State and area t easeS Cash share cash share 
Ind. 2b· ......... 44 0 2 H 82 
Iowa 2a .......... 109 10 2 66 21 
Kan. 6 ........... 11 9 9 45 36 
Minn. 7-S" ....... 87 29 2 39 30 
Neb. 6" .......... 50 12 12 62 14 
S. D. 4b" ........ 64 5 3 78 11 
Wi •. 3 ........... 52 19 2 0 79 
·One or more sIgnificant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent distribution of all leases. 
t Area with largest number of cases reporting. 
will receive those returns which are forthcoming 
only over a period of time. Use of lime is an 
example. Benefits accrue over a period of years, 
but the costs are usually paid in 1 year. If the 
tenant is to be interested in applying lime, and 
he shares in the cost of application, he must either 
stay on that farm long enough to receive the full 
benefit or be compensated in case the lease is 
terminated. In other instances, there may be need 
for the landlord to receive compensation. 
Tenants cannot expect to continue on the same 
tract indefinitely. Not only changes in ownership 
of the farm or tract, but also changes in opinion 
of the landlord result in uncertainty of tenure. 
Uncertainty of continuity at the expiration of 
a given lease period may offer opportunity to make 
adjustments wanted by both landlord and tenant. 
The advantages and disadvantages by no means 
act for one party alone. The landlord may have 
another tenant to whom he wishes to rent the 
farm. The tenant may be looking for another and 
larger farm, or one with improvements more to his 
needs and tastes. In this respect, tenant operation 
may offer fewer obstacles to change and possibly 
lower costs of changing operating units than does 
owner-operatorship. 
In general, the mere fact that operating deci-
sions are subject to the will of two parties leaves 
less room for choice by either party. Under some 
leasing arrangements, the operator has complete 
freedom of choice as to crop rotations, selection 
of enterprises and farming practices. N everthe-
less, uncertainty as to renewal at the expiration 
of the current lease may cause him to choose 
those combinations that will maximize his income 
in the period covered by the lease rather than over 
a longer time period. Uncertainty may also be 
involved in the frequency of contacts of the two 
parties and in their opinions of each other. Unless 
there is mutuality of understanding, one party 
may not know what to expect in reaction from 
the other concerning use of a new practice. 
If the land is in a temporary or unstable owner-
ship status, the tenant has additional uncertainty 
of tenure. Land in estates being probated, that 
owned by speculators, some of that managed bv 
government agencies, and that held by landlord's 
of advanced years sets up a condition under which 
the tenant is inclined to operate in the short run. 
In any situation in which ownership is subject to 
change at a near but unknown date, chances are 
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greater that the given tenant will not be able to 
renew his lease. 
Uncertainty is an attribute of the outlook for 
many landlords, too. Although the land has been 
rented for 10 years or more, it was not necessarily 
known by the landlord that the tenant would stay 
for another year. Uncertainty as to the continuity 
of the tenant on the given unit increases the 
problems of making and maintaining improve-
ments. The new tenant may not be interested in 
t~e kind of improvements requested by the pre-
VIOUS one. 
If numerous changes in tenants or in farms 
result from the conditions of uncertainty as to 
renewal, nature of future operations or quality of 
performance that will be accepted, the fault is in 
the terms and conditions of the lease as such. In 
the following paragraphs, selected characteristics 
of leases are discussed to show some of the impli-
cations for resource use and income distribution 
through time. 
MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD AND LENGTH OF LEASE 
With no understanding on renewal, the tendency 
would be to select products that could be finished 
within the term of the lease. Tenants would have 
reason to select enterprises which would not neces-
sarily maximize the income for the farm over a 
period of years. There would be a tendency to 
stay away from enterprises such as dairy products 
or beef cattle because of the disruption costs if 
the lease is not renewed. 
Current leasing practices demonstrate the tend-
ency for length of lease to be the same regardless 
of type of product (table 11). The comparison 
between major product and type of lease is for 
tenants renting all the land they operate from one 
landlord. Each farm may have more than one 
major source of income. But, on any farm op-
erated under a 1-year lease there would need to 
be some specific arrangement for the operator to 
receive a return on investments in any enterprise 
extending beyond the length of the lease. Dairy 
and beef cattle require more than 1 year for pro-
duction. Even though the landlord does not share 
in livestock enterprises, difference between length 
of lease and time required to produce the product 
increases the uncertainty of operation and de-
creases the opportunity for the resource owner to 
maximize returns on his investments between pro-
duction periods. 
TABLE 11. NUMBER OF LEASES AND PERCENT WITH l-YEAR 
TERM BY MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD; FULL TENANTS. 
ONE LANDLORD. 
Cash grain Dairy Beef I H~g 
State -------------,-----
and No. Petcent No. Percent No. Percent Xo. Pere~nt 
areat lease. I-year I.ases I-year leases I-year Icase. I-year 
--------------
Ind. 2b .... S7 57 4 75 5 20 37 51 
Iowa 4 ..... 13 69 29 59 13 46 85 64 
Kan. 6 ..... 29 76 10 40 14 64 10 70 
Minn. 7·8 .. 47 62 23 43 17 41 84 60 
!'Ieb. 6 ..... 36 83 2 50 30 87 46 76 
S. D. 4b ... 45 78 7 29 24 71 59 78 
Wis. 3 ..... 2 100 191 61 12 50 47 64 
t Area with largest number of cases reporting. 
MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD AND LENGTH 
OF TERMINATION NOTICE 
Whether the major product sold is a grain crop 
or livestock, short notices of termination are more 
frequent in practice than a:re notices of 11 or more 
months, and length of notice is the same. among 
different products (table. 12). A notice of 4 
months or less supposedly would be sufficient to 
bring the farm business to settlement if cash grain 
is the product. A longer period would be needed 
to settle accounts and for both landlord and tenant 
to make arrangements for another year if the 
livestock enterprise is dairy or beef cattle. Ap-
parently, the length of termination notice is not 
adjusted to fit the type of product sold. Further-
more, short notices increase uncertainties of op-
eration for both parties. 
MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD AND MONTH LEASE BEGINS 
The first 4 months of the year are the beginning 
dates for the great majority of leases (table 13). 
Had the specific day been asked in the question-
naire, undoubtedly that date would have been 
March 1. Again, the comparison in table 13 is for 
full tenants renting from one landlord. 
A date early in the year would allow the tenant 
to get settled before the beginning of spring work. 
Also, a date before planting time in the fall 
would be suitable in winter-grain areas and for 
farms on which the major livestock enterprise is 
fattening of beef cattle.23 A March 1 moving date 
may be too late for early farrowing of spring pigs. 
Lack of differences between beginning dates re-
gardless of the major product sold suggests that 
beginning date is not adjusted to type of product. 
This might influence choice of products as well 
as allocation of resources between production pe-
riods. 
~ly CK' August is the most frequent beginning month for the dis-
tribution of all leases in several economic areaS in Kansas. as shown 
in supplementary table 59. 
TYPE OF LEASE AND LENGTH OF LEASE 
One-year leases are the most frequent length 
of lease for all types of leases (table 14). Although 
both length of lease and type of lease are the 
result of many related forces, significant differ-
ences would be expected in proportions of 1-year 
leases. In view of the longer production period 
involved in livestock enterprises, the percentages. 
of I-year leases in livestock-share arrangements 
should be smaller than the proportions of I-year 
agreements in cash, crop-share or crop-share-cash 
leases. This would be the case especially in dairy-
ing or in raising beef in which more than 1. year 
is essential for efficient planning of production. 
The small differences in percentages of I-year 
leases among types of leases suggest that in prac-
tice length of lease is the same regardless of 
type. The differences are statistically significant 
in 16 of the 46 economic areas; in each of these 
areas, the proportion for livestock-share leases is 
significantly smaller than the proportion for one 
or more other type of lease. 
Distribution of I-year leases among types of 
leases (table 15) varies among economic areas 
mainly because of differences in proportions of 
lease types among areas (table 17). One-year 
leases exceed those of any other length in all 
economic areas (table 16). 
The purpose in fitting type of lease and length 
of lease to the needs of the individual case is to 
provide the incentive for resources of both land-
lord and tenant to be used efficiently. These are 
points for agreement between individual landlords 
and tenants. There are many reasons for the 
existence of 1-year leases. It is one device land-
lords can use to encourage husbandry on the part 
of a tenant. Likewise, the I-year lease may be to 
the advantage of the tenant when he may want 
to change farms. 
TABLE 12. NUMBER OF LEASES AND PERCENT WITH 1 TO 4 AND 11 OR MORE MONTHS 
TERMINATION NOTICE BY MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD; FULL TENANTS. ONE LANDLORD. 
State 
and areat 
Ind. 2b ...... . 
Iowa 4 ....... . 
Kan. 6 ....... . 
Minn. 7-8 .... . 
Neb.6 ....... . 
S. D. 4b ..... .. 
Wis. 3 ....... . 
No. 
leases 
26 
10 
20 
29 
22 
25 
2 
Cash grain 
I Percent 1-4 mo. 
35 
50 
40 
24 
14 
24 
o 
Percent 
11 or over 
15 
o 
o 
10 
14 
8 
o 
t Area with largest number of cases. 
No. 
le ... es 
2 
23 
7 
15 
1 
2 
159 
Dairy products I Beer I I!o~s 
r1~~~ lr~rc~~~r I-J~!-O~-li--~r--4-~-~~-llr~:~~!r l-l-e~-o~.-I-r~~~~TJ~r~ 
50 
17 
43 
20 
o 
50 
34 
o 4 50 0 25 40 4 
o 8 25 0 65 :12 2 
14 11 9 27 10 30 0 
13 13 15 15 60 IS 8 
o 19 16 0 33 21 6 
o 15 40 0 33 2j 9 
3 10 70 0 34 38 6 
TABLE 13. PERCENT OF LEASES BEGINNING IN GIVEN MONTHS BY MAJOR PRODUCT SOLD: FULL TENANTS. 
ONE LANDLORD. 
C ... h grains I Dairy products I Beer ~ __ _ 
State and areat ~ May-Aug. I Sept.-Dec. I Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sept.· Dec. Jan.-Apr. I May-Aug. I Sept.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. i )[ay-Aug.1 Sept.-Dec. 
Ind.2b...... ......... .. ..... ...... .. .. ~~ i ~ 1~ 8 ~ l~ g g ~i g ~ 
Iowa 4.. .... ... .. .... .. .. ... ..... . .... 93 3 0 90 10 0 100 0 0 91 0 9 K~n. 6 ........................... " . .. 76 9 11 78 4 13 83 0 6 83 5 8 
MlDn. 7-8.. ................ ........... 1 0 0 100 0 0 93 0 7 92 4 2 
Neb. 6 ........................... " .. . gg 2 2 100 0 0 96 0 4 91 0 2 S"p. 4b....... .......... .. ........ . .. . 100 0 0 96 1 2 92 0 8 96 0 4 \\IS. 3 ............................... . 
tArea with largest number of cases reporting. 
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TABLE 14. NUMBER OF LEASES AND PERCENT WITH 
I-YEAR TERM BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
Cash Crop ... hare I Crop-sh.re-c .. h I Livestock ... hare 
St t • e ----------------------
and ~o. I Percent I No. Percent I No. I Percent I No. Percent 
~_ -..!~~ _I.!~ leases I-Y •• ~ leases -..!-yea~ -..!eases I-year 
Ind. 2b .... \ I 0 59 68 52 69 120 53 6 ..... 11 73 103 68 19 63 38 50 
Iowa 3 •.... 14 93 25 68 83 76 57 56 
5" .... 49 80 26 65 86 69 76 43 
Kan. 23*, .. I 0 157 52 114 51 23 13 
7a*, .. 19 90 82 77 92 87 12 58 
Minn. J-4 .. 84 70 130 55 61 67 23 52 
7-8 .. il 59 65 66 133 54 61 48 
Neb. I· .... 84 42 56 75 84 73 21 48 
Sb .... 9 100 83 75 187 82 14 86 
S. D. 1. ... 35 37 66 52 27 56 22 50 
3b ... 2 50 51 76 134 81 8 87 
Wis. 2.b ... 74 76 15 80 9 78 131 57 
6-7 ... 100 56 7 86 3 33 85 42 
·One or more' significant difference in proportions between lease 
types. 
tAreas with lowest and higbest proportions of I-year leases. each 
state. 
TABLE 15. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF I-YEAR LEASES 
BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
Crop-share- Livestock-
State and area t C.sh Crop-share cash share 
Ind.2b . 0 28 26 45 
6 ........ .... , 7 64 11 17 
Iowa 3a .............. 10 14 50 26 
5· .............. 26 11 40 22 
Kan. 2a .............. 0 57 41 2 
7 •...... 10 38 48 4 
Minn. 1-4 .... 32 39 22 7 
i-8 ...... 23 23 39 15 
Neb. 1 ..•.... 23 27 39 6 
3b .............. 4 26 65 5 
iI. D. 1. .............. 17 44 19 14 
3boO . 1 25 69 4 
Wi •. 2ab .............. 36 8 49 
6-7 .............. 54 6 35 
·One significant difference in proportions when tested against percent 
distribution of all lea.es by type. 
tAreas with lowest and highest proportions of I-year lease •• each 
state. 
TABLE 16. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LEASES 
BY LENGTH OF LEASE. 
None 2 or 3 4 or 5 I 
State and areat named ~ ~_.::~~ Indefinite ~ 
Ind. 2b ............. oO..... 60 2 4 16 18 
6.... . . . . . . . I 64 2 5 10 19 
Iowa 3a ......... .......... 70 4 6 13 
5 .......... .......... 62 6 11 18 
Kan. 2a ......... 48 2 29 16 
7a ......... 2 81 3 8 5 
Minn. 1-4 ....... 62 15 8 8 6 
7-8 ....... 56 15 9 11 8 
Neb. 1. ......... 59 15 8 2 15 
3b ......... 81 4 3 4 5 
S. D. 1. ......... .......... 48 25 5 12 10 
3b ......... .......... 79 4 3 10 4 
Wi •. 2ab ........ I 65 9 5 4 16 
6-7 ......... .......... 50 19 8 10 13 
tAreas with lowest and highest proportions ot I-year leases. each 
state. 
100 
Nonetheless, adjustments in type and len~th 
of leases might benefit both landlord and tenant. 
Among other things to be considered is the effect 
of uncertainty about length of the agreement. 
Small percentages of tenants in several economic 
areas reported that length of lease was not cov-
ered in the agreement. A contract is not binding 
legally unless a specific period of time is named. 
Also, 2 to 29 percent of tenants in all areas re-
ported the length of the lease as "indefinite." 
Probably in most of these "indefinite" instances 
the lease was initiated as a 1-year agreement and 
then continued on from year to year without spe-
cific dis~ussion between the parties. 
THE FOUR INCENTIVE CONDITIONS 
TAKEN TOGETHER 
All four of the incentive conditions must be met 
in each lease to encourage efficiency in the use of 
resources and prevent transfers of income from 
one to the other party. Absence of anyone of 
them creates a motivation for the resource owner 
to move away from the highest profit combination 
in use of the combined resources of landlord and 
tenant or results in an income transfer. The con-
ditions apply whether the given lease is for a 
TABLE 17. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LEASES 
BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
\ Cro~ Live-I No. Crop- share- stock- Labor-
State and area leases Cash share cash share share Other 
------------
Ind. 2b .. . .......... 275 27 20 52 I··· .... · 1 6 ............. 186 6 62 11 21 ... . ........ 
Iowa 1a ............ 297 20 7 48 2t : ........ 1 
lb ............ 272 5 21 44 29 ........ I 
2 •........ .... 339 7 11 64 17 . ....... 1 
2b .. .... .. 342 5 It 62 I 19 ........ . ...... 30 ........ .. 189 8 14 45 33 . ...... 
3b .... ....... 167 6 17 45 31 1 
4 ... " . 221 19 7 22 51 1 ........ 
5 ............. 252 21 11 36 32 ........ 
6 ....... " ..... 245 3~ 11 25 29 ....... 1 
, 
Kan. I. ............ 314 1 71 23 4 I I ....... " 
20 ............ 314 . ....... 56 36 8 . ....... ! ..•....• 
2b ............ 303 1 48 46 5 ..... j .. , .... "j"" 
3a ............ 303 1 53 42 2 
3b ............ 352 4 39 50 6 ........ I 
4 ............. 314 1 35 51 13 ...... . ....... 
5 ............. 277 13 26 51 10 . ....... ........ 
6 ............. 343 6 32 45 17 .. . .... ........ 
7a ............ 223 9 40 45 6 ........ 
7b .. " ......... 361 6 53 35 5 ........ I 
Minn. 1-4 ........... 329 26 45 20 9 :::::::f:::::: 6 ............ 275 45 11 11 33 i-8 ........... 352 21 20 40 19 
Neb. I. ............ 284 31 22 31 9 ........ 7 
2 ............. 362 2 73 18 5 ........ 2 
3a ............ 269 4 41 44 11 . ....... ........ 
3b ............ 328 3 29 62 5 ........ 1 
4 ............. 360 2 42 46 9 ........ I 
5 ............. 334 37 55 6 . ....... 2 
6 ............. 315 13 32 45 8 . ....... 2 
7 ............. 271 4 29 55 6 . ....... 6 
S. D. I. ............ 172 21 42 16 15 ........ 6 
2 •............ 222 2 37 50 6 ........ 5 
2b ............ 203 4 40 46 7 1 2 
3a ............ 183 6 31 55 4 ........ 4 
3b ............ 219 1 26 67 5 ........ 1 
40 ............ 193 I 27 63 5 ........ 4 
4b ............ 296 4 19 67 8 ........ 2 
Wi •. !.. ............ 179 68 5 1 12 . ....... 14 
2ab ............ 254 31 7 3 54 . ....... 5 
3 .............. 332 13 I 2 83 ........ I 
4 .............. 283 49 2 2 42 ........ 5 
5 .............. 230 25 21 2 H . ....... 8 
6-7 ............ 227 47 3 I 4t ........ 5 
8-9 ............ 278 29 4 2 64 ........ 1 
, 
whole farm or a tract of land and whether the 
operator is a part-owner or a full tenant. 
That some farms may not maximize income and 
use all resources efficiently even though the neces-
sary conditions are present and even though the 
lease is perfect as a contract does not deny the 
importance of the incentive conditions. Rather, 
it is to be emphasized that one leasing problem 
per se is solved as soon as there are arrangements 
in the lease to motivate efficient use of resources 
and prevent unintended income transfers. This 
does not necessarily solve the economic problem 
common to all farms-namely the problem of com-
bining and using resources efficiently. 
Adjustments in content and detail of leases ap-
parently are made slowly as the need becomes 
recognized. The process seems to be that pro-
visions are added to the previous agreement with-
out disturbing the general content. One type of 
adjustment is that of making a change in the 
share of cost of one item to take care of a change 
that has arisen in another. For example, a tenant 
needs new brooder houses for the hogs he is rais-
ing on a farm he rents under a crop-share lease. 
He and the landlord agree that the landlord will 
furnish the brooder houses, and to match that 
cost the tenant will apply a given amount of fer-
tilizer. The adjustment may be satisfactory to 
both parties, but often the expediency merely 
postpones the solving of the economic problem in-
volved. Usually the need for compensating ad-
justments arises because one or more of the in-
centive conditions is absent. 
As illustration, suppose a tenant on a crop-share 
lease desires to shift to dairy farming. The 
change in enterprises requires additional build-
ings and fences and a change in crop rotation. 
The proposed solution is for the landlord to pro-
vide the buildings and fences, receive the old share 
of cash crops and receive a cash rental per acre 
of hay and pasture. The common argument in 
favor of this type of adjustment is that the land-
lord can afford to make expenditures to help shift 
to a livestock type of farming, because crop yields 
will be increased. His income from higher yields 
of crops on a smaller number of acres and from 
the cash payment for use of hay and pasture 
will be higher. Supposedly the tenant's income is 
increased. If both are satisfied, what is the fault 
in this type of practice? 
More direct methods of adjustment are avail-
able to handle shifts in type of farming and 
changes in methods and costs of operating. For 
example, a flat annual payment for the use of 
buildings will give the landlord direct return on 
his investment and at the same time show the 
tenant how much additional income from livestock 
is needed to cover the cash payment. Compensat-
ing adjustments tend to increase the opportunity 
and the incentive for each party to try to max-
imize the return on the resources he contributes 
instead of causing both to try to maximize the 
return to the combined resources. Apparently, 
one or more adjustment has been made in many 
leases in all economic areas to compensate for the 
absence of the incentive conditions. 
Several types of compensating adjustments 
amount to reasonable approximations of the in-
centive conditions. Specific balancing of variable 
costs is an example. Under a high level perform-
ance in management and a mutuality of interest 
between landlord and tenant, the same result is 
obtained if each party pays one of two equal ex-
penses or each pays half of both expenses. Fur-
thermore, it is extremely difficult in practice to 
calculate the ratio of costs to returns along a 
scale of intensity. Even with only one item of 
variable cost for one type of input (for example, 
the amount of concentrates to feed to hogs), the 
answer at best may be only an approximation 
because the exact results from units of additional 
input are not known. This is even more the case 
when there are multiple variables involved. But 
lack of detailed knowledge does not deny the ne-
cessity of experimenting to find the combination 
that results in the highest income. 
An arrangement for the tenant to pay all costs 
of fertilizer to balance all of another expense paid 
by the landlord might run into difficulty only in 
an occasional year. Suppose an agreement speci-
fied that 500 pounds of a given kind of fertilizer 
would be applied at the proper time and place 
in the rotation. An unusual season occurs; rain-
fall is heavier than usual; the crop prospects are 
better than usual; and there is possibility of 
higher yield by an additional application of ni-
trogen fertilizer. Both parties will benefit by the 
additional yield. Who pays the cost of the addi-
tional fertilizer? The compensating cost arrange-
ment cannot take care of this type of case in ad-
vance. 
Compensating adjustments as worked out in 
practice, with definite agreement as to form and 
amount, suggest that landlords and tenants have 
fairly specific ideas about the items or inputs 
being adjusted. They know that a given arrange-
ment of different shares works to the advantage 
of one or the other and how much it is doing so. 
Otherwise, they would have no idea as to how 
much of an allowance to make in some other item. 
The adjustment would fit all cases if the four 
incentive conditions were met. 
Compensating adjustments sometimes take the 
form of one party assuming more than his pro-
portionate share of a given expense to raise the 
level of farming practice and thereby increase the 
total income of the farm. Use of lime and fer-
tilizer is an example. Landlords may pay all of 
the costs to get the tenant to adopt the practice. 
This type of incentive may be useful in accom-
plishing desired results, but if continued indef-
initely after its utility has been demonstrated the 
result is an annual income transfer. There are 
instances of tenants being the leaders in tech-
nology with the landlord being reluctant or refus-
ing to allow a practice that will increase produc-
tion on the farm. Contouring and terracing for 
water control and soil conservation are examples. 
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The tenant may pay all costs of contouring and 
terracing merely to demonstrate the effects. In 
such cases, whether one or the other party bears 
more than his proportionate share of cost, the 
result is a lack of return for the specific contribu-
tion. The fact of income transfer may be less 
important to the two parties to the agreement 
(and to society, because of the production ob-
tained) than would be the lack of use of the 
practice-in the short run; but the practice could 
remain as a source of dissatisfaction in the long 
run. 
OTHER ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
LEASING PRACTICES 
The primary purpose in comparing select~d 
characteristics of leases, renters and landlords IS 
to examine the possible effects upon resource use. 
Although some of the relations between given 
characteristics may have no direct implications 
upon resource use and may serve only to describe 
current leasing practice, the indirect implications 
may indicate need of adjustments in lease con-
tent. Some comparisons may illustrate the nature 
of advantages of one group of renters or of land-
lords, the significance of written versus oral 
leases, or demonstrate the effects of variations ~n 
practices, and thus show the need for changes In 
educational programs. Furthermore, methodical 
examination of selected characteristics or prac-
tices may help in the solution of leasing problems 
by demonstrating that some associations common-
ly believed to be important are of little economic 
consequence. 
To facilitate discussion, the same economic 
areas are used for all comparisons. The area used 
as example for each state is one with a sufficient 
number of leases of each type to test variation 
in proportions. These areas are not representa-
tive of whole states because economic areas within 
states vary in the proportions of numerous char-
acteristics. The areas used as examples only 
characterize leasing practices in those areas and 
illustrate conditions in the seven states. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEASES 
TYPE OF LEASE 
The general form of the type of lease appar-
ently is established by customary practice, and 
then variations are made within it to fit some of 
the needs of the individual case. This is shown 
by the tendency for comparability among types 
of leases within areas as to length of term, length 
of termination, shares of expenses and of returns, 
and the lack of differences on numerous items 
such as age of operator, age of landlord, type of 
owner and sex of landlord. 
Comparability between leases suggests the need 
for more careful study on the part of parties to 
the individual contract as to the content and 
terms of the agreement. Each lease is a contract 
fitting a particular situation. Al~hough some ?f 
the practices that are common In an area wlll 
fit the individual case, the agreement can serve 
its full purpose only if it is tailored to the needs 
of the individual landlord, the indivJdual tenant 
and the specific property in question. . 
The distribution of types of leases In all eco-
nomic areas is given in table 17 for all respondents 
to facilitate discussion of the relation between 
given characteristics for selected areas. The dis-
tribution in following tables is shown only for 
cash, crop-share, crop-share-cash and livestock-
share leases, because the small numbers of labor-
share and special leases were not sufficient for 
tests of significance. 
The crop-share-cash lease is the most frequent 
type in 25 economic areas, the crop-share in 9 
areas the livestock-share in 6 areas and the 
cash iease in 5 areas. Labor-share leases are as 
much as 1 percent of all leases in only three 
areas. The proportion of other leases is also small 
in all areas.2i 
TYPE OF LEASE AND SIZE OF TRACT RENTED 
Within economic areas, the number of acres 
rented from this landlord (the landlord in the 
lease reported in detail) are distributed differ-
ently among types of leases (table 18). In crop-
--;;jie distribution of types of leases among individuals as ow.ner,s 
was also calculated and was the same as for all owners, because mdl' 
viduals are 85 percent or more of all owners in all areas. 
TABLE 18. DISTRIBUTION OF SIZE OF TRACTS RENTED BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
Percent of cash leases with aCrea Percent crop-share leases with acres 
------------------------------------
State and area Under 50 lia-99 lDa-179 ISa-259 26a-499 Over 500 Under 50 Sa-99 10a-179 ISa-259 260-499 Over 500 
---------------------
------------
8 8 64 18 9 9 27 30 27 
.... ·7 .. ·· . ......... 26 12 0 46 27 20 24 38 .......... Ind. 6' ............................... . Iowaaa .............................. . 
Xu.6· ............................. .. 22 6 28 33 11 26 31 28 14 1 
2 24 48 19 7 4 45 36 9 6 
2 4 8 2 24 · .. ·00 .. ·· 7 19 32 25 13 4 Minn. 7-S· ........................... . Neb. I' .............................. . 
S. D.1· .............................. . 6 9 23 3 14 45 2 9 51 4 22 12 
Wi'."· .............................. . 26 27 29 9 9 30 37 19 12 2 
Percent crop-share-ea..h l.ases with aer .. Percent Iivestock-share leases with acres 
Under 00 - 5a-99 lDa-179 ISa-259 26a-499 Over 500 Under 50 _lia._9_9 __ 1_Da-_1_79_ 
---~-------I---------------------
State and area 
Ind. 6' ...... .'.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 10 45 25 10 5 23 
5 I 3a 16 46 20 IS.. .. .. .... .. ........ ~i!~;~~~.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: · .... r.. Ig ~~ ~: l~ .. · .. i .................. ·i .. .. 
,!.;~~:.::::: ::::: ::::: :::: :::: ::::::: .... ~r ....... ~ ........ ~~.... d ~~ :5 .............. ·4 .. .. 25 .... ·i.... 17 
. .One Or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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36 
27 
35 
44 
" 4 49 
lsa.259 260-499 Over 500 
10 26 5 
36 21 11 
24 35 6 
33 16 6 
24 71 
16 76 
26 6 1 
'l'ABLE 19. PERCENT MALE LANDLORDS BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
CroJHIhare- Livestock-
State and area All leases Cash CroJHIhare c .. h share 
Ind. 6 ........... 72 73 71 68 74 
Iowa 3a .......... 74 53 77 70 82 
Kan. 6· .......... 75 7S SO 68 85 
Minn. 7-8 ........ 79 87 75 75 82 
N.b.I ........... 75 68 SI 79 67 
S. D.!. ......... 79 64 80 75 87 
Wi •. 5 ........... 74 71 76 75 78 
• One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent for all lea.es. 
share leases, there are higher proportions of small 
tracts than in other types of leases. Few tracts 
of less than 100 acres are rented under livestock-
share leases. Although the proportion of leases 
of one type in a size group is frequently larger 
than that of another in the same area, few are 
higher than all others in the same area. There 
is no consistent pattern of differences within 
areas. The average size of tract rented conforms 
with the differences in size of farm between areas; 
there are more of the larger tracts in the wheat 
and range-livestock type farming areas (Nebras-
ka, Kansas, South Dakota) than in corn-hog, dairy 
and general farming areas (Iowa, Minnesota, In-
diana, Wisconsin) for all types of leases.2' 
The absence of small tracts under livestock-
share leases is explainable in that the renter 
usually has only one landlord and the size of tract 
needs to be large enough for an economic unit. 
Any operator renting from more than one land-
lord might purposely rent an additional small 
tract to enlarge his operating unit even though 
the terms were unfavorable. 
Full tenants renting all the land they operate 
from one owner and renting a complete economic 
unit would have no reason to select one type of 
lease over another because of any peculiar rela-
tions between type of lease and size of tract as 
such. However, the tenant with limited resources 
would likely select a large tract on share rent 
rather than a smaller one under a cash rental. 
The cash renter would need to be able to assume 
the risk and to furnish all machinery, livestock 
and operating expenses. Cash renters of a given 
size of tract would need a higher net worth (for 
the same type of farming) than would share rent-
ers in the same size of business. 
TXPE OF LEASE AND SEX OF THE LANDLORD 
There is no consistent pattern of differences in 
the proportions of male landlords among types of 
leases (table 19). The percent of livestock-share 
leases with male landlords is significantly higher 
than one other type of lease in 9 of the 46 eco-
nomic areas, but is larger than all other types in 
only 2 areas. There is no significant difference 
in the proportions between other types of leases. 
Sex and type of landlord may have impact upon 
the content of leasing agreements and thereby 
become important in programs to improve leases. 
The problem is partly one of reaching and im-
--;;;;:rbe comparison here Is on size of tract rented from this landlord. . 
It must be remembered that in numerous caSes the tenant rents land 
from more than one landlord. For comparison of number of acres 
rented and farmed. see supplementary tables 79 and 80. 
TABLE 20. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
State and area Cash CroJHIhare CroJHIhare-cash Livestock ... har. 
Ind. 6· ...•........... 18 13 37 46 
lown3"· ............. 33 4 55 46 
Kan. 6' .............. 5 5 24 H 
Minn. 7·S· ............ 50 25 47 42 
Neb. 1· .............. 64 aD 55 48 
S. D.l· .............. 72 41 62 33 
Wis.S ................ 33 13 25 40 
.One or more significant difference In proportions when tested against 
percent for all leases • 
pressing all landlords and all tenants. Tenants 
can be found. They live on or near the farms 
operated and can be contacted through usual in-
formational channels such as extension programs. 
But nonresident landlords, nonfarm landlords, 
corporations and government agencies mayor 
may not be reached by usual educational pro-
grams. Also, beliefs, mores and preferences of 
renters may make it more difficult for an agree-
ment to be satisfactory if the landlord is a 
woman.26 
TYPE OF LEASE AND PERCENT WRITTEN AGREEMENTS 
Smaller proportions of crop-share leases than of 
all leases are written; the difference in propor-
tions is significant in 33 of the 46 economic areas. 
Livestock-share leases are written more frequent-
ly than are all leases in 4 areas, but are written 
less frequently in 4 areas. The proportion of writ-
ten cash leases is significantly larger than that 
for all leases in 8 areas. Crop-share-cash leases 
tend to be written more frequently than any other 
type of lease (table 20). 
It is the other factors involved in making the 
agreement rather than type of lease alone that 
determines whether the lease is written. Con-
fusion of the tenant in replying to the question 
would be the same among types of leases. If the 
tenant had rented the same land a number of 
years from the one landlord, there may have been 
doubt in his mind, particularly if it had been 
written the first year but had never been specific-
ally extended in writing. 
TYPE OF LEASE AND NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED 
The number of years rented is the same for 
leases of different types (table 21). Although the 
percent of leases of one type that has been in effect 
for a given number of years (for example, 38 per-
cent of the crop-share leases in Minn. 7-8) may 
be larger than the similar percent for another 
type of lease, thElre is no consistent pattern of 
significant differences in proportions. 
TYPE OF LEASE AND LANDLORD OWN MACHINERY 
Tenants usually own the farm machinery under 
cash, crop-share and crop-share-cash leases (table 
22). Ownership of machinery by the landlord is 
significantly more frequent under livestock-share 
leases. However, in some areas, the tenant owns 
the machinery in as high as 50 percent of the live-
stock-share leases. 
Ownership of machinery by the landlord under 
.8Comparisons were also made between sex of landlord and length 
of lease; size of tract rented; and age of landlord.. Se" supplementary 
tables 60. 63 and 74. 
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TABLE 21. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED THIS LAND BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
Number of years rented 
C ... h I Crop-share Crop-share-c ... h Livestock .. h:1re 
------------------------------------------
State and area 1 2-{ .5-9 10+ 1 2-4 5-9 10+ 1 2-4 .5-9 10+ 1 2-4 5·9 10+ 
---------------------------------------------
Ind. 6' ..................... 18 46 9 27 9 30 
Iowa 3a ... _ ................ 13 20 27 40 8 50 
Kan. 6 ..................... 5 15 30 50 1 33 
Minn. 7-8· .................. 9 29 40 22 17 38 
Neb. 1. .................... 6 25 28 41 11 35 
S. D. 1" .................... 9 20 17 54 6 41 
Wis. 5· ..................... 21 26 34 19 22 50 
• One or more significant difference In proportlons betwee'n lease types. 
TABLE 22. PERCENT OF LEASES WITH LANDLORD SHARING 
OWNERSHIP OF MACHINERY BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
State and area 
I croP-share-1 Livestock-
All types Cash Crop-share cash share 
---_.--------------------
Ind. 6' ......... . 
Iowa 3a* ..... ~ .. . 
Kan. 6· ......... . 
Minn. 7-S' ...... . 
Neb. I' ......... . 
S. D. 1· ........ . 
Wis. 5' ......... . 
15 
42 
28 
19 
16 
19 
30 
o 
8 
33 
3 
3 
6 
7 
3 
23 
18 
16 
6 
12 
11 
5 
28 
19 
15 
12 
9 
25 
62 
76 
67 
50 
58 
52 
53 
·One or more significant difference in propor-tions between lease types. 
any type of lease should be determined by the 
amount each is able to supply and what each does 
in respect to other contributions. Ownership of 
machinery has been the traditional function of the 
tenant. Sharing arrangements have developed 
with the increased amount of investment in ma-
chinery and the use of costly items of special 
equipment. 
TYPE OF LEASE AND LENGTH OF TERMINATION NOTICE 
There is no consistent pattern of significant 
differences in termination notices between types 
of leases (table 23). There are significant differ-
ences, but the type of lease with a higher propor-
tion varies from area to area. The 1 to 4 month 
termination notice tends to be the most frequent 
length. Length of termination notice apparently 
is not fitted to type of lease. 21 
Other provisions in the lease influence and are 
influenced by the agreement on termination notice. 
Among others are the length of lease, and with 
1-year leases predominating it is to be expected 
that there would be few notices of more than 1 
year. Likewise, any form of automatic renewal 
27 A similar comparison by type of landlord shows that there is no 
significant difference between types in ]ength of termination notice; 
supplementary table 69. 
29 
23 
38 
28 
33 
32 
15 
32 10 5 25 60 5 45 37 13 
19 18 34 26 22 12 34 34 20 
28 1 42 33 2! 4 40 33 23 
17 9 22 44 25 4 31 H 21 
21 7 30 32 31 5 43 3R 14 
21 4 55 26 15 8 46 38 8 
13 ........ 75 25 ........ 12 34 28 26 
clause and any provision to pay for unexhausted 
improvements might easily negate the importance 
of termination notice as such. 
TYPE OF LEASE AND AGE OF RENTER 
The age of renters is much the same for crop-
share and crop-share-cash leases (table 24). The 
percent of renters in the 25-34 age group is 
significantly larger under livestock-share leases 
than under one or more other type of lease in 20 
economic areas. Also, there are more areas with 
no renters under 25 for cash leases than for other 
types of leases. In general, the tendency is for 
cash renters to be older than others and for live-
stock-share renters to be younger than others. 
But the age distributions are the same for all 
types of lease in one-third of the areas. 
In interpreting the distribution of ages among 
types of lease in table 24, it must be remembered 
that the leases reported are for tracts of land 
and that only part of the leases are for whole farm 
units. Thus, some of the farming operations in-, 
valved may include leases of other types. 
NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED THIS LAND 
As shown in table 21, there are few significant 
differences in number of years land is rented by 
type of lease. Other characteristics of leases, of 
renters and of landlords do vary by length of 
time land has been rented. A few of these are 
given below. 28 
NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED THIS LAND AND AGE OF RENTER 
In general, the proportions of older renters in-
crease as the number of years rented increases. 
Larger percentages of the tenancies of 10 or more 
28Comparisons were also made for shares of fer-tilizer, shares of corn. 
and size of tract rented. There were few are'as with significant differ-
ences; .ee supplementary tables 62 and 64. 
TABLE 23. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LENGTH OF TERMINATION NOTICES BY TYPE O};' LEASE.t 
N umber of months of notice 
--------------------'-------------------,--------------------,------------------
___ . ~ ___ 1 ___ ~~~~~ ______ .....:rop-share-~s_h ______ Livestock~~r-=---~ 
_________ S_ta_te_a_n_d_a_r_e_a __ . _______ t:? ___ ~1_9~1 __ 1-_4 __ 1 __ 5._8 __ 9~ __ 1-_4_1 5-8 9-12 1-4 _~_. _9::2_ 
Ind. 6. . ....................... . 25 0 13 47 12 12 47 20 13 52 23 3 
Iowa 3a' ............................. . 43 14 14 44 6 0 54 25 3 {2 38 2 
Kan. 6· ......... . 50 12 12 19 15 10 40 25 9 29 29 H 
JIIinn. 7-8'. . . . . .. . ........... . 29 17 10 17 24 5 15 27 14 H 48 2 
Ncb.!. ....... . 16 40 7 15 55 3 15 48 8 0 47 7 
s. D.!. .................. . 26 26 5 38 5 7 56 22 6 29 29 7 
Wis. 5· ....................... . 47 8 6 37 3 3 50 0 0 60 7 6 
--------------------~--~----~----~----~--------~----~----~----~----~----------
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
tData excluded for notices Over 1 year, instant, by agreement, and not in lease. 
104 
TABLE 24. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGE OF RENTERS BY TYPE OF LEASE. 
1 _________ C_as_h_le_as_es _________ , Crop-share Ie .... 
Percent of renters, age I Percent of renters, age 
----------_._----------,--------_._------_._--
Stat" and area Under251~1_ 35·44 I~:~.J 55.6~~J Und.r251~1~1~1 55-6~1~ 
Ind. 6*........ ...... .. .... .. .... .... .. 0 37 18 18 9 18 6 26 23 26 15 4 
Iowa 3a. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. ....... .. . .. . 0 38 31 8 15 8 4 36 28 32 0 0 
Kan. 6"...... ...... .............. ..... 0 40 15 25 0 20 5 22 41 17 12 3 
Minn. 7·8............................. 2 38 29 23 6 2 11 30 22 25 9 3 
Neb.!.... ... .. ..... .. .. ... .. .. .. . .. .. 0 26 35 16 16 7 5 30 21 33 11 0 
S.D. 1·............................... 0 11 23 35 20 11 3 32 33 21 10 1 
Wi •. 5".. .. .. .... .................... 7 13 45 20 10 5 0 22 26 31 17 4 
Crop-share",ash leases Livestock-sbare le .... s 
_______ Percent of ~.nters, age ___ . ___ 1 ______ P.rcen~~enters, ag..".. _____ _ 
______ S_la_te_a._nd_a_r_ea ____ :_u __ n_d_.r_25 I~I~I 45..;.:J_~.~~ __ ...I~1 Under25 ~1~~~L_:~~I_~5.64-'~ 
Ind. 6" ............................. . 5 5 45 20 20 5 \0 46 31 10 0 3 
Iowa 3a ............................. . 8 46 23 18 5 0 3 49 35 10 3 0 
Kan. 6" ............................. . 4 33 29 22 9 3 18 39 26 14 3 0 
lIIinn.7-8 ........................... . 3 41 31 17 8 0 5 42 31 16 5 I 
Neb. 1. ............................. . 4 32 34 14 11 5 0 42 46 8 4 0 
S. D.l· .............................. . 7 41 22 22 7 0 12 64 8 12 4 0 
Wi •. 5" .............................. . o 0 25 25 25 25 8 49 20 15 8 0 
*One or mOre significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
years are of tenants between 45 and 64 years of 
age than is the case with tenancies of 1 year 
duration (table 25). Larger percentages of the 
tracts rented 1 year than of those rented longer 
are rented by operators under 25 years of age. 
NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED AND LENGTH OF LEASE 
N umber of years rented is apparently influenced 
but little by the length of the lease. There is no 
consistent pattern of difference in proportions of 
1-year leases (table 26). The proportion of 1-year 
leases in l-year tenancies is larger than the pro-
portion in another group in seven areas; the pro-
portion in the 2- to 4-year tenancies is larger in 
eight economic areas, and that for the 5- to 9-year 
tenancies is larger in seven economic areas. 
Distributions of number of years rented and 
proportions of 1-year leases cannot be interpreted 
to mean no nroblems exist for landlords and rent-
ers regarding length of lease, number of years 
rented or renewals. Within types and within 
areas, many problems can exist because individ-
uals have not made adaptions. 
NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED AND PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES 
Tracts rented 1 year are more frequently cov-
ered bv written leases than are tracts rented 2 or 
more years (table 26). Apparently the practice 
is common for the lease to be written for the first 
period, and then it is extended orally. The pro-
portion of written leases decreases as length of 
tenure increases. Smaller percentages of the tracts 
rented 10 or more years are covered by written 
leases. 
WRITTEN AND ORAL LEASES 
Whether the lease is written or oral may have 
important consequences in settling disputes when 
disputes arise. Content of the lease is more likely 
to be specific on details when written. The major-
ity of leases are oral in nearly all economic areas 
(table 27). 
TABLE 25. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGE OF RENTERS BY NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED THIS LAND. 
Tracts rented 1 y .... Tracts rented 2·4 year. 
Percent of renters, age Percent of renters. age 
-----------------------------------,---
State and area Under 25 25-34 35·44 45-54 55-64 65+ Under 25 25-34 35-H 45-54 55-64 
------------1----1-----------------------------------
Ind. 6·".............................. 31 38 
Iowa 3a.. .... . . . .... . . .... . . .... . ... . . 16 52 
Kan. 6·............................... .......... 40 
Minn. 7·8'. . . .. .. .. .. . ... . . .. .. . . .. . .. 17 40 
N.h. 1"............................... 13 52 
S.D. 1·............................... 17 50 
Wis. S·............................... 12 41 
19 
32 
20 20 
23 17 
17 9 
17 8 
20 18 
Tracts rented 5-9 years 
Percent or renters, age 
12 9 
.......... 8 
20 16 
3 10 
9 4 
8 -I 
6 3 12 
40 28 16 5 
55 18 17 2 
37 26 18 3 
50 25 11 2 2 
51 17 20 7 1 
49 18 22 7 
' .... ·3· .. · 36 26 16 7 
Tracts rented 10 or more years 
.--------
Percent or renters, age 
------------------1----1----------------
State and area Under 25 25-34 45-54 55-64 65+ Under 25 25-34 35-H 45";4 55-64 
.One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against distribution of age of al\ renters. 
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TABLE 26. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES AND I-YEAR LEASES 
BY NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED THIS LAND. 
Number years rented Number years rented 
State . Percent I-year 
and 
__ Percent. written __ 
--------
area 1 2-4 5-9 10+ 1 2-4 6-9 10+ 
--------------
Ind. 6 ..... ·63 27 17 14 ·69 68 73 52 
Iowa 3a .... '77 47 34 29 81 76 60 65 
K.n. 6 ..... ·60 22 11 9 ·80 79 58 64 
Minn. 7-8 .. '68 47 39 33 '76 55 56 49 
Neb.!. .... '57 54 50 44 ·77 63 63 46 
S. D.l. ... 75 47 38 58 33 52 44 49 
Wis.5 ..... ·1i0 33 24 16 72 65 63 50 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between classes. 
TABLE 27. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES BY SEX OF LANDLORD 
AND BY SELECTED PRACTICES IN SHARING. 
Landlords Does landlord share 
--
Ownership Ownership Cash 
livestock machinery expenses 
All ------------
State and area lea ... Male Fem.le Yes No Yes No Yes No 
------
------------
Ind. 6 ......... 23 24 17 "46 17 '48 19 23 20 
Iowa 3a ....... 43 42 44 46 42 41 44 44 17 
Kan.6 ........ 15 12 17 14 16 9 18 16 4 
Minn. 7-8 .•... 42 41 39 40 43 35 44 43 40 
N.b. 1. ....... 50 47 46 41 52 43 50 52 52 
S. D.l ........ 49 46 34 42 52 '32 55 ·41 57 
Wis. 5 ........ 30 33 20 ·38 24 ·49 23 34 25 
·Slgnifiicant difference between proportions. 
The general content of written leases is the 
same as that of oral leases. The differences be-
tween them are in details. 
There is no significant difference between male 
and female landlords in frequency of written 
leases. Likewise, the percent of written leases is 
the same whether or not the landlord shares in 
ownership of livestock, machinery or payment of 
cash expenses (table 27). 
If the length of lease is for more than 1 year, 
it is more likely to be written (table 28). A higher 
percentage of the 2- to 5-year than of the 1-year 
leases are written. Leases in which the length of 
term is indefinite or at will of the two parties are 
seldom written. 
Larger percentages of the oral than of the 
written leases have instant notice for termination 
and termination notice "not in lease." Written 
leases have higher proportions of notices of 1 to 
6 months (table 29). Written leases tend to be 
more specific concerning termination.20 
CONTENT OF LEASES ON LANDLORD AND AGENT 
MANAGED TRACTS 
Renters who dealt with an agent of the land-
lord in making the agreement usually also dealt 
with his agent in the operating decisions under 
the lease. Likewise, the renter dealing directly 
with the landlord in making the agreement also 
dealt with him in making the operating deci-
sions.30 This suggests that renters deal with 
agents mainly in cases in which the land-owner is 
nonfarmer and nonresident. 
Significantly higher proportions of the leases 
made with the agent of the landlord are written 
'OThe percent of written leases does not vary with age of landlord; 
supplementary table 77. 
80See supplementary table 76. 
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(table 30). Whether this extends after the first 
year of the contracts is unknown. The agent act-
ing for the landlord gets the contract in writing. 
It would appear that the agreements would con-
tinue to be in writing after the first year, because 
renters who deal with the agent in developing the 
lease also deal with him in operations under the 
lease and presumably during the life of the agree-
ment. 
In most economic areas, a slightly higher per-
cent of the leases are for 1 year when the tenant 
deals with an agent of the landlord, but the dif-
ference is significant in only nine areas. In only 
1 of the 46 areas is there a significant difference 
in the proportion of leases with payment of a cash 
rental on buildings. Cash rentals for use of build-
ings are paid in as many as 25 percent of the 
leases (crop-share-cash, and livestock-share, and 
cash) in only five economic areas.81 
31Comparlsons were also made for percent of renters dealing with 
landlord by type of lease, and by age of landlord. There were few 
significant differences; supplementary tables 57 and 75. In a compari-
son of percent of renters dealing with agent of landlord by type of 
landlord. there were no consistent differences between individuals as 
landlords; but, other landlords-i.e. Including estates, corporations, and 
the government-were significantly higher in use of agents; supple-
mentary table 70. 
TABLE 28. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES BY LENGTH OF LEASE. 
State and area 1 year 2-3 years 4-5 years I Indefinite Other 
----
Ind. 6 ........... 24 75 75 ............ 19 
Iowa 3.· ......... 48 86 83 ............ 17 
Kan. 6· .......... 18 56 36 5 ............ 
Minn. 7-8· ....... 44 86 fi9 12 12 
Neb. 1' .......... 44 85 89 It 37 
S. D. 1· ......... 40 85 56 21 47 
Wis.5 ........... 32 67 6~ 
............ 1 20 
.One or more significant difference in proportions between lease 
lengths. 
TABLE 29. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LENGTH OF TERMI-
NATION NOTICES IN WRITTEN AND ORAL LEASES. 
Written leMes I Oralle .... e. 
----------
-_._-----
--
Stat. By I i By 
and In- 1-6 7 mo.- agree- Not in In- 1-6 I i mO'-I agree- Not in 
area stant mos. 1 yr. ment lease stsnt moS. 1 yr. ment Ie ... 
------
Ind. 6* ....... ...... 89 11 ...... 
''':i'' 24 53 9 9 5 Iowa 3a· ..... 6 86 6 19 46 17 18 
Kan. 6· ...... ...... 75 11 3 11 23 46 U I 16 
Minn. 7-8' .... 16 57 11 6 11 30 32 15 6 17 
Neb. 1. ...... 19 60 7 14 13 66 4 1 16 
S. D.l ....... 31 49 8 6 6 25 53 12 2 8 
Wis. 5·" ..... 19 73 6 ...... 2 48 44 5 ...... 3 
• One or more significant difference in proportions between written 
and oral leases. 
TABLE 30. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES. PERCENT I-YEAR 
LEASES AND PERCENT OF LEASES WITH CASH RENTAL 
FOR BUILDINGS, RENTERS DEALING WITH LANDLORD 
AND THOSE DEALING WITH AGENT. 
___ With landlord ______ .With agent __ _ 
Written I-year Cash bldg. Written I-year Cash bldg. 
State and area leases leas.s rental leases leases rental 
------
---------
Ind. 6 ........... "21 63 6 83 80 
Iowa 3a ......... ·40 '67 3 78 100 ..· .. 8 .... 
Kan.6 .......... "11 "66 12 46 89 
Minn. 7-8 ....... "40 56 4 65 M 9 
N.b. 1. ......... "46 61 8 82 H 
S. D.!. ......... '42 50 4 92 30 
Wis. 5 .......... 29 61 11 50 ti~ 
.Significant difference in proportions between groups. 
COMPARISON OF LEASES BY RELATION OF LANDLORD 
Parent-son tenancies would be expected to have 
income advantages to one or the other party not 
found in nonrelated tenancies. It is the purpose 
in many related tenancies to shift part of the in-
come from given resources to the other party; it 
should follow that in related tenancies there would 
be a larger proportion of leases with differences 
between share of cost and share of return, larger 
shares of given expenses and larger shares of 
ownership of livestock and equipment by the land-
lord. 
Leases between nonrelatives are compared 
with those between a father (or a mother) and a 
son in the following tables. The questionnaire 
asked each respondent to indicate the relationship 
of the landlord. In the analysis of data, these 
replies were grouped into categories of: none; 
father; mother; father-in-law; mother-in-law; 
grandparent; brother or sister; son or daughter; 
uncle or aunt; and other. Summary is given here 
only for the nonrelated as compared with tenants 
renting from a parent. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TYPE OF LEASE 
Parent-son leases have a significantly higher 
proportion of livestock-share leases and a lower 
proportion of crop-share than do non related ones 
(table 31). There are larger proportions of young-
er renters among leases between related parties 
than among nonrelated (table 36). The implica-
tion is that young tenants renting from parents 
have opportunity to share in a larger business. 
This is an income advantage that results from the 
fact of relationship alone. The content or terms 
of livestock-share leases might be the same among 
related and nonrelated cases with no shift in 
income in the firm; but the fact of more livestock-
share leases among related tenancies indicates 
greater opportunity to get established earlier in 
a larger business. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TYPE OF RENTER 
There is no significant difference in the distri-
bution of types of renters in nonrelated compared 
with parent-son tenancies in 25 of the 46 economic 
areas~ In 19 of the other 21 areas, the proportion 
of full tenants with one landlord is larger, or that 
of part-owners with more than one landlord is 
TABLE 31. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LEASES 
BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
Nonrelative I Parent 
___ P.re~twiility~e ____ ~wiili~~I~ __ 
State Crop- Live· Crop- Liv .. 
and No. of Crop- shar .. stock· No. or Crop- shar .. stook-
area Jeases Casb .hare cash sbare leases Cash share cash ""a'o 
------------------
Ind. 6 ........ 122 4 66 10 20 18 ...... 55 6 39 
Iowa 3a ...... 110 6 15 52 27 35 11 3 34 51 
Kan. 6· ...... 18, 5 40 44 11 63 11 6 46 37 
Minn. 7·S· .... 181 22 21 46 11 94 19 17 30 34 
Neb. 1· ...... 158 31 27 35 4 61 23 10 21 26 
S. D. 1· ...... 110 24 46 20 6 25 8 32 4 36 
\Vis.S· ....... 104 28 29 4 37 75 17 5 ...... 68 
.One or more slgmficant dIfference In proportions between relatIOn 
types. 
TABLE 32. PERCENT OF FULL TENANTS AND PART-OWNERS 
BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
Nonrelative Parent 
Full tenant Part-owner Full tenant Part-owner 
---------
--------
State 1 20r+ 1 20r+ 1 20r + 1 20r+ 
and land· land- land- land· land. land· land· land. 
area lord lords lord lords lord lords • lord lords 
--
----
--------
Ind. 6 ..... 19 25 20 36 22 33 22 22 
Iowa 3a .... 62 22 12 4 68 17 6 9 
Kan.6 ..... 22 34 14 30 14 41 14 30 
Minn.7·S·. 60 21 22 7 66 20 7 6 
Neb.!.. ... 39 27 IS 16 46 21 16 16 
B. D.l· ... 23 16 29 32 44 12 28 16 
\Vis. 5' .... 38 12 31 19 57 12 28 3 
·One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
TABLE 83. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF SIZE OF TRACTS 
RENTED BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
N onrelativ .. , with .cr.a~. Parents, with acreage 
Stat. 
-----------
---- -------
and Under 100- 180- 260- 500 Under 100- 180- 260- 1100 
area 100 179 259 499 + lOll 179 259 499 + 
----
----------
-----
Ind. 6· ....... 47 27 11 14 I 33 49 6 6 6 
Inwa3a· ..... 23 36 18 18 Ii 11 34 46 9 
Kan. 6· ...... 33 37 15 14 1 11 34 32 19 4 
Minn.7·S· .... 22 47 15 15 1 7 51 30 11 1 
Neb. I' ...... 13 17 9 23 38 6 10 4 27 63 
S. D.I· ...... 11 34 6 20 29 8 12 
"27" 21 59 Wis. 5' ....... 47 35 13 4 1 25 38 9 1 
·One or more slgmficant dIfference In proportions between types. 
smaller for relatives (table 32). In general, part-
ownership is less frequent and full tenancy with 
only one landlord is more frequent among rela-
tives. In other words, the typical case for the son 
renting from a parent is that the son owns or 
rents no other land. One possible advantage is 
that relatives deal with fewer landlords and thus 
have fewer persons to satisfy in organizing re-
sources into an efficiently operated firm. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND ACRES RENTED THIS LANDLORD 
There are significant differences between one or 
more of the size groups in 29 of the 46 economic 
areas. More nonrelatives rent tracts of less than 
100 acres; more relatives rent tracts of 180 to 259 
acres or larger (table 33). 
The larger size of tract rented by relatives is 
an indication but not a Droof of advantage result-
ing from kinship. The difference shown here may 
be more than compensated by tracts rented from 
other landlords. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND DEAL WITH LANDLORD 
Larger proportions of the tenants renting from 
parents than those renting from nonrelatives deal 
directly with the landlord (table 34). Nonrela-
tives deal with an agent more frequently than do 
relatives; but the general practice for both is to 
deal with the landlord. 
Agents familiar with leasing problems and 
trained in farm management could offer useful 
service to the development of leasing arrange-
ments among both relatives and nonrelatives by 
acting as consultants. The leasing arrangement 
used may not always be the one best adapted to 
the property and to the parties. Opportunity for 
the two parties to discuss the terms with an expert 
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TABLE 34. PERCENT COMPARISON OF SELECTED CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF LEASES BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
__ Nonr.lative __ I ___ ~~ __ 
S~~e ~~~ I Written' ~~~. 'l.year I ~~ 'Written ~~. 'I-year ~_ landlor~ leases notice ~~ landlord lease. notice ~..:':.-
Ind. 6. . . . . 96 *32 '66 '70 100 6 40 43 
Iowa 3a. . . . 87 '56 '75 7i 94 26 45 67 
Kan. 6.... . 92 '18 '55 *74 100 0 29 61 
Minn. 7-8. . 'S8 '51 *46 61 99 25 29 49 
Neb. 1..... '92 '56 '65 '68 100 34 52 46 
S. D. 1. . . . *84 '50 '51 52 100 24 36 38 
Wis. 5..... 98 '39 '64 '73 100 25 49 41 
N onrelative Parent 
Share Share 
Share cash Share Share cash Share --,----,-,--
_State and area_ livestock expense_ machiner~ ~vestock ~ machine':. 
Ind. 6.... .. . ... . '20 PO 15 39 100 33 
Iowa 3a......... *27 99 '33 51 97 ij6 
Kan. 6... .. .. .. . '11 92 *25 38 93 52 
Mian. 7-8 ... ,. .. '11 81 '15 38 79 29 
N.b. 1...... . .. . '7 50 '11 47 63 35 
S. D. 1... . . . . . . . '12 '32 '9 54 71 55 
Wi •. 5. .. .. .. .. . '38 70 *22 69 77 48 
·Significant difference between proportions. 
could lead to solution of some of the problems 
peculiar to related tenancies. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND FREQUENCY OF WRITTEN 
LEASES 
Written leases are significantly more frequent 
in nonrelated than in closely related tenancies 
(table 34). In general, less than one in three or 
four leases between parent and son are written, 
whereas half or more of the leases between non-
relatives are written. 
This difference between related and nonrelated 
tenancies is not indicative of difference in resource 
use or frequency of income shifts between parties. 
Instead, the difference only reflects the relatively 
greater intimacy of contact and dealings among 
relatives and the tendency for relatives to deal 
orally. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND LENGTH OF TERMINATION 
NOTICE 
The proportion of leases with 1 to 6 months 
termination notice is significantly higher among 
nonrelatives than among relatives (table 34). 
The proportions of leases with no agreement on 
termination and the proportions of leases with 
instant notice are higher for relatives than for 
nonrelatives. Thus, leases between nonrelatives 
tend to be more specific about termination notice. 
Notices of more than 1 year are infrequent in all 
leases (tables 23, 29, 34). 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND LENGTH OF LEASE 
Significantly higher percentages of leases are 
for 1 year among nonrelatives (table 34). The 
proportions of agreements for 2 to 5 years are 
the same for nonrelatives and relatives. Higher 
proportions of the parent-son leases are in terms 
of "so long as we both agree" or for a period 
longer than 5 years.32 
Differences in length of lease between the two 
'"This detail i. not shown in the tahle but i. available at each 
participating state agricultural experiment station. 
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groups indicate an advantage to tenants renting 
from relatives. The longer term lease facilitates. 
planning of farm operation for a longer period of 
time. 
Problems of selecting the length of lease should 
be exactly the same whether there is or is not 
kinship between parties. Length of lease would 
need to be fitted to the kinds of products, and that 
choice should be unaffected by kinship. Undoubt-
edly, part of the difference in distribution of 
length of lease between the two groups is explain-
able by the greater frequency of livestock-share 
leases in related tenancies. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK 
Ownership of part or all of the livestock by the 
landlord is much more frequent in parent-son than 
in nonrelated tenancies (table 34). The differ-
ences in proportions are significant in all but seven 
economic areas. Ownership of livestock by the 
landlord is one of the methods of increasing the 
size of the farm business. In such case, the tenant 
has the opportunity of operating on a larger scale 
and sharing in a greater total farm income. This 
type of leasing arrangement is less frequent 
among nonrelatives except in areas in which live-
stock-share leases predominate. In economic area 
3 of Wisconsin, for example, ownership of live-
stock by landlords is as frequent among non-
relatives as among relatives. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND PAYMENT OF CASH EXPENSES 
There is no significant difference between rela-
tives and non relatives in the practice of payment 
of cash expenses in 34 economic areas. The gen-
eral practice is for the landlord to share some of 
the expenses whether or not related to the tenant 
(table 34). 
The extent of sharing of expenses, the shares 
paid by the landlord on given items and the prac-
tice of sharing variable expenses in the same pro-
portion as returns are shared are quite another 
question. It is in these details of arrangement 
that shifting of income from one party to the 
other can take place. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND OWNERSHIP OF MACHINERY 
Ownership of machinery by the landlord is more 
frequent in parent-son tenancies than in non-
related ones (table 34). This again is one of the 
practices used by parents in helping to finance 
the operations of a son. The same type of ar-
rangement would be applicable among nonrela-
tives. 
Ownership or lack of ownership of machinery 
by the landlord is no cause in itself for a shifting 
of income. Investment in machinery and equip-
ment is merely one of the essential fixed expenses 
that must be handled the same as other fixed 
expenses in evaluating the contributions of the 
parties to the agreement. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND CASH PAYMENT FOR 
HAYLAND 
Relatives and nonrelatives pay the same rates 
per acre for the use of hayland under crop-share-
TABLE 35. COMPARISON OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 
CROP-SHARE-CASH LEASES BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
Nonr.l.ti.... I ___ ~.rent ___ _ 
Percent with Percent with 
Stat. 
and 
areat 
hayland rental hayland rental 
rer acre in $ Percent with per acre in S Percent with 
--'.- - -- cash rental - - - -- cash rent.l 
I 2-4 5_9 IO-H for huildings 1 2-4 5_9 10-14 for buildings 
Ind. 6 ......................... . 
Iowa 3a...... .... 5 56 .... .. 
K.n.6 ........... 19.... 4 
Minn. 7-8..... .... 10 59 21 
Neb. 1. . . .... 33 .... 7 .... .. 
S. D. 1 ....... 50 ............. . 
42 
2 
10 
Ii 
7 
5 
tWisconsin area deleted; too few cases. 
.... "g' ·.i5· "'0" :::::::::::: 
.... 11 .................... .. 
.... 4 75 11 .......... .. 
, ... 50 .......... 10 
cash leases (table 35). The differences in the per-
centage distributions of rates per acre within 
areas are explainable by differences in quality 
alone.~3 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND CASH RENTAL FOR USE 
OF BUILDINGS 
There is no significant difference between rel-
atives and nonrelatives in the frequency of the 
practice of paying a cash rental for use of build-
ings (table 35). Relatives and non relatives follow 
the same general practice regarding this type of 
cash payment by the tenant. Payment of a cash 
rental for use of buildings is the exception rather 
than the rule. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND AGE OF RENTER 
There are significantly higher proportions of 
renters 25 to 34 years of age and significantly 
~~A .ignifieant difference between related !lnd nonrelated tenancies 
might exist in the number of acres for which the payment is made. 
Even though the number of acres used for hay could be the same, rela-
tives may arbitrarily decrease the number of acres for which charge is 
made. The data are not in sufficient detail to test this difference. 
lower proportions 45 or older renting from parents 
than renting from non relatives (table 36). The 
proportions of renters over 55 years of age who 
rent from parents are smaller than the propor~ 
tions of nonrelatives over 55.34 
This type of difference between related and non-
related tenancies results from the institutional 
arrangements within which tenancy functions 
rather than from peculiarities within leasing sys-
tems. The parent or other relative may purposely 
choose to give the tenant such advantage. The 
young tenant gains in experience, capital accu-
mulation and in the opportunity for continuity of 
operation on the same land. Resources may be 
used more efficiently because of the interest in 
future ownership. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TYPE OF LANDLORD 
Significantly greater proportions of landlords 
are retired farmers and farm widows in related 
than in nonrelated tenancies. Landlords are busi-
ness or professional men more frequently in non-
related tenancies (table 37). 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND AGE OF LANDLORD 
Parents are older than nonrelated landlords 
(table 38). Less than 15 percent of the parents 
are under 54 years of age, but 20 to nearly 40 
percent of nonrelatives are under 54 years of age. 
The proportions of parents between 55 and 74 are 
significantly larger in 17 economic areas. N on-
relatives are distributed more evenly among all 
age groups than are parents. 
a4The differ. nee between related and nonrelated disappears as the 
degree of relationship changes. Operators renting from an uncle or 
cousin have the same age distribution as do those renting from non-
relatives. Additional data are available at eaeh participating state agri-
cultural experiment station. 
TABLE 36. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGE OF RENTERS BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
N onrelative Parent 
Pe-rcent of renters. age Percent of renters. age 
___ . __ , __ S_ta_te_a_n,d_ .a_r_e.______ und.r2~1 25-34 I 3~44 45-54 55_64 I 65+ Under 25 I 25-3~J 35-14- 45-s4]_~5-64 65+ = 
Ind. 6'" ... , . , , ...................... . 5 27 30 18 16 4 5 56 22 17 ................... . 
Iowa 3a .... , .... , .................... . 5 H 28 17 5 6 50 29 12 3 
Kan. 6' ... , .......................... . 7 23 29 24 12 5 3 46 34 12 3 2 
Minn. 7-S* ..... , ..................... . 4 34 28 22 10 2 6 48 31 15 ................... . 
Neb. I' ............ , ................. . 2 35 25 20 12 6 3 36 48 5 7 
S. D.I' .......................... .. 4 29 25 28 to 4 8 52 36 4 
Wis. 5' ............................. .. 5 30 29 IS 12 6 10 41 25 20 4 
• One or more significant difTerence in proportions between types. 
TABLE 37. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LANDLORD BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
:SonreJative Pare,,1 
Percent landlords Perce"t landlords 
Active I' Itetired Bus. or I~ Nonfarm 1--- Active Retired Bus. or Farm -I~ ---
St.te and arca farmer farmer ~ widow widow ~ farmer farmer ~~ widow widow ~ 
Ind. 6'.".. ..................... .... 7 19 48 12 7 7 18 24 12 35 0 12 
Iowa 3a ............ " .... .. .. . .. .... .. II 22 43 9 5 10 9 57 6 20 0 9 
Kan. 6'.. ..."....................... 13 32 34 7 6 8 25 H 0 27 0 3 
Minn. 7-S'.. ... ................. ...... 15 28 27 7 9 14 12 67 0 19 I 1 
Neb. I'.. .. .... .. .. .... .. .... .. . .. .. .. 22 19 27 12 7 13 25 H 0 23 2 7 
S. D. 1*".. .. .. .... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. . 22 18 31 5 7 16 17 6,3 4 17 0 0 
Wis. 5'. . . . . . . . . . ..... ............... 15 24 34 13 3 12 12 45 9 24 3 7 
'One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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TABLE 38. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF AGE OF LANDLORDS 
BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
Nonrcla.tive 
State Percent of landlords. age 
and ------
-,------area Under 25 25-34 35-44 45..54 55-64/ G5-74 75-84 85+ ------------Ind. 6 ..... 1 5 20 27 28 15 4 
Iowa. 3a*, .. 1 2 13 13 28 26 14 3 
Kan. 6* .... ........ 5 15 37 26 16 1 
Minn. 7-8*. ........ 1 11 20 29 25 10 4 
Neb. 1 * .... ........ 2 8 24 29 22 14 
S. D. 1 .... ........ 4 10 23 21 31 10 1 
'Wis. 5* .... ........ 2 10 15 33 26 14 . ....... 
Parent 
State Porcent of landlords. age 
and --
25-34135-44/45-51 55-64/65-7-:" 75-84 85+ area Under 25 
Ind. 6 ..... .. .. .. . . 5 11 39 3~ 1\ ........ 
Iowa 330* ••. ........ ........ 15 35 21 23 6 
Kan. G· .... ........ ........ 25 16 38 17 3 
Minn. 7-8'. ........ ........ 1 7 35 34 17 5 
Neb. 1* .... ........ , ....... 2 12 15 45 25 2 
S. D.!. ... ........ ........ ........ 4 36 52 8 
'Wis. 5· .... ........ ........ ........ 7 31 30 23 I 9 
·One Or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
RELATION OF LANDLORD AND NUMBER OF YEARS RENTED 
There are significant differences between par-
ents and nonrelatives in the number of years 
tracts have been rented (table 39). More of the 
parent tenancies have been in effect 5 years or 
longer. This indicates that tenure is longer for 
the son renting from his father than for a tenant 
renting from a nonrelative. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RENTER 
Several characteristics of renters have been dis-
cussed in the preceding section. Age, size of tract, 
proportion of written agreements, number of 
years rented, termination notice, relation of land-
lord and type of landlord apply to renters as well 
as to leases. The particular items may be used to 
characterize either the lease or the renter depend-
ing upon the point of emphasis. 
AGE OF RENTER 
Age is directly related to the accumulation of 
capital; tenants who have acquired their livestock 
and equipment through their own earnings are 
usually older ones. Young tenants generally would 
have sufficient capital to operate farms that are 
smaller than those operated by tenants nearing 
the retirement age. Few renters under 25 years 
of age have cash leases (table 24). Younger ones 
have rented the same land fewer years than have 
older renters (table 25). Those renting from par-
ents are younger than those renting from non-
relatives (table 36). 
AGE OF RENTER AND TYPE OF RENTER 
Larger proportions of renters in the younger 
age group than of those in older age groups are 
full tenants (table 40) _ The percent of renters 
under 35 who are full tenants is significantly larg-
er than the percent of part-owners in all but two 
of the 46 economic areas. At 55 and over, the 
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proportion of part-owners is significantly larger 
than that of full tenants in more than half of 
the economic areas_ 
AGE OF RENTER AND SIZE OF TRACT RENTED FROM 
THIS LANDLORD 
There is no consistent pattern of relation be-
tween age of operator and size of tract (table 41). 
In 18 economic areas, there are no significant dif-
ferences_ In the other 28 areas, one or more pro-
portion is larger (or smaller) than the comparable 
proportion for all leases, but there is no single 
age group with all proportions differing from the 
average. There are too few cases in the 65 to 74 
group for reliable tests of difference. In general, 
renters of all ages rent the same size of tract. 
But this does not mean that they operate the 
same size farm because many of them rent from 
more than one landlord and only one tract is re-
ported here_ 
AGE OF RENTER AND PROPORTION OF WRITTEN LEASES 
There is no significant difference in the fre-
quency of written leases among renters of differ-
ent ages compared with the percent of all leases 
written in 29 of the 46 areas. In practice, the 
age of the renter apparently has little effect upon 
whether the lease is written (table 42). The class 
interval itself could account for the differences 
shown in table 42. A few operators just past 25 
and a few more not quite 35 would be enough to 
make the 25- to 34-year age group larger than the 
corresponding proportion for all renters in a given 
area. 
TYPE OF RENTER 
Full tenants renting from one landlord are 
somewhat more frequent in related than in non-
TABLE 39. PERCENT DISTlUBUTION OF NUMBER OF YEARS 
RENTED THIS LAND BY RELATION OF LANDLORD. 
State 
N onrel.live I Parent 
__ Percent or tracts re~e_d _____ Percent of tracts rente_d_ 
and 1 2-4 5-9 10+ 1 I 2-4 5-9 10+ 
area year years years _years ~ years_ years ~~_ 
Ind. 6 ..... 11 30 31 28 12 12 41 35 
Iowa 33*, .. 20 39 25 16 ........ ~6 41 33 
Kan. 6· .... 2 43 33 22 ........ 26 35 39 
Minn. 7-8'. 14 23 42 21 1 32 H 23 
Neb. 1· .... 8 37 30 25 9 21 43 27 
S. D. 1·, .. 9 40 22 29 4 36 56 4 
Wi!. 5' .... 24 41 24 11 9 31 27 33 
·One or more significant difference in proportions between groups. 
TABLE 40, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF FULL TENANTS 
AND PART-OWNERS BY AGE OF RENTER. 
State Under 251 25-34 , 35-44 ~-~I~-~ 65+ 
and F:T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T.I P.O. area F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. 
--~~
Ind. 6· ...... 84 16 53 47 40 60 35 65 3'} 68 33 67 
Iowa 3a· .... 90 10 91 9 68 32 67 33 75 25 0 100 
Kan. G· ..... 91 9 76 24 48 52 54 46 38 62 20 80 
Minn. 7-S· .. 100 0 91 9 76 24 63 37 48 52 33 67 
Neb. 1· ..... 100 0 90 10 61 39 44 56 32 68 50 50 
S. D. 1· ..... 72 28 57 43 40 60 32 68 0 100 20 80 
Wis. S· ..... 57 43 78 22 48 52 51 49 38 62 33 67 
·Significant difference between proportions within two or more age 
groups, 
TABLE 41. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF SIZE OF TRACTS 
RENTED BY AGE OF RENTER. 
Under 25 years 25·34 years 35-44 years 
Percent of tracl8 Percent of tracl8 Percent of tracl8 
with acres with acres with acres 
State ------------------------
and o. 100- 26().. 500 o. 10o. 260- 500 o. 100- 26o. 500 
area 99 259 499 + 99 259 409 + 99 259 499 + 
----------------
--------
Ind.6 ....••• 58 33 8 0 45 47 6 2 42 40 16 2 
Iowa 3a· .... 10 70 10 10 11 68 19 2 25 51 17 7 
Kan. 6· ..... 5 56 39 0 18 70 11 1 36 52 12 0 
Minn. 7-8 •.. 13 73 13 0 17 67 15 1 18 72 9 1 
Nt'>. 1· ..... 17 17 33 33 12 29 30 29 7 13 23 57 
S. D. 1· ..... 0 57 0 43 7 19 22 52 9 40 23 28 
Wis. 5· ..... 43 50 7 0 29 67 3 1 53 42 5 0 
45-54 years 55-64 years 65-74 years 
Percent of tracl8 Percent of tr ... 18 Percent of tracts 
with acres with acres with acres 
State ------------------_._- -
and o. 10o. 26o. 500 o. 10o. 26().. 500 o. 100- 26o. 500 
area 99 259 499 + 99 259 499 + 99 259 499 + 
--------------
--------
Ind. 6 ....... 50 35 13 2 46 36 18 0 56 44 0 0 
Iowa 3a* .•.. 40 60 0 0 25 37 37 0 100 0 0 0 
Kan. 6· ..... 32 47 18 3 64 20 16 0 30 70 0 0 
Minn. 7-8 ... 24 61 13 2 9 78 9 4 0 67 0 33 
Neb. 1· ..... 17 37 17 29 4 32 14 50 12 38 25 25 
S. D. 1· ..... 6 50 14 30 24 35 24 17 20 60 0 20 
Wi •• 0· ..... 32 61 7 0 62 28 5 5 50 50 0 0 
·One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
distribution of all tracts by size groups. 
TABLE 42. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES BY AGE OF RENTERS. 
State .nd area Under 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 
---------------
Ind. 6 ........... 45 21 31 15 18 11 
Iowa 3a ......... 50 49 43 30 50 0 
Kan.6 .......... 9 18 10 25 14 0 
Minn. 7-8 ....... 60 44 36 44 39 33 
Neb.!. ......... 50 53 50 38 58 60 
S. D. 1 .......... 33 46 48 56 56 60 
Wis. 5" ......... 21 52 18 23 24 12 
.One or more significant difference between proportion for age groups 
and proportion for all leases. 
related tenancies (table 32). Full tenants tend to 
be younger than part-owners (table 40). In gen-
eral, however, there is no consistent pattern of 
differences between full tenants and part-owners 
or between tenants renting from one or more than 
one landlord. 
TYPE OF RENTER AND SHARE OF CORN 
There are few significant differences between 
the proportions of leases with a 50-50 share of 
corn for full tenants and part-owners (table 43). 
Share of crop paid as rental varies between areas; 
the 50-50 share predominates throughout the 
Corn Belt and the Va or % share predominates in 
the wheat and grazing areas for both full tenants 
and part-owners.35 
TYPE OF RENTER AND SHARE OF EXPENSE 
There is no significant difference between the 
proportions of leases with a 50-50 share of lime 
or of hired labor for full tenants and part-owners. 
The prevailing practice is for the tenant to pay 
85This same situation appears when further breakdown is made 
between full tenants with one landlord and full tenants wbo rent from 
more than one landlord: the shares are the same. Likewise. tbere is 
no significant difference between shares for part-owners renting from 
One landlord and part-owners renting from more than one landlord. 
the costs of hired labor (table 43). Full tenants 
and part-owners pay the same share of expenses. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LANDLORDS 
In all economic areas, 80 percent or more of the 
owners of rented land are individuals (table 44). 
An estate is the owner of as much as 10 percent 
of the tracts in only five economic areas. Partner-
ships account for ownership of not more than 5 
percent, and a corporation is owner of 1 to 3 
percent of the tracts in half the economic areas. 
The government is owner of 1 to 4 percent of the 
tracts in nine areas, and of 8 percent of the tracts 
in one economic area. 
TYPE OF LANDLORD 
Individual owners were classed as: active farm-
ers; retired farmers; business or professional 
men; farm widows; nonfarm widows; and others, 
to include other individuals, estates, corporations 
and government. The distribution of types of 
landlords is very much the same in all economic 
areas, as illustrated by the examples in table 45. 
TYPE OF LANDLORD AND TYPE OF LEASE 
There is no consistent difference between type 
of lease and type of landlord within areas (table 
46). In general, the distribution for each type of 
landlord follows closely the distribution of all 
leases by type (see table 17). The proportion of 
one type of lease for one type of landlord is small-
TABLE 43. PERCENT OF LEASES WITH 50-50 SHARE: CORN; 
LIME; HIRED LABOR; FULL TENANTS AND PART-OWNERS. 
I Corn Lime Hired labor 
------------------
Fun Part- Full Part- Full Part-
State .nd area tenant owner ten.nt owner tenant owner 
------------
Ind. 6 .......... 63 39 12 6 8 2 
Iowa3a ......... 97 97 24 23 7 7 
Kan.6 .......... '74 57 36 31 , 7 
Minn. 7-8 ....... "50 31 37 29 5 0 
Neb. 1 .......... 16 5 9 0 12 0 
S. D. 1. ......... '26 4 II 8 8 6 
Wis.5 .......... 83 64 35 25 21 20 
.Significant difference between proportions. 
TABLE 44. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF OWNER. 
State and ares leases vidual Estate ship ration ment Other 
No. of Indi- p.ttner-I Corpo- Govern· 
-----11--------------
Ind. 6 ............. . 185 91 5 2 1 0 1 
Iowa3s ........... . 189 88 7 5 0 0 
Kan. 6 ............ . 341 . 93 Ii 1 1 0 0 
Minn. 7·8 .......... . 352 87 10 2 0 1 
Neb. 1. .......... .. 281 85 5 2 3 4 
S. D.l ........... .. 171 81 6 2 2 8 0 
Wis. 5 ............. . 230 95 2 1 2 0 0 
TABLE 45. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LANDLORDS. 
Active 
I 
Retired Bus. or Farm I Xonfarm I St.te and arell farmer farmer professional widow widow Other 
---------
Ind. 6 ........... 10 22 36 14 7 II 
Iowa 3 .......... 13 30 28 13 5 11 
Kiln. 6 .......... 12 29 24 16 4 15 
Minn. 7-8 ...•... 14 41 16 10 
" 
14 
Neb. 1. ......... 23 26 17 13 5 16 
S. D.1 .......... 19 26 24 8 5 18 
Wis. 5 .......... 11 29 23 17 4 16 
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TABLE 4G. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LEASE 
BY TYPE OF LANDLORD. 
Business or 
State professionalt Activo farmert I Retired farmert 
and 
-IJ 2 1 3J_4 _~L~J_~]_~ 1 I 2 [~~[4 area 
------
Ind. 6 ....... 11 61 6 22 2 71 12 15 6 60 9 25 
Iowa 3a· .... 4 24 36 36 5 14 43 38 6 10 4G 38 
Kan. 6· ..... 0 39 37 24 5 29 47 19 12 41 28 19 
Minn. 7-8' .. 16 24 42 18 25 20 31 23 18 14 5S 12 
Neb. 1· ..... 27 13 H 8 21 30 23 14 19 36 38 0 
S. D. 1· ..... 16 47 22 16 9 36 13 29 15 56 12 7 
Wi •. 5 ...... 28 20 0 52 20 23 2 53 30 16 4 40 
Farm widowt Olhert State 
nd 
I Nonfarm widowt 
:rea '-'-2-1-3- -41-1-'-2- -3-1-4- -1-1-2- -3"1-4-
~-----------------
Ind. 6 ....... 0 52 12 36 8 77 8 8 14 62 19 5 
Iowa 3.· .... 17 12 46 25 0 22 56 22 19 5 52 24 
Kan. G· ..... 2 27 61 10 8 25 67 0 4 27 53 16 
Minn. 7~8* .. 22 25 36 17 5 22 56 17 24 18 40 18 
Neb. 1· ..... 37 17 23 14 46 8 31 8 47 21 26 7 
S. D.I· ..... 8 62 23 8 38 38 
2g I 0 52 23 13 10 Wi •• 5 ..... 24 24 3 38 20 10 50 25 25 0 36 
'One Or more significant difference in proportions between types of 
landlord. 
tType of lease: l-cash; 2-crop-ohare; 3-crop-share-cash; 4-live-
stock-share. 
er (or larger) than that for another type of land-
lord in half the areas; but the pattern of difference 
varies from area to area_ 30 
The significance of the association between type 
of lease and type of landlord is in the effect of 
the capital position of the individual landlord upon 
the kind of lease he wants and the extent of his 
interest in the day to day operations of the farm. 
An active farmer who plans to lease his farm as 
a part of his retirement plan would likely be in-
terested in a livestock-share lease. In contrast, 
a farm widow would likely be interested in a cash 
lease, particularly if entirely dependent upon the 
rented farm as a source of living expenses, be-
cause of the certainty of the given income from 
year to year. 
TYPE OF LANDLORD AND LENGTH OF LEASE 
The proportion of I-year leases is much the 
same for landlords of different types and for land-
lords of different ages (tables 47 and 48). The 
smaller number of landlords under 25 years of age 
(table 48) explains the higher proportion of 
I-year leases in that age group. Although the 
proportion of 1-year leases for one type of land-
lord (or one age of landlord) differs significantly 
a·A similar comparison Was made by age of landlord with the same 
result; lease' types do not vary consistently with age of landlord; aee 
supplementary table 72. Nor does size of tract vary consistently with 
type of landlord; see supplementary table 67. 
TABLE 47. PERCENT I-YEAR LEASES BY TYPE OF LANDLORD. 
[ I Non-I I All Active lI.tired Bus. or Farm farm 
State and area I..... farmer farmer ~ widow widow Other 
Ind. 6' ... , .. , , .... , 64 67 72 70 46 42 60 
Iowa 3a ... ,., .. , ... 70 67 70 67 81 67 75 
Kan. 6'. , .. , , ...... 69 R8 68 72 60 100 58 
Minn. 7-8 ........ , .. 56 65 56 58 SO 47 54 
Neb. I· ..... , ..... 59 58 63 72 57 77 45 
S. D. I"." .. 48 48 52 60 50 57 21 
Wis. 5" .. , ... : ::::: 62 65 54 63 57 60 76 
·One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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from that of another in the same area, there are 
no consistent differences from area to area. 
Type of landlord and age of landlord, separately 
and together, are matters of importance to the 
tenant because of the need of opportunity for 
the two parties to pool their resources over a 
period of years. Any tenant renting from a land-
lord of advanced years knows that a change in 
landlords is certain in the near future. 
TYPE OF LANDLORD AND AGE OF LANDLORD 
The proportions of landlords of different types 
change with age of landlord (table 49). There are 
few landlords of any type under 35 or over 85_ 
The proportion of active farmers decreases and 
that of retired farmers increases with the in-
crease in age. The change takes place gradually. 
There are few significant differences between the 
proportions of retired farmers 45 to 54 compared 
with those 55 to 64; but in most economic areas 
the proportion of retired farmers 65 to 74 is great-
er than that of retired farmers 45 to 54. The 
proportion of farm widows also increases with 
age of landlord; but the number of cases in the 
younger age groups is so small that the differ-
ences in proportions are not statistically sig-
nificant. The proportion of landlords who are 
business or professional men remains the same 
with change in age, as does that of nonfarm 
widows.3i 
TYPE OF LANDLORD AND FREQUENCY OF WRITTEN LEASES 
Written leases occur with the same frequency 
among all types of landlords in one-third of the 
economic areas. In half the areas, the proportion 
of written leases is significantly higher for land-
lords who are business or professional men than 
for those who are farmers or farm widows. The 
proportion of nonfarm widows with written leases 
is significantly larger than that of all others in 
two areas and is larger than the proportions of 
farm widows, active farmers and retired farmers 
in seven areas. Thus, written leases are more fre-
quent for business men and nonfarm widows 
(table 50). 
The same need for written leases is present 
among all types of landlords. Agreements be-
tween father and son can involve such close work-
ing relationships in the day to day operations that 
whether the lease is written or oral is of no conse-
quence. However, planning the content of the 
"1Comparison was aloo made between age of landlord and age of 
renter; the distribution of age of tenants I. the same for all ages of 
landlord; see supplementary table 73. 
TABLE 48. PERCENT I-YEAR LEASES BY AGE OF LANDLORD. 
Stat. 
Under 251 25-34 1 35-44 45-54 1 55-64 65-ul~~I~ and area 
Ind. 6,.,., . . . . . . . . 50 75 63 64 64 63 67 
Iowa 3a'", ........ 83 83 50 55 76 81 88 
Kan. 6'" .. ........ 100 80 80 59 73 71 100 
Minn. 7-8 .. . . . . . . . . 50 52 62 48 61 53 75 
Neb. t· .. " ........ 60 29 70 67 53 59 ICO 
S. D. 1. ... 100 75 80 67 41 40 47 ........ 
Wi •. 5 ..... 100 67 82 69 58 67 45 40 
·One or more significant difference In proportions between age 
groups. 
TABLE 49. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF LANDLORD BY AGE OF LANDLORD. 
State Percent of landlords 25-34t Percent oflandlord. 35-Ht 1 Percent of landlords 45-5~t 
:~e~ 1 I 2 - 3 4 -' 5 I 6 1 2 --3 4 I 5 '6 I 2 3 4' 5 ' 6 
Ind. 6'".. ........ ........ 25 ..... '.. ........ 75 12 0 50 12 12 12 12 3 59 3 3 19 
Iowa 3a·.. 33...... .. 17 .......... ,..... 50 25 00 .. .... .. ........ 25 25 11 29 4 14 18 
Kan. 6·... ........ ........ 100 .. ...... ........ ........ 33 47 7.... .. .. 13 27 20 24 20 4 4 
Minn. 7-8' .... .... ........ 50........ ........ 50 42 4 21 8.... .. .. 25 31 18 35 6 4 6 
Neb. 1'.. . 60. .... . .. 40. .... ... ........ ........ 50 21 .. .. . ... ........ 29 H 15 37 2 2 
S. D. 1.". ........ ........ 75.. .. .... ........ 25 40 50 ...... " ........ 10 38 10 31 4.. .. .. .. 12 
Wis. 5·.... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 100 9 9 36 27 9 9 9 3 53 3 9 22 
State Percent of landlords 55-6H Percent of landlords 65-Nt I Percent of landlords 75-8H 
--.J:'.~ 1 2 L 3 4 1- 5 6 1 1 2 3 I 4 0 6 l' 2 1_ 3 4 =-5 1_ 6 
Ind. 0'".. 10 14 47 12 2 14 10 37 23 17 12 2 4 36 U 20 12 4 
Iowa 3.·.. 20 29 29 8 6 8 3 46 26 23 3 4 57 14 21 4 
Kan. 6'.. . 11 28 38 10 4 10 12 37 18 18 5 11 9 60 9 21 2 ...... .. 
Minn. 7-8' 18 48 15 10 4 6 4 58 8 11 10 9 3 56 18 21 3 ...... .. 
Neb. 1·... 24 24 17 16 3 16 17 48 3 23 5 5 3 45 16 11 13 13 
S. D. 1... . 21 39 15 9 6 9 12 49 22 12 2 2 7 40 7 20 27 
Wi •. 5·.... 19 2~ 36 8 2 12 12 45 8 27 8 3 50 3 33 6 6 
'One or Inore signitlcant difference in proportions between age groups. 
tType of lBndl!'rd: I-active farmer; 2-retired farmer; a-business or professional; 4-farm widow; Ii-nonfarm widow; 6--other. 
lease and making it specific on the important de-
tails should result in fewer misunderstandings 
between parties and also encourage the reaching 
of agreements on matters that are often present 
and continuing sources of dissatisfaction but upon 
which decision fully acceptable to both is never 
made. The question of improvements on buildings, 
for example, might be raised under an oral lease 
without action being taken_ Spelling out the de-
tails under a written lease would tend to encour-
age action and actual solution of the problem. 
TYPE OF LANDLORD AND CASH PAYMENT FOR BUILDINGS 
There is no significant difference between types 
of landlords in the proportions of leases with cash 
payments on buildings (table 51). The propor-
tions are for only those leases in which a definite 
answer was given by the tenant. Respondents who 
did not reply are excluded. Therefore, the percent 
of all landlords receiving a cash payment for build-
ings is smaller than the data in the table indicate. 
In practice, specific cash payment for use of build-
ings is the exception rather than the rule. 
TENANT SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE LEASING 
PRACTICES 
Respondents were asked to express their ideas 
on changes needed in rental agreements in their 
community to: (1) increase the income received 
by both renters and landlords; (2) increase soil 
conserving practices on rented farms; (3) en-
courage keeping more livestock on rented farms; 
and (4) encourage making improvements in build-
ings and land on rented farms. Roughly a third 
of all respondents gave one or more specific sug-
gestions. 
The content of suggestions made by tenants for 
improvement of rental practices indicates that 
many tenants in their own thinking draw a clear 
distinction between terms of the lease as such 
and problems of organization and management on 
the leased farm. Apparently, there is a tendency 
to think of a lease as merely a contract or agree-
ment which specifies dates and rates of payment. 
Organization and management of the leased farm 
after the lease terms are specified are another 
and separate problem. The relation between the 
two, and especially the effect of the terms and 
content of the lease upon the level of farm income, 
apparently does not appear to be viewed as a 
specific problem in leasing. 
The suggestions are summarized by states be-
cause of the small number of replies per area. 
Percentages were calculated by taking the num-
ber of tenants replying with the given or classi-
fied answer as a percentage of those who gave 
any answer. Some tenants gave more than one 
suggestion, and therefore the sum of the percent-
ages may exceed 100. It is the percent making 
the given reply rather than the distribution be-
tween different replies that is important. 
TABLE 50. PERCENT WRITTEN LEASES BY TYPE 
OF LANDLORD. 
Active Retired Business Farm Sonfarm 
Stale and area farmer farmer or prof. widow widow Other 
---------------
Ind. 6 ........... 17 20 31 21 8 19 
Iowa3a ......... 40 41 48 29 6j 48 
Kan. 6· ......... 7 9 21 6 50 27 
Minn. 7-8· ...... 28 35 61 34 50 60 
Neb. 1·, ........ ~4 44 51 50 77 53 
S. D. 1·, ........ 42 40 55 23 38 H 
Wi •. S .......... 42 30 35 19 30 35 
·One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
TABLE 51. PERCENT OF LANDLORDS RECEIVING A CASH 
PAYMENT FOR USE OF BUILDINGS BY TYPE OF LANDLORD. 
I Active I Retired I Business Farm Nonfarm State and ~ farmer farmer or prof. widow _~dow ~ 
Ind. 6........... .......... 6 7 9 5 
~:n~~~::::::::: :::::::::: .... ·5.... ~ .. ··ai ........ iii.... 1~ 
Minn. 7-8....... 9 ... ·2·0 .... · 10 .... 2·5..... .......... 9 )IIeh. 1.......... 11 .................. .. 
S. D. 1.......... 14 ................................................ .. 
Wi •. 5.......... .......... .......... 17 ............................ .. 
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TABLE 52. PERCENT OF TENANTS MAKING SPECIFIC 
SUGGESTION, AMONG TENANTS OFFERING 
SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE INCOME. 
Increase I Increase Landlord Share length termit\ation Improve furnish more 
State expense oflease notIce practices facilities 
Ind •............. 25 12 1 30 12 
Iowa ............ 22 17 1 37 10 
Kan ............. 27 19 1 52 3 
Minn ............ 25 16 ...... i .... · 34 12 
Neb ............. 25 11 55 7 
S.D ............. 21 12 . ........... 53 4 
Wi ............... 23 10 ............ 24 10 
SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE INCOME 
Less than 20 percent of those who offered sug-
gestions on methods to increase income on rented 
farms proposed an increase in the length of lease 
as one way to do it (table 52). By inference, the 
cause-effect relation between length of lease and 
level of income does not appear as a problem im-
portant to a majority of tenants. One percent of 
those offering suggestions mentioned termination 
notice. 
Improvement of management practices was the 
most frequent suggestion. There is no way of 
telling whether the respondent was thinking of 
changes in rotation, adding legumes or increased 
use of fertilizer as management decisions separate 
and distinct from the lease as such or whether 
some of the practices were to be brought about 
by changes in provisions of the lease. 
Those suggesting that changes be made in shar-
ing 9f expenses usually also suggested that the 
landlord either share a part of an expense not 
now shared or assume a larger share of a given 
expense-most often of lime and fertilizer. The 
majority of those offering suggestions saw the 
problem of increasing farm income as a joint 
responsibility of tenants and l~ndlords working 
together. Few specifically stated that the contri-
bution of more production facilities should be by 
the landlord alone. 
SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE SOIL CONSERVING 
PRACTICES 
The most frequent suggestion to increase con-
servation was some form of land-management 
practices-a change in rotation, use of manure 
and commercial fertilizer or keeping more live-
stock. These suggestions were often posed as 
management problems alone, and few respondents 
expressed any ideas about particulars of relations 
between terms of the lease and conservation 
(table 53). 
One exception to the apparent distinction be-
tween leasing and conservation problems was ex-
pressed by respondents who saw the main con-
servation problem as one of getting landlords to 
appreciate the needs for conservation on their 
own farms. Five to 19 percent mentioned need 
to "educate the landlord," and this education ap-
plied to conservation on rented farms. Obviously, 
there is a problem in landlord-tenant relations 
whether it is the landlord who wants to conserve 
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and the tenant who is unwilling or whether it is 
the tenant who wants to conserve but is held 
back by refusal of the landlord. 
Sharing the costs of conservation practices was 
the second most frequent suggestion offered by 
respondents (table 53). Often this suggestion 
took the form of recommending that more land-
lords furnish materials and tenants do the work, 
thus indicating a willingness on the part of ten-
ants to bear some of the costs of conservation. 
Less than 1 percent of those making suggestions 
proposed an increase in government payments for 
conservation practices. 
SUGGESTIONS TO ENCOURAGE MORE LIVESTOCK 
The most frequent suggestion to encourage 
greater numbers of livestock on rented farms was 
for the landlord to provide more facilities for 
livestock (table 54). There is no indication iIi the 
replies as to how the payment would be made to 
the landlord for these facilities. The information 
supplied by respondents only indicates that, in the 
tenant's opinion, provision of livestock facilities 
by the landlord is the most important method of 
increasing livestock numbers. 
The most frequent suggestion in the economic 
areas in which cash grain is the major product 
sold was that changes are needed in the type of 
lease and type of farming. Usually this sugges-
tion proposed a decrease in numbers of cash and 
of crop-share rentals or a revision in the cash-
crop system of farming. There were no details of 
suggestion on substitutions, except that some 
respondents suggested the use of more stock-share 
leases. 
Few respondents mentioned need for longer 
leases to encourage greater numbers of livestock. 
TABLE 53. PERCENT OF TENANTS MAKING SPECIFIC 
SUGGESTION, AMONG TENANTS OFFERING SUG-
GESTIONS TO INCREASE CONSERVATION. 
Chaoge 
Increase Increas. ~otation, 
length Share Improve Educate government 
State ofleas. costs practices landlord payments 
Ind .............. 10 26 29 11 
..· .. ·2 .... · 
Iowa ............ 15 14 55 7 
Ksn ............. 14 25 64 19 ............ 
Minn ............ 11 22 53 4 1 
Neb ............. 10 22 57 10 1 
S.D ............. 13 22 63 10 1 
Wis .............. 9 26 57 5 ............ 
TABLE 54. PERCENT OF TENANTS MAKING SPECIFIC SUG-
GESTION, AMONG TENANTS OFFERING SUGGESTIONS 
TO INCREASE NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK. 
Eliminate Landlord Decreas. 
More live- Increase eash-crop provide cash rent 
stock ... hare length system of more on hay and 
Btate leases of Ie ... farming facilities pasture 
Iod .............. 15 5 8 51 2 
Iowa ............ 13 5 1 45 14 
Kao ............. 16 4 59 20 6 
Minn ............ 8 2 6 38 12 
Neb ............. 12 4 15 51 11 
S.D ............. 7 4 36 24 5 
Wis .............. 6 3 ............ 20 ............ 
SUGGESTIONS TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVEMENTS 
In conformity with the ideas on how to increase 
farm income, how to encourage conservation and 
how to increase livestock numbers, the most fre-
quent suggestion to obtain additional improve-
ments on rented farms was for the landlord to 
do more of it (table 55). There were a few ex-
planations of how this might be done or par-
ticularly of the kinds and amounts of payments 
that tenants might make to give the landlords a 
return on the investments. Much the same idea 
is involved in the suggestion that the way to 
obtain improvements is for the landlord to furnish 
the materials and for the tenant to do the work. 
Approximately the same percent of respondents, 
though not necessarily the same ones, suggested 
that longer leases are needed to encourage farm 
improvements as suggested that same solution to 
increase income, conservation and livestock num-
bers. 
REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH . LEASE 
All respondents were asked the question, "Are 
you satisfied with your rental agreement?" The 
reasons for dissatisfaction were summarized in 
the same manner as were the suggestions to im-
prove leasing practices. These reasons substan-
tiate the suggestions offered to improve leases in 
the community. Three of the more detailed com-
ments are quoted below as an illustration that 
individual tenants are aware of the incentive con-
ditions and of some of the needs for changes in 
leases: 
" .•. As far as shares, cash rent (I am satisfied), 
however, I do think I would like a better agreement 
on fertilizers, grass seed, soil conservation and an 
agreement of some sort that would enable the landlord 
to improve buildings and yards. . . ." 
"I think that if we could have longer lease, say 5 
years, it would pay me to help pay on fertilizer and 
lime and it would help both of us out. Where (we 
have a lease for) 1 year we might have to move 
next year and leave what we have done." 
"I have almost as much money invested in machin-
ery as the landlord has invested in the farm and my 
upkeep and taxes amount to almost as much as the 
landlord's upkeep and taxes. Now, when this % and 
% rental agreement started it was to be the land-
lord's capital investment or farm against the renter's 
labor. So either I am not getting much for my labor 
or nothing for my investment in machinery. True, I 
can get the farm work done faster with modern ma-
chinery than without it, but I feed much more stock 
than what the farm will produce feed for which would 
be impossible without the machinery. Since I feed 
more stock over and beyond the amount the farm will 
produce feed for and the landlord doesn't provide 
capital for livestock and feed and yet dividing the net 
profit half and half, it seems to me that I do not re-
ceive full benefits for my efforts and labor put forth. 
Maybe I am wrong in my thinking but I am interested 
in what others do. In this day and age I know it is 
hard to know what is fair for both the renter and 
landlord." 
Whether or not respondents were aware of 
cause-effect relations between length of lease and 
level of farm income, length of lease was one 
of the main reasons for dissatisfaction with the 
rental agreement (table 56). Likewise, present 
practices in sharing of expenses, lack of improve-
ments or the condition of improvements, and lack 
TABLE 55. PERCENT OF TENANTS MAKING SPECIFIC SUG-
GESTION, AMONG TENANTS OFFERING SUGGESTIONS 
TO ENCOURAGE FARM IMPROVEMENTS. 
I 
I,alldlord furnish 
lucre""", IClIgth Morc livestock- Landlord provide materials and ten-
Stat. of lease .hare I.ases more facilities ant do the work 
Ind." ........ 11 7 46 6 
Iowa ......... 15 5 47 14 
Kall .......... 12 3 16 17 
Minn ......... 12 2 58 10 
Neb" ........ 15 3 46 10 
S. D .. " ...... 14 3 48 10 
Wi ........... 7 ................ 64 8 
TABLE 56. PERCENT OF TENANTS MAKING SPECIFIC 
SUGGESTION, AMONG TENANTS EXPRESSING 
DISSATISF'ACTION WITH THEIR LEASE. 
Landlord 
not inter-
Noo. e.ted in Expenses Cash rent No oppor-
Lease poor conserving not on hay or tunity 
too improve- orim- .hared pasture for joint 
State short ments proving fairly too high planning 
----------------
Ind ............. 7 12 21 31 3 
Iowa" .......... 10 24 16 45 6 5 
Kan ............. 22 21 39 27 3 4 
Minn ............ a 16 14 31 4 1 
Neb .. " " ....... 13 23 32 24 5 3 
S. D ............ 12 16 23 33 7 4 
Wis .......... ". 6 18 13 44 2 
of interest on the part of the landlord in improv-
ing or conserving the farm were mentioned as rea-
sons for dissatisfaction. Few respondents stated 
that cash rent for hay or pasture was too high 
(but the proportion here would be greater if 
expressed for those actually paying a cash rent 
for hay or pasture). 
Some respondents gave one or more reasons for 
dissatisfaction even though they made no sug-
gestions for improving rental practices. By in-
ference, removing the source or cause of the dis-
satisfaction would be an improvement in leasing 
arrangement. 
One outstanding feature of the reasons listed 
by tenants for dissatisfaction with their leases is 
that these dissatisfactions are expressed against 
customary practices. Possibly the source of the 
dissatisfactions is that practices of the commu-
nity have been applied without sufficient adapta-
tion to the details of the particular case. 
Suggestions to improve leases involve no out-
standing departure from custom. Relatively small 
percentages of tenants propose change in the 
length of lease; and length of lease does vary in 
practice. The changes most frequently proposed 
are made up of changes in management practices 
that affect the income of the farm. Seemingly, 
the change is proposed at an operational level only 
rather than in terms of provisions in leases to 
encourage or bring about the result desired. 
SOLVING LEASING PROBLEMS 
NEED FOR METHOD OF ANALYZING LEASING 
PROBLEMS 
This study developed from the continuing re-
quests by landlords and tenants for information 
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and advice on how to handle problems in farm 
tenancy. The variety of requests received by the 
state agricultural experiment stations, extension 
services and federal agencies prompted a survey 
of current leasing practices. Even in the begin-
ning stages of the study, it became evident that 
an inventory of practices would not be sufficient; 
practices would need to be subjected to systematic 
analysis to be of assistance in solving leasing 
problems. 
Only part of the solutions to problems can be 
found in the experiences of landlord and tenants, 
because satisfactory solutions to some phases of 
the problems have not been developed in practice. 
The questions bothering some tenants or some 
landlords may be answered by pointing out to 
them the methods that others have used in han-
dling similar difficulties. But custom also per-
petuates error. It is only in departure from un-
satisfactory customary practices that contribution 
is made to problem solution. Guides or norms of 
behavior for future action cannot be abstracted 
from history alone, because the past does not con-
tain all the experiences of the future. Use of 
current practice as the only guide to future 
actions is the same as using custom as a perfect 
model. 
Need for a systematic method of analyzing 
leasing problems arises from the existence of 
problems that landlords and tenants have been 
unable to solve for themselves. The great variety 
of questions raised by landlords and tenants dem-
onstrate the necessity of reducing these ques-
tions to comparable types and applying principles 
of analysis to each type. 
The great variety of details involved in current 
leasing practices throughout the areas covered by 
this study demands that the proposals for changes 
in practice to solve the problems be stated in 
broad perspective. Only the general patterns of 
change can be specified. Solution in the individual 
case is a matter for separate and detailed analysis. 
There is no hope for solution to the economic 
problems of leasing, either in the individual case 
or in all cases together, without a workable frame-
work of analysis for the problems involved. The 
tenant and the landlord need an economic ra-
tionale, a system of calculating, a method of de-
termining what to do and how to do it in develop-
ing the terms of a lease and in operating the 
farm under the lease. This economic frame of 
thinking is the same for the two parties even 
though they contribute different resources to the 
agreement. 
For purposes of this study, a lease is defined 
as an agreement within a farm firm, between a 
landlord and a tenant, concerning the use of re-
sources for a given time period and at a named 
price. The purpose of the lease is two-fold: (1) 
to provide the basis for combining resources in 
production and (2) to distribute income to re-
source owners within the farm firm. 
Efficiency in resource utilization is a test that 
can be applied to any farm, and the tests of 
efficiency are the same for all farms. A leasing 
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problem exists whenever characteristics or terms 
of the lease cause resources to be used inefficiently 
or cause unintended transfer of income from one 
party to the other. This distinction separates 
leasing problems as such from the problems of 
organization and management that are common 
to all farms. 
CHANGES IN PRACTICES TO SOLVE 
LEASING PROBLEMS 
Current leasing practices have been analyzed in 
the two preceding sections to determine whether 
leases contain four incentive conditions and to ex-
amine the economic implications of selected char-
acteristics of leases, renters and landlords. From 
this analysis, it follows that several changes in 
practices are needed to solve the problems with 
which landlords and tenants are confronted. The 
analysis assumed specific functions for the lease 
and was directed toward lease oriented problems. 
The changes in practices are discussed below in 
broad perspective and in categories that individ-
uals may apply to their own problems. In essence, 
the solution to lease oriented problems of the indi-
vidual landlord and tenant rests in systematic 
analysis, applying economic principles to the par-
ticular set of conditions. The two parties together 
will need to work out the details that will accom-
plish the desired results, and adjustments will 
necessarily take the form of reasonable approxi-
mations because of the complexity of some of the 
problems. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The striking similarity of practice after prac-
tice, within and between economic areas, in itself 
prompts questions as to how well the terms of 
individual leases meet the requirements on the 
farms they cover. Lack of variation in practice 
and lack of difference between selected sets of 
terms or of characteristics of the lease, the renter 
or the landlord, suggest that these many and 
broad details which are the same cannot possibly 
match the variations in farms and the differences 
between desires and abilities of tenants and land-
lords. These details require further study. 
Some of the comparisons of characteristics 
have no implications for use of resources or in-
come distribution between landlords and tenants. 
Whether the lease is oral or written, for example, 
is of little consequence if the agreement is com-
plete and serves to encourage good husbandry. 
The fact that shares of crops paid as rental are 
the same whether the tract has been rented for 
1 year or 10 years or whether the renter is a part-
owner or a full tenant mainly serves to describe 
existing situations. 
Other comparisons of selected characteristics 
of leases do emphasize necessity for adjustments 
in leasing practices. In many instances, the lack 
of variation is the strongest evidence of the need 
for adjustments in practice. For example, the 
tendency for l-year length of lease regardless of 
type of lease, provisions for termination notice or 
kinds of products that are the major source of 
income are indications that not enough adapta-
tions are made in individual cases. Of still more 
consequence, the fact that shares of crops paid as 
rental vary little within areas strongly implies 
that land rental and land productivity are out of 
line on many farms. These details require further 
study. 
The lack of variation in rental practices within 
economic areas demonstrates the need for pro-
grams of education in which tenants and land-
lords will be encouraged to make adaptations to 
fit the particulars of their situations. Among the 
more important of these adjustments would be 
that of getting away from standardized fractional 
shares of crops and of expenses. The share to be 
paid as rental is a problem for solution on the 
individual farm, through careful analysis, and is 
not a "given" proposition to which other items 
are adjusted. As further illustration, the lack of 
differences between types of landlords as to length 
of termination notice indicates the need for a 
generalized program of education for all, pointing 
out the need for longer termination notice. This 
has many implications for use of resources on 
leased farms. A high proportion of 1-year leases 
with short notices means that both landlords and 
tenants operate in a short-run environment. The 
tendency would be for enterprises to be selected 
for completion within 1 year. The short-term out-
look would tend to decrease investments by both 
parties in necessary or desirable improvements. 
The above evidences demonstrate need for 
change in sources and kinds of information upon 
which decisions are made concerning terms of 
the lease. Especially, this means less use of cus-
tom and more analysis of the details of the indi-
vidual case. Deciding that the share of corn 
should be one-half because one-half is the prevail-
ing share in the area appears comparable to 
deciding that $265 is the appropriate price for a 
specific dairy cow because the average price of 
all cows for the past year was $265. 
Customary practice may be used as a guide, a 
measure of alternative opportunity and as a point 
of departure for the individual case. No two farms 
are the same, produce the same or give the same 
return per unit of input. There is, therefore, no 
logical reason for the annual price for the use of 
land, namely the cash or share rental, to be the 
same on all farms in an area. Similar reasoning 
applies to other terms and provisions of the lease. 
SELECTING THE TYPE OF LEASE 
Lack of variation in numerous details between 
types of leases indicates need for changes in prac-
tice concerning choice of type of lease. Although 
the selecting process for two given parties might 
be looked upon as a special problem in source of 
information, selection of the general form of the 
agreement is important enough to be studied by 
itself. 
The type of lease that will fit the particular 
case depends upon the characteristics of the farm, 
the financial position and interests of the land-
lord, and the abilities, interests and financial posi-
tion of the tenant. The type of lease to be used 
needs to be fitted to what the two parties are will-
ing and able to do. 
One or another type of lease is more common 
than others in most economic areas (table 17). If 
competition for farms is keen and tenants are 
bidding actively against each other to obtain the 
use of land, there may be little opportunity for a 
tenant to obtain the kind of lease he wants. The 
only opportunity may be to take a farm under a 
type of lease that the landlord prefers. But in 
any given case the two parties to a prospective 
arrangement stand to benefit by choosing that 
arrangement which best fits their purposes. 
TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE 
The main type of change in practice to solve 
leasing problems is in the process of selecting the 
terms and provisions of the agreement. There is 
need for more landlords and tenants to figure out 
and agree upon the detail of terms that fit their 
particular situations. Although there is evidence 
that much is already being done by adjustments 
in minor provisions of leases, the evidence also 
shows that numerous practices are standard from 
lease to lease. One-year terms, short termination 
notices, fixed shares of crops and of expenses, and 
contribution of selected factors by the tenant are 
illustrations (see tables 6-51). Because of the 
variations among farms, parts of farms, build-
ings, input-output ratios, and more important, in 
the financial abilities and interests of landlords 
and tenants, standardized practices cannot fit 
equally well in all cases. 
If resources are to be used efficiently on rented 
farms and economic problems of leasing are to be 
solved to the satisfaction of both landlords and 
tenants, it follows that the planning process in 
the development of each leasing arrangement 
must be systematic and detailed. The first step in 
this planning process may well be for the land-
lord and the tenant together to determine a care-
fully devised program of operation for the farm. 
What does it require in inputs of all kinds to 
make the farm or tract efficient? Attention then 
can be given to terms in the lease that will bring 
this plan to fruition. 
The rates of payment and the division of costs 
and expenses are the most important points of 
decision in any leasing arrangement. These terms 
determine the distribution of income to the par-
ties. There is a dynamic cause-effect relation be-
tween them and the achievement of the goals or 
purposes held by the parties to the agreement. 
Actual calculation and determination of the rates 
of payment and the method of sharing costs and 
returns is a complex problem because of the many 
uncertainties as to future prices and costs. The 
principles to be followed in the calCUlation process 
and the guides to achieve maximum income for 
both landlord and tenant are fairly simple once 
they are fully understood. The further applica-
tion of these principles is really the crux of the 
economics of farm leasing. 
The conditions required for any farm firm to 
maximize profits from given quantities of re-
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sources are the same. Four incentive conditions 
are needed to encourage efficient operations and 
prevent income transfers under a lease. Few 
leases contain all four incentive conditions (tables 
2-16). 
Absence of one or more of the four incentive 
conditions from many leases cannot be interpreted 
as justification for a rapid and wholesale revision 
in leasing practices and in provisions of all leases. 
These and other changes in practices are matters 
for individual landlords and tenants to study, 
understand and apply. 
WRITTEN LEASES 
Written leases may be used as a method of put-
ting other changes in practices into effect, but 
change from oral to written leases is a change 
in practice. There are two main reasons why 
more written leases should be used. First, written 
leases are less subject to error. The written pro-
vision is specific and fewer disagreements should 
develop through time as to exact content of the 
agreement. Second, the process of writing out 
the details of an agreement may itself be cause 
for more careful discussion and analysis of pro-
visions. 
PERIODIC EXAMINATION 
Leases are devised to cover given time periods. 
Changes in provisions are needed through time. 
The end of one period is a convenient time for 
revisions to be made for a subsequent period. 
Periodic examination of the provisions of the lease 
should give both parties to the agreement oppor-
tunity to remove causes of difficulties, and to make 
adjustments to changes in technology, costs and 
prices as those changes take place. 
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
CHANGES IN LEASING PRACTICES 
Changes in leasing practices will have many 
and far-reaching effects upon organization and 
operation of both rented and owner operated 
farms. Changes within farm firms will affect 
allocation of resources between farms. 
Adjustments within leased farms will effect 
both the amount of income and its distribution-
wherever terms of the lease as such are retarding 
efficient operations or changing income distribu-
tions in present practice. Detailed study is needed 
to point out where these are taking place; the 
present analysis stops short of such detail and 
evidences only that many leases do not contain 
incentives for efficient operation. These adjust-
ments will need to be made slowly, as an evolu-
tionary process rather than as a revolutionary 
one, subject to the understanding and will of both 
parties to the agreements. 
The more important consequences of changes 
in leasing practices may be I'oummarizerl as fol-
lows: 
1. Income transfers between parties in leasing 
agreements have important policy implications, 
not only to farm tenancy, but also to the welfare 
of all persons employed in agriculture. Transfer 
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of a few hundred dollars of income may be suffi-
cient to cause an operator to continue operation on 
one unit alone whereas otherwise he would be 
inclined to rent additional land, move to another 
farm or enter another occupation. In other words, 
income transfers may contribute directly to re-
source inefficiency and retard economic adjust-
ments by holding people in agricultural employ-
ment or preventing the transfer of land resources 
between farms. Likewise, income transfers from 
tenants to landlords may influence the prices at 
which land is sold, and may retard the sale of less 
than economic units either to tenants or to per-
sons who are already owner-operators and are 
attempting to enlarge their operating units. These 
problems and their implications require more 
study. 
2. Greater sharing in the decisions of day-to-
day operations and in the division of expenses 
would tend to move the share lease in the direction 
of a full partnership in the economic and legal 
meaning of partnership. To protect both parties 
and to satisfy their interests, concurrent develop-
ments in the agreements will have to be provided 
to get away from the full personal liability that 
characterizes the legal partnership. This calls 
for changes in legal practice to make economics 
and law work together. 
3. The economic requirements of the lease need 
not interfere or change substantially the scope of 
decisions made by tenants or their freedom of ac-
tion in making decisions in the operation of the 
leased farm. This, too, can be a matter of agree-
ment between landlord and tenant when the lease 
is drafted. 
4. Any greater detail of participation in deci-
sions and sharing of all variable expense (in share 
leases) calls for more and better farm bookkeep-
ing. But this in itself can contribute to the solu-
tion of some of the economic problems in leasing. 
The individual has little knowledge of specific 
changes to make in farming operations if there is 
no record of income and expenses. 
5. The bargaining process between landlord 
and tenant can be strengthened. If both parties 
go through a careful economic analysis pointed 
toward the objectives of obtaining the highest 
possible returns for each, then differences of opin-
ion on particular points can be matters of negoti-
ation. The fact that shares of crop paid as rental 
seldom depart from a few standardized shares in 
broad economic areas clearly implies that there is 
little bargaining done on one of the basic phases 
of the lease. 
Economic principles and economic analysis are 
the foundation upon which effective bargaining 
can be developed. This analysis provides a frame-
work of thinking for either party to come to con-
clusions concerning his own resources or contribu-
tions and, at the same time, can give him an 
appreciation and understanding" of thm;e or the 
other pal'ty. 
6. Separate and distinct payments for the main 
types of resources used in the rented farm give a 
basis for arriving at workable arrangements. If 
specific rental payments are made for the housing 
facility and for fixed improvements that contrib-
ute directly to production, appropriate adjust-
ments will also be needed in cash rental rates and 
in share rentals. The economic rationale behind 
these specific payments is only that of making it 
possible for each party to figure out what each 
type of resource contributes to the income of the 
firm and thereby allow the resource owner to 
obtain a return from each resource. Pricing the 
factors separately should also contribute to more 
effective bargaining between landlords and ten-
ants. 
7. Determining the rental is a problem common 
to all rental agreements. If this basic problem 
can be solved in practice so that tenants and land-
lords together can determine the appropriate 
charges, the minor details of what to do about 
particulars will largely disappear. Circumstances 
differ from farm to farm, tenant to tenant and 
landlord to landlord. A set of economic principles 
that can be applied to any given situation by the 
parties themselves is needed as the basis for deci-
sions on the many details that are matters of 
judgment, opinion or outlook, and often also de-
pend upon the alternative opportunities available 
to both parties. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study examines leasing practices on a 
regional basis, using economic areas as the geo-
graphic unit of study and selected characteristics 
of leases, renters and landlords. Mail question-
naires were the primary source of information. 
The analysis has dealt with only some of the more 
important aspects of leasing practice at the in-
tra-firm level. 
Findings serve to demonstrate the need for ad-
ditional research, especially upon details or prob-
lems that could not be encompassed in this one 
investigation. Several specific needs have been 
stated in previous discussion. The most important 
problems for further research are outlined briefly 
below in broad frameworks. Delimitation of re-
search problems and details of research projects 
including procedures to be followed in analysis of 
selected problems are themselves matters for care-
ful study. 
ALTERNATIVE TENURE FORMS 
Little is known about the relative efficiencies of 
alternative leasing arrangements and the specific 
influences of tenure upon the allocation and use 
of resources. Likewise, there is need for careful 
analyses of the factors and forces that explain the 
behavior patterns of landlords, tenants and owner-
operators. The different environments under 
which operating decisions are made presumably 
have effect upon the kinds of decisions made; for 
example, differences in planning horizons, pur-
poses in land ownership and alternative income-
earning opportunities affect resource allocation. 
More specifically, the purpose of inquiry is to find 
empirical evidence of mis-allocations of resources 
and of income transfers resulting from conditions 
of tenure. This would include analysis of the re-
lations between intra-farm and inter-farm alloca-
tions of resources, analysis of operator reactions 
to incentive conditions and analysis of the effects 
of income transfers between resource owners. 
DETERMINING THE RENTAL RATE 
The present study takes as given the shares of 
crops or livestock and the cash rental. No analysis 
was made of the methods by which landlords and 
tenants arrived at the decisions about rental rates. 
In addition to the development of an economic 
rationale or system of analysis by which individ-
uals can arrive at decisions concerning rental 
rates, there is need for study of factors affecting 
the bargaining powers of landlords and tenants. 
Also, there is need for study of the evaluation 
problems, particularly for land, buildings, labor 
and management. 
AGENT MANAGED FARMS 
Increasing numbers of tenant-operated farms 
are managed by agents of the landlord. Few em-
pirical data are available to indicate the effect of 
agents upon the operation of the rental market, 
land prices, or terms and provisions of leases. The 
leasing practices and terms posed by professional 
farm managers, lawyers and attorneys, represent-
atives of credit institutions, relatives of landown-
ers and other types of agents will need to be 
directed to benefit both landlord and renter. 
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
Price s.upport for agricultural products, conser-
vation, credit and other government programs 
affect resourse use and income distribution to re-
source owners. Careful studies of these influences 
over which parties to a leasing agreement have 
no control may be able to point out revisions in 
programs that can serve to make the programs 
more effective in purpose. 
OTHER PROBLEMS 
Tenants have difficulties in obtaining farms. 
Landlords have difficulties in obtaining tenants. 
Two types of problems are involved. One is in the 
lack of information about rental opportunities. 
The other is in the selection processes by which 
the two parties reach agreement with the landlord 
choosing among several possible tenants and the 
tenant making choice between farms and land-
lords. Research upon this type of weakness in the 
rental market has opportunity of benefiting both 
landlords and tenants. 
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APPENDIX 
COOPERATIVE EXTENSION WORK 
in 
AGRICULTURE AND HOME ECONOMICS 
STATE OF IOWA 
REGIONAL FARM RENTAL PRACTICES STUDY 
Iowa State College and U. S. Department of Agriculture 
Cooperating 
Dear Sir: 
Those who rent farms ask many questions about rental arrange-
ment. Who pays new expEnses 1 How can agreements be made to 
caver changes in farming method.? How can farm and home improve-
ments be added? How can livestock be handled 1 
You can help answer these questions. By filling out the following 
questionnaire you will be helping yourself and other renters. Please 
take time to complete and send your reply in the enclosed self addressed 
envelope. It does not take a stamp. A copy of the report will be sent 
to you. Your reply will be appreciated and will be kept strictly con-
fidential. 
Sincerely yours. 
MAURICE W. SOULTS 
Assistant Director 
Extension Service 
A. ABOUT YOUR FARM OPERATIONS IN 1951 
1. How many acres did you farm in 1951? ______ --, Acres 
2. Of this, (a) how many did you own? Acre. (b) How many 
did you rent? Acres 
3. What Is your age? ___ Years 
4. What were the three main products sold from this farm In 19511 (name the specific crop, livestock or livestock product) (a) ___ _ (b) (C)I _____ ---:.,..,.---
5. Number of livestock on hand on December 15, 1951 were: (a) Beef 
cows (b) Otber beef cattle _____ (c) Dairy cows 
and heifers (d) Sows (e) Other hogs and 
pIgs (f) Sheep and lambs (g) Hens ___ _ (h) Broilers (i) Other poultry ____ _ 
6. From how many landlords did you rent in 19511 _____ Numher 
NOTE: Please answer the remaining questions for only One landlord 
and for the rental agreement with that landlord, if you rent from 
more than one. Answer for the one whose name is first in the 
alphabet. Example: It the names are Smith and Jones, anSwer for 
Jones. 
B. ABOUT THE LANDLORD 
1. Check V whether land is owned by: Individual-- Estate __ _ 
Partnership ___ Corporation ___ Government ___ Other 
2. ~any acres did you rent from this landlord in 19511 __ _ 
Acres 
S. Check V whether landlord Is: Active farmer ___ Retired farmer 
--- Business or professional man ___ Widow of farmer __ _ 
Nonfarm widow Other ____ _ 
4. What relation Is landlord to you? To your wife? 
5. What is landlord's age? ____ Years 
6. In making the rental agreement for this land, did you deal: (check 
V) (a) Directly with the landlord? ___ (b) With his agent or 
manager? __ _ 
7. In discussing the operation of this land, do you deal: (check V) 
(a) Directly with the landlord? ___ (b) With his agent or 
manager? __ _ 
C. ABOUT THE RENTAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS LANDLORD 
1. Do you live on thl. rented land? Yes ___ No __ _ 
2. Was the rental agreement with this landlord in writing in 1951? Yes ___ No __ _ 
S. How many years have you rented this land? ___ Years 
4. What month of the year does the agreement begin? Month_~_----,:-_ 
5. What period does agreement cover? One Year ___ Three Years 
___ Five Years ___ Other __ _ 
6. How much notice is required to end the agreement? ____ Months 
7. Did you pay cash for the use of all or any part of this land in 19511 Yes ___ No ___ , 
8. If any cash was paid, how much was paid per acre for: Hay land? 
$--~ Pasture? $ ___ Building lots? $ ___ How much for: 
Buildings? $ ___ Other? $ ___ Total farm? $,_~ __ 
9. Crop shares: Indicate below the use of this land In 1951 and the 
landlord's ahare of the crops, such 8S: none. 113.2/5, 1/2, or all. 
Crop Acres Landlord Share 
a. Corn 
b, Oats 
c. Soybeans 
d. Wheat 
e. Alfalfa seed 
Crop Acres Landlord Share 
m. Clover seed 
q. Permanent 
pasture 
r. Rotation 
pasture 
u. Legume hay 
v. Other hay 
10. Does your landlord own or receive income from any livestock covered 
by this rental agreement? Yes ____ No ____ If yes, Indicate 
below the landlord's share of ownership and of sales, such as: none, 
l/S. 2/5, 1/2, or all. 
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Kind of 
Livestock 
a. Dairy cattle 
b. Dairy calves 
c. Beef cattle 
d. Beef calves 
e. Hogs 
f. Sheep 
g. Poultry 
Livestock 
Products 
h. Dairy products 
I. Eggs 
j. Wool 
Landlord's Share 
of Ownership 
Landlord's Share 
of Sales 
Landlord'. Share of 
Product Sales 
11. Expenses. Indicate the shares of each cash expense on this land, 
for both you and the landlord such as: none, 1/3, 2/5, 1/2, or all. 
Share Paid By 
Item of Expense Renter Landlord 
a. Fertilizer 
b. Lime 
c. Seed, small grain 
d. Seed, corn 
e. Seed, grass 
f. Seed, legume 
g. Seed, soybean 
i. Hired labor 
j. Combining small grain 
k. Combining soybeans 
1. Hail insurance 
m. Government crop insurance _____ _ 
12. 
p. Tractor fuel 
q. Weed spray materials 
r. Weed spraying, hired 
s. Livestock feed purchased 
t. Breeding fees 
u. Veterinary expense 
y. Hay balling 
aa. Silo filling 
bb. Corn picking 
dd. Machinery repair 
ff. Building repair labor 
gg. Building repair materials 
jj. Fence repair labor 
kk. Fence repair material 
nn. Electricity 
pp. Terracing 
Machinery and equipment. Indicate 
farm machinery and equipment used 
1/3, 2/5, 1/2, or all. 
Kind of 
the shares of ownership of 
on this 1and, such as: none, 
Share Owned by 
Equipment Renter Landlord 
a. Tractor 
b. Truck 
c. Combine 
d. Corn picker 
e. Field chopper 
f. Hay bailer 
g. Weed sprayer 
h. Manure spreader 
i. Milk cooler 
j. Milking machines 
k. Milk house 
m. Hay drier 
n. Grain drier 
o. Brooder houses 
p. Movable poultry houses 
q. Movable hog houses 
r. Electric fence 
s. Feed grinder 
v. Terracing equipment 
w. Fertlizer equipment 
D. ABOllT IMPROVING RENTAL AGREEMENTS 
1. Are any changes in rental agreements needed. to increase the .in-
come received by both renters and landlords 10 your communIty? Yes ___ No __ _ 
Describe: 
2. Are any changes in rental agreements needed to Increase soil con-
servation practices on rented farms in your community? Yes __ _ 
No--
Describe: 
3. Are any changes in rental agreements needed t!' encourage keeping 
more livestoek on rented farms In your commumty? Yes ___ No 
Describe: 
4. Are any changes in rental agreementa neceded to encourage making 
improvements in buildings and land on rented farms in your com-
munity? Yes ___ No __ _ 
Describe: 
5. Are you satisfied with your rental agreement? Yes ___ No __ _ 
Why or why not? 
Describe: 
